

The End of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Last Man:

Examining the Ideas of Francis Fukuyama and
Samuel P. Huntington in Relation to the
Geo-Political Developments of
the Post-Cold War.

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the contrasting ideas of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* (1989) and Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993). My research will support Fukuyama's claims that the end of the Cold War marks a triumph for Western ideals and the spread of liberal democracy has produced a lasting order of peace and prosperity. The study will defend the existence of a New World Order and the notion that democracy is a universal concept from which to challenge Huntington's arguments of future conflict among civilizations. I will argue that Huntington's interpretation of civilizations is too simplistic and fails to acknowledge the extent to which globalization has increased economic interdependence between states.

The consequence of interdependence will be examined in relation to the social effects of globalization and the extent to which a universal consumer society is creating a global culture of mass consumption. In arguing that cultural tensions will be reduced by the effects of globalization, I will defend the idea of a liberal peace and the argument that democracies do not fight each other. The study will then address Fukuyama's concept of the Last Man at the end of the History and the concerns that this raises for stunting social advancement. Future societies will not necessarily degenerate into apathy and nihilism as the Last Man will live in a world governed by market forces and will remain innovative and competitive. Furthermore, individual pursuits for power and prestige will not threaten to undermine the social order as individual endeavour will be constrained to the economic sphere and will seldom extend to political or military ambitions.

The study will conclude that the spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism can secure a sustainable New World Order. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations will not occur due to increased economic interdependence and a culture of mass consumption. The study will argue that the intensification of national sentiments and a revival in fundamentalism will not necessarily lead to a full blown clash of civilizations. While antagonisms will still exist, these conflicts will be unable to produce a dialectical opposition capable of undermining the global balance of power. Therefore, the strength of opposition to global capitalism will be ineffective in preventing the spread of a consumer culture and civilizations will exist as benign entities within an increasingly globalized world.

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Abbreviations

AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APPCDC	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CEBR	Centre for Economics and Business Research
CRG	Centre for Research on Globalization
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	European Monetary Union
EU	European Union
G7	Group of Seven Leading Industrial Nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA
G8	Group of Eight Leading Industrial Nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA and Russia
G20	Group of Twenty Leading Industrial nations: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union (represented by the rotating Council Presidency and the European Central Bank).
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICC	International Criminal Court
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	Newly Industrializing Country
OAS	Organizations of American States
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TNC	Trans-National Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
US	United States (pertaining to the USA)
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Context

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a unipolar world in which democracy and capitalism had triumphed over all other ideologies. Suddenly a new paradigm in global politics emerged offering the hope of a New World Order in which conflicts could be resolved peacefully through international institutions and respect for the rule of law (Krauthammer, 1990). Francis Fukuyama argued that the beginning of this New World Order marked the end of History whereby liberal democracy and free-market capitalism would become the only viable system of social organization. Fukuyama's article *The End of History?* (1989) promoted the idea that liberal democracy had triumphed over communism and would produce a lasting social order which could be universally applied. But while Fukuyama proclaimed the end of History, Samuel P. Huntington had a far more pessimistic outlook. In *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993), Huntington argued that the post-Cold War would be characterised more by conflict and tension. This tension would emerge between civilizations where culture and nationality would form the fault lines of future conflict. Whereas the Cold War consisted of an ideological conflict between superpowers, the twenty-first century would be structured around a clash of civilizations emanating between different cultural traditions (Lewis, 1990). The ideas which Fukuyama and Huntington developed some twenty years ago have not only framed the post-Cold War debate but have also presented the prospect of two opposing geo-political realities which could define the nature of international politics in the twenty-first century.

Fukuyama's ideas rely heavily on the virtues of classical liberalism with the belief that democracy and capitalism can provide the universal aspiration of freedom and prosperity which all cultures would rationally aspire to. While this liberal triumphalist view appeared defensible in terms of ending the ideological debate which characterised the Cold War during the latter half of the twentieth century, it has become a lot harder to justify an end of History against the emergence of new ideologies, like the growth of radical Islam or the rival of nationalism, at the start of the twenty-first century. But despite the emergence of new ideological conflicts and the numerous challenges to *The End of History*, Fukuyama has remained adamant that the central tenets of his theory still remain valid.

In contrast, Huntington's evolutionary examination of global politics argued that the ideological conflict of the Cold War would be replaced by a Clash of Civilizations in which international events would be shaped by national identities like culture and religion. Here the growth of radical Islam and the economic rise of China and India would create the fault lines of future conflict between civilizations with opposing identities and interests. However, Huntington's study does not fully appreciate the social impact of globalization and the extent to which societies are being transformed by the effects of a global consumer culture. As individual societies become increasingly integrated through the effects of globalization, the fault lines of future conflict will become increasingly nullified and civilization itself may well exist as a benign entity having little importance in shaping the character of global events.

1.2. Aims and Objectives

The aim of this research has been to examine the contrasting ideas of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* (1992) and Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* (1997). The study essentially supports Fukuyama's claims that the spread of liberal democracy represents a triumph of Western ideals and will produce a lasting order of peace and prosperity. The research then examines the opposing argument of possible future conflict as outlined in Huntington's clash of civilizations. While Huntington rejects the idea of a liberal peace and argues that the future world order will consist of a series of conflicts between different civilizations with opposing cultures, the study will argue that Huntington's interpretation of civilizations is too simplistic and fails to acknowledge the diversity of culture. The research disputes Huntington's claim by arguing that the spread of global capitalism will increase economic interdependence and reduce the likelihood of unresolvable conflict. This argument is extended even further to argue that the long term effects of globalization will lead to a universal consumer society resulting in an erosion of cultural identity. So while cultural and national identity may strengthen in opposition to the effects of globalization, the study will argue that this reaction will not present any real challenge to the overall spread of global capitalism.

Globalization may ultimately lead to a global culture of mass consumption which could nullify cultural antagonisms between nation states. As the long-term effects of global capitalism leads

to greater economic interdependence, a universal culture of mass consumption will become increasingly evident. Therefore, globalization will create a global consumer whose tastes, values and aspirations will become increasingly universal. Some traditional societies may try to resist the spread of decadent consumer values, but this task will ultimately prove to be futile as Western consumer culture will eventually become a recognizable characteristic within all modern societies (Storper, 2000 and Tomlinson, 2007). As consumer culture spreads throughout the world it will penetrate new markets and affect the culture and values of host nations. In order to accomplish this, consumer products and services will be tailored to suit the aspirations of each nation and consequently each consumer society will project recognisable characteristics that appeal to the cultural sentiments of indigenous people. However, the long-term effects of increased globalization will create greater amounts of economic inequality and social fragmentation (Axford, 1996). Traditional societies may object to these ill-effects and adopt a reactionary stance designed to preserve existing cultural values in which case globalization may lead to an ideological polarization and create feelings of hostility towards liberal democratic values. But while opposition to globalism may increase and intensify, this reaction will prove ineffective and over time civilizations will still exist but only as benign entities incapable of disrupting the global balance of power.

The objective of this study will be to argue that the intensification of national sentiments and a revival in fundamentalism will not necessarily lead to a full blown clash of civilizations. Antagonisms based upon national sentiments and cultural conflicts will exist and may well intensify, but these conflicts will be unable to produce a dialectical opposition capable of undermining the global balance of power. Therefore, the strength of opposition to global capitalism will be ineffective in preventing the spread of consumer culture and civilizations will increasingly reflect the universal aspirations of a globalized world. Civilizations which remain strongly opposed to the spread of Western ideals will increasingly become marginalized and will exist as militant factions whose opposition will prove ineffective against the spread of modernization. Therefore, civilizations that remain committed to the preservation of traditional values will ultimately become increasingly alienated and disempowered. These civilizations will either have to embrace global capitalism or remain as rogue regimes

imprisoned by a culture that opposes modernization. Some civilizations may retain elements of an orthodox culture but modernization will increasingly lead to a growing population of consumers whose ideas, tastes and aspirations will increasingly reflect Western ideals.

Having established that Huntington's clash of civilizations will not occur due to the spread of democracy and capitalism, the research will then consider Fukuyama's depiction of the *Last Man* at the end of History (Russett, 1995, Friedman, 1999 and Stiglitz, 2006). The study will agree with Fukuyama's assertion that the Last Man will exist in a world of peace and prosperity, but will dispute the notion that society will be characterised by a sense of apathy and nihilism. Instead the Last Man will live in a world governed by market forces in which the demands of free-market enterprise will force societies to remain innovative and competitive. While democracy can provide citizens with freedom and equality, capitalism can satisfy the desire for material wealth and social recognition. But as the forces of free-market capitalism characterize the conditions of society, Fukuyama's Last Man will be compelled to live in a world that is precarious and increasingly competitive. In such an environment, peace and prosperity will be achieved but at the price of maintaining a social order characterised by high levels of fear and anxiety as the ill-effects of a capitalist society lead to greater levels of social inequality, exclusion and uncertainty. Therefore, the Last Man at the end of History will be compelled to pursue a sense of purpose and will not procrastinate as his unpredictable way of life will require constant vigour and determination.

1.3. Methodology and Approach

The study of international relations (IR) is complicated and one cannot apply a single methodology of fixed ideological assumptions to understand the way in which states behave (Kurki and Wight, 2010: 27-9). While "theory is inescapable" and cannot be removed from the interpretation of world events and has laid the foundation of IR theory as an academic discipline since the end of the First World War (Daddow, 2009: 36), a uniform theory of scientific enquiry cannot be applied to international politics. This is because "historical conditions are too varied and complex for anything that might plausibly be called 'a theory' to apply uniformly," observes Chomsky, and the world of global politics is simply too diverse and complex to be accurately interpreted by a rigid orthodoxy (1994: 120).

Furthermore, our perception of reality is limited to what we can experience and comprehend and our perception of what we can comprehend is also limited by experience. Then there is the problem of contextual bias in which the contents of global events are interpreted against the time and circumstances in which they occurred (Kurki and Wight, 2010: 29-31). So in order to avoid the dogma of theory and contextual prejudice, the study of global politics needs to be more comprehensive so as to account for the complexity of world events and to be more receptive to the changes that may occur. Therefore, this study will avoid using a fixed methodology of observation and deploy a reflexive theory of analysis that utilizes logical deduction and textual analysis from which to interpret key developments in global events (Bourdieu, 2003 and Eagleton-Pierce, 2011).

The application of reflexivity in IR attempts to identify the potential dilemmas and biases of research traditions so as to exercise a greater sense of awareness of the motivations involved in research and how these motivations can influence the results obtained (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011: 9). The practice of reflexive thinking has an established history of practice which can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's use of reason as a self-reflexive practice. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) Kant deploys a sense of reflexivity in order to examine the very concept of reason and establish the grounds on which reason can be justified as having the authority to defend an argument (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011: 3). Georg W. F. Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1807) argued that an individual's sense of self-consciousness emerged from a process of awareness of others as self-conscious entities leading to a sense of self-realization which would only be possible through a process of reflexive thinking. Bourdieu's defence of objective reflexion in *Homo Academicus* (1988) refers to identifying the organizational and mental structures that influence the researcher's work. In other words reflexivity considers how the researcher's findings will be influenced by their social conditions and personal interests (Bourdieu, 2003: 284-5). "As the term suggests, to be reflexive is to actively 'turn or bend back', to take account of the self in relation to other subjects and objects," explains Eagleton-Pierce (2011: 2). Therefore, reflexivity can enable the researcher to separate concepts from the social world in order to attain a greater sense of objective analysis and avoid the preconceived assumptions of various research traditions.

The study of IR has been divided into several paradigms or research traditions, such as, realism, liberalism, the English School, Marxism, postmodernism and a variety of other paradigms which have emerged from these main traditions. Each of these research traditions seek to analyse international events from differing perspectives and make various assumptions as to how states behave. Realists often examine the behaviour of states from the perspective of power, survival and pursuit of self-interest. Marxists are primarily interested in economic power arguing that international developments can be understood by examining economic conditions which determine the nature of global politics. Liberalism tends to focus on international organizations and promotes the idea of an international society which will respect the rule of law and conform to rational modes of cooperation. In providing a reflexive examination of global events, this study will try to avoid the prescribed limitations and fragmented nature of analysis which can arise from using a diverse range of research traditions. The diverse range of research traditions reflects both the complexity of international politics and our fragmented understanding of global events, and due to the complexity of the international system it is not possible to apply a single research tradition to analyse all the developments in global politics. Furthermore, a single universal theory does not exist. “We are far from a grand unified field theory of international studies, if such a thing is even possible,” states Lake, and therefore, “we will almost certainly continue to have many different partial theories that, at best, provide insight into limited pieces of the overall puzzle of world politics” (2011: 467).

Creating research traditions helps to simplify scholarly research into easily recognizable schools of inquiry but it also reduces a field of study into its lowest common denominator forcing the researcher to comply with a prescribed set of criteria. Empirical arguments are often narrowed so as to support a specific research tradition. So for example, realists tend to focus on the security policies of great powers which are better suited to defend arguments relating to power politics and the preservation of self-interest. Liberals often focus on economic policies and international cooperation in order to establish arguments supporting their liberal ideals (Lake, 2011: 470). As each research tradition narrows its field of empirical focus it becomes more selective and specialised and is better equipped to focus on what it does best. However, this narrowing of empirical focus also causes

traditions to increasingly ignore subjects which fall outside their area of specialism or do not conform to the principles of their orthodoxy. Once the researcher has adopted a specific research tradition they will look for evidence which affirms their beliefs and dismiss evidence which could undermine their beliefs. This produces a self-affirming exercise in which the researcher comes to believe “in the power of their tradition based on a selective reading of the possible empirical evidence,” explains Lake, and “it is here that research traditions move from the realm of objective social science to theology” (2011: 470). Scholars have strong professional incentives to defend their tradition against rivalling ideologies to the point of becoming engaged in a form of intellectual combat resembling an arms race. Academics compete for attention in order to establish a sense of recognition and this inevitably will influence their research. Failure to compete with a rival tradition creates the fear of losing the battle for intellectual supremacy and forces each tradition to compete in order to avoid the expectation of being dominated (Lake, 2011: 471). “Many think of this as a war,” explains Lake, “in which truth and justice will prevail only if their side wins” (2011: 477).

Western thought has been committed to searching for the truth since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, using the principles of logic, sense and reason as a means of attaining an objective reality. The relationship between truth and objectivity are closely related but the relationship is a contentious one as the term “objective” can have two distinct meanings. “In the first sense, an objective claim can be said to be a statement relating to external facts as opposed to internal thoughts and feelings,” explains Kurki and Wight (Dunne et al, 2010: 29). From this perspective something can be objective and still be independent from a system of beliefs. However, the term “truth” is typically used by philosophers and scientists to express a relationship between the world and a statement which aims to be objective. From this perspective the truth reflects the relationship between language and the physical world. In the second sense objectivity relates to a statement which is not influenced by the opinions of a subjective belief. Here objectivity forms the foundation of an academic discipline and provides the researcher with the basis of theoretical debate. Objectivity requires the researcher to remain open minded, dispassionate and impartial so as to avoid becoming emotionally attached leading to subjective bias and personal prejudice (Dunne et al, 2010: 30). But while remaining

objective may help to reduce subjective bias and prejudice no set of statements or theoretical approaches can ever be entirely accurate in representing the world exactly as it is (Dunne et al, 2010: 30). So while no approach can be said to be infallible, striving for an “objective” truth which is impartial and free from personal prejudice does at least place the researcher in a better position to try and make an accurate observation when applying a theoretical method of enquiry.

Most theoretical methods of enquiry seeking to examine the cause of social and political behaviour tend to rely upon models of deductive and inductive logic (Dunne, et al, 2010: 178-193). The deductive method uses a process of conceptual analysis and reflection to draw conclusions from a sequence of principles, while the inductive method simply uses empirical observations to search for patterns and generalizations from which to draw a conclusion (Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 14). The application of deductive logic places an emphasis on the processes of logical deduction but pays little attention to the means by which the evidence has been acquired or tested. This can cause the researcher to become selective with how the evidence is presented in support of the argument(s) being made. The deductive approach can also result in the suppression of pieces of evidence which are not considered favourable to the process of theoretical deduction as this could ultimately undermine the conclusion. Furthermore, the “world of political reality is in fact a jumble,” states Yong-Soo and, “we must thus assume a world far less predictable than is suggested by a formal form of deductive logic” (2012: 165). Therefore, by using a fixed methodology, the researcher is simply justifying their use of a selective approach and allowing the dogma of theoretical argument to restrict their observations. This selective examination of ideas results in a loss of diversity, causing the researcher’s analysis to become a self-affirming practice, in which they simply prove what they set out to prove.

In contrast, the use of inductive logic is restricted to examining empirical evidence and infers that through direct observations we can produce objective findings and develop generalisations concerning the nature of international events (Yong-Soo, 2012: 162). Empirical evidence relies on the idea that theoretical understanding can be obtained from an examination of facts ranging from past events to the present. As this process of inquiry relies upon observation it intends to be free from any theory whose established doctrine could lead to subjective evaluations. But the inductive approach of

giving priority to empirical facts without any prior theoretical assumptions is also problematic as it is impossible for the analyst to observe all the relevant facts. Furthermore, an individual's perceptions and beliefs may influence their sense of judgement in ways in which they are not even aware causing an empirical study to be undermined by subjective interpretation. In this case, using inductive logic as a theoretical method of enquiry has impaired and prevented a better understanding of global events. Therefore, it is essential to separate the content of political events from the context in which they have taken place. In order to accomplish this, the researcher needs to consider how the events they are interested in have been influenced by their own perception of contextual events (Burchill, et al, 2009: 307). By developing an awareness of subjective perceptions the researcher is able to free events from contextual prejudice and provide a far more objective interpretation of events.

In order to avoid the problems associated with fixed methodologies and contextual prejudice, this study will use a reflexive analysis of logical deductions derived from empirical observations. Using a reflexive theory and a more generalised approach to examining global events will not entail imposing a strict model of examination which would ultimately result in a restrictive practice replicating the problems associated with other methodologies. While a generalised approach can be ambiguous and may fail to address the intricate complexity of world events, the use of a reflexive theory can be more easily applied to a broad spectrum of events providing a more comprehensive method of analysis. This view is supported by King, Keohane and Verba in *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994), in which they argue that a general analysis is a vital component for understanding developments in global politics and "the question is less whether...a theory is false or not...than how much of the world the theory can help us explain" (1994: 101). In giving priority to a specific methodology, researchers are simply using theoretical assumptions to explain the behaviour of nation states. Therefore, this study will attempt to place a greater emphasis on the role of empirical investigation and less emphasis on making theoretical assumptions to explain world events, so as to provide a more impartial analysis which is not restricted by prescribed methodology.

Political theory is more effective when it questions the assumptions on which practical judgements rest as opposed to defending a prescribed methodology. It is difficult for researchers to

make useful observations based upon applying abstract theories which simply look for similarities between the cause and effect of developments taking place in global politics. Therefore, the political theorist should be an observer not a participant in the activity of research (Burchill et al, 1995: 288). Research in international relations (IR) should be flexible in its approach to understanding global events and avoid becoming restricted by the ideological assumptions of a prescribed methodology. “The role of theory for IR scholars should be as an evolutionary guide,” explains Yong-Soo, used to provide an “accurate explanation of the complex reality underlying world politics rather than as the simplification of it as a condition for the generation of predictive hypotheses” (2012: 170-1). While the use of greater flexibility will not find solutions to all the problems posed by other methods of empirical analysis a more multifaceted and open ended approach to examining developments in IR will alert researchers to the existence of other causes and factors influencing global politics. The arguments made in this study have attempted to provide a greater level of depth and refinement to existing bodies of knowledge and produce a more comprehensive examination of global events.

1.4. Argument and Observations

At the end of the Cold War the U.S. emerged as the world’s sole superpower able to act freely in a unipolar world. However, the New World Order was not entirely due to the triumph of Western liberalism over other ideologies but more the consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union which allowed the U.S. to become the last remaining superpower. Therefore, the U.S. was able to increase its position of power and influence due its unchallenged military capability and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conventional wisdom of realist scholars, such as Kagan (2008) and Mearsheimer (1990), is that unipolarity is inherently unstable and if the U.S. continues to act as a global hegemon this will inevitably lead to a backlash resulting in a return to a multipolar world of strategic balance. This argument assumes that a unipolar world is not durable and the terrorist attacks on September 11 are proof of its demise. But the events of 9/11 did not change the U.S., instead it provided an opportune moment for the U.S. to pursue its global ambitions. The threat of international terrorism created a sense of crisis which provided the U.S. with the excuse it needed to legitimize its actions and implement a set of policy measures which prior to 9/11 would have been simply unachievable.

Therefore, the so called “liberal moment” in world affairs was really the beginning of a unipolar order in which the U.S. emerged as the world’s last remaining superpower enjoying a position of a global hegemon reminiscent to that of Imperial Rome.

The perception of the U.S. pursuing a unilateral foreign policy in a world characterised by instability is too simplistic and fails to acknowledge the developments which have taken place since 9/11. Today a New World Order has emerged in the form of a trans-governmental order (Drezner, 2007). So despite the perception of U.S. hegemony and a “Bush doctrine” committed to unilateral action and fighting a war on terror, the U.S. has actually entered into a process of multilateral engagement pursuing inter-governmental cooperation. This has increasingly led to the formation of a trans-governmental order in which states are forming interconnected networks of exchange through which to attain a sense of global governance and pursue their national interests (Kirkup, 2011: 13-18). The aspirations of global governance and globalization reflect the ideals of liberal progress in which democracy and free-trade will help to promote an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. The view here is that the spread of democratic capitalism can increase economic cooperation between states and reduce the incentive for imperial wars of conquest. From this perspective the spread of democracy will ultimately lead to a New World Order of peace and prosperity. However, the spread of global capitalism in Non-Western countries does not necessarily indicate the spread of Western values. Huntington agrees that at a superficial level Western culture has spread throughout the rest of the world most notably in the form of mass consumption and popular culture. But at a fundamental level Western concepts are considered to be fundamentally different to that of traditional societies and their influence is fiercely opposed. It is from this perspective that Huntington dismisses the notion that the spread of popular culture is evidence of a universal civilization spreading Western values of democracy and capitalism. Therefore, Huntington argues that the notion of a “world community” or “Free World” is nothing more than a euphemism for Western dominance and the West’s continued domination over the rest of the world will become an on-going source of conflict (1993b: 39). Huntington goes on to explain that increased levels of global interaction will not necessarily lead to a common culture of interdependence. Liberal democratic ideals of individualism, secularism and

respect for human rights have not been readily embraced by orthodox cultures and increased levels of multi-cultural interaction have led to increased levels of tension and anxiety often resulting in hostility towards other groups. While non-Western civilizations will want to acquire wealth and technology for national development, Huntington rejects the assumption that increased modernization and economic development will result in a universal culture based on Western values.

As the world continues to globalize and interact through commercial exchange, there is a growing concern over the erosion of national and cultural identity. For some communities globalization represents a threat to existing customs and traditions. This ultimately results in the imposition of “western-centric” norms and practices on indigenous cultures resulting in a psychological crisis, feelings of alienation and provoking hostility (Axford, 1996: 158). But the effect of globalization does not necessarily require assimilating to a set of foreign values. So while the spread of globalization increases the spread of global culture, this does not necessarily mean the formation of a universal homogenous culture nor does it mean a reactionary backlash of patriotic sentiments designed to restore cultural integrity and national pride (Tomlinson, 2002 and Legrain, 2002). Global culture appears to find expression as an integrated component of national culture. By appealing to both proponents and opponents it exists as a culture which promotes homogenization and the sentiments of national cultural integrity (Lechner and Boli, 2008: 53). Therefore, at a superficial level globalization does pose a threat to cultural identity but on closer inspection it reveals a conflicting trend in which global capitalism actually helps to strengthen cultural identity. The New World Order of global capitalism with its materialist values of pleasure through consumption is challenging the traditional values of custom and community. Over time this global culture may erode away national sentiments and replace traditional values with a uniform identity or universal culture. As a cosmopolitan culture spreads throughout the world, civilizations will come to adopt the universal characteristics of a global culture. National sentiments and cultural identities may still remain but civilizations will have more to unite them than to divide them as the long term development of globalization will result in a greater sense of homogenization and sustained periods of peace and stability.

Fukuyama is adamant that the end of History signifies the triumph of liberal democracy over all other ideologies which in time will become universal. It is from this universal homogenous state that the Last Man will emerge living in a world of peace and prosperity (McCarney, 1992: 39-40). But Fukuyama is concerned that the long term pacifying effects of democracy combined with stability and material affluence will ultimately act as a disincentive for human endeavour. As the Last Man lives in a world of material abundance his base desires are satisfied and, no longer being compelled by a dialectical struggle for desire and recognition, he loses all sense of purpose (Strauss, 1968). This conjures up an image that humanity no longer possesses the drive and vigour necessary for self-advancement. But on closer inspection the Last Man will be exposed to the competitive forces of the free-market compelling him to adapt to the challenges of his environment and preventing social stagnation. While liberal democratic societies are able to provide their citizens with freedom and equality, capitalist enterprise not only satisfies the desire for material goods and wealth but also satisfies the desire for social recognition (Drury, 1992/3). Therefore, the restless ambition of the Last Man will not necessarily be thwarted by peace and prosperity as liberal democracy will still be able to accommodate these desires through non-destructive pursuits, such as, sport, commercial enterprise and individual endeavour. From this perspective globalization reflects the highest order of human society based upon the rationality of market forces in which individual self-interest and competition serve as the driving force and motivation for all human interaction.

1.5. Conclusion

This study will argue that the spread of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism following the Cold War has resulted in a sustainable New World Order. The arguments set out in Fukuyama's *The End of History* (1989) not only reflect the triumph of liberalism at the end of the twentieth-century but also a liberal pluralist's conception promoting the benefits of globalization. The New World Order is based upon a teleological conception of History in which the rationality of market forces, promoting individual self-interest and competition, serve as the driving force and motivation for all human endeavours. Proponents of globalization argue that the spread of democracy and capitalism represents the spread of Western civilization and the benefits of its achievements (Legrain, 2002 and Stiglitz,

2009). These achievements have spread throughout the rest of the world creating vast amounts of wealth and improving living standards. Global capitalism not only promotes the aspirations of freedom and democracy but also impacts upon the values of traditional societies influencing their attitudes and behaviour. As global capitalism spreads so does a consumer culture whose ideals increasingly reflect the aspirations of Western ideals. Therefore, the spread of globalization signifies the spread of Westernization and its achievements to other parts of the world.

Opponents of globalization argue that Western ideals of freedom and democracy and a commitment to free trade are nothing more than an attempt to dominate the global economy which will increasingly lead to instability (Hoffmann, 2002 and Waltz, 2000). Therefore, Huntington's article on *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) has a far more pessimistic view arguing that the end of the Cold War has been dominated by conflict and not cooperation. From this realist perspective the hope of achieving a stable world order appears unachievable and goes against the course of human History. In Huntington's view one should not expect the future to be a peaceful coexistence among states but a conflict between civilizations. However, the basis of this study will argue that the intensification of national sentiments and a revival in fundamentalism will not necessarily lead to conflict between civilizations. Huntington's clash will not occur due to increased levels economic interdependence and a culture of mass consumption which will reduce the antagonisms of national sentiments. Antagonisms will still exist but these sentiments will be unable to produce a dialectical opposition capable of undermining the global balance of power. Furthermore, individual pursuits for power and prestige will not threaten to undermine the social order as individual endeavour will be constrained to the economic sphere and will seldom extend to political or military ambitions. Therefore, the strength of opposition to global capitalism will be ineffective in preventing the spread of consumer culture and civilizations will exist as benign entities within an increasingly globalized world.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War was marked by a great sense of optimism that the world was about to enter a New World Order in which democracy, capitalism and respect for liberal institutions would become universal and replace the bipolar world of ideological confrontation. Exemplifying this sense of optimism was Francis Fukuyama who attained international fame with his controversial article *The End of History?* (1989) which was later expanded into an acclaimed book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Fukuyama's book provided a comprehensive examination of History illustrating how its evolutionary nature had reached a decisive point of conclusion which would determine the future of international developments. Drawing from the ideas of Hegel (1817) and Kojève (1947), Fukuyama made a bold speculation that History had been driven by a dialectical conflict between the collective and the individual. He argued that since the French Revolution (1789) a struggle had existed between the forces of collective control and individual freedom (Fukuyama, 1992: 4). This conflict had reached its zenith during the Cold War when freedom and democracy stood in opposition to the totalitarian ideology of communism. Writing in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama's essay *The End of History?* (1989), argued that Western liberal democracy had defeated communism signalling "the end of history as such: that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (1989: 4). As governments began to embrace freedom and democracy, Fukuyama proclaimed that this represented an historic victory for the West in which individualism had triumphed over the collective. This effectively supported the notion that the dialectical conflict between the collective and the individual had now ended, signifying the beginning of a new era in which democracy and capitalism would become a universal system of world order.

In contrast to this optimistic view of a New World Order opponents argued that the world of international politics would continue to be competitive and unstable, being characterised more by anarchy than stability. One such opponent was Samuel P. Huntington whose article *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) was far more pessimistic about the prospect of a New World Order and dismissed

the view that Western liberal democracy was in any way universal. His article was later expanded into a book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1997) which has become an important text in the study of international relations. In building on from the arguments put forward by Bernard Lewis in *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (1990), Huntington argued that the world was about to enter a new phase of development in which civilizations would clash (Lewis, 1990: 7-10). He maintained that while the clash of secular ideologies had ended after the Cold War this did not mean an end to conflict itself. Instead Huntington took an evolutionary approach to global events arguing that the world had passed through several stages of conflict ranging from the sovereignty of princely states, the nationalism of empires, to the ideologies of the Cold War. But now the world was entering into a new phase in which civilization itself would become a source of conflict (Huntington, 1993: 22-3). Furthermore, Huntington argued that liberal democracy would not result in a universal order of economic interdependence as the effects of globalization were more likely to provoke a cultural backlash against the perceived threat of Western imperialism (*ibid*, 1130). Therefore, interactions between civilizations are more likely to be characterized by confrontation than cooperation. It is from this perspective that cultural identity will become the central force in determining the future of global politics in the twenty-first century.

2.2. In Defence of Realism

The realist conception of international politics has followed a long established orthodoxy that nation states are essentially motivated by the pursuit of self-interest. The realist relies upon the past to understand the present, citing empirical evidence as a basis from which to make decisions and believes that morality has no place when insuring the protection of the state. The writings of Thucydides and his insights into the *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431B.C.) illustrates how a state's military and economic power will ultimately determine its fate (1972: 35-49). In *The Prince* (1532) Niccolò Machiavelli produces a hand book for autocrats providing an account of statecraft which is devoid of moral constraints (2009: 60-63). Therefore, realism supports the notion that international politics reflects a Hobbesian conception of the world in which international relations are conducted in a state of nature. Under these conditions there is no authority higher than the sovereignty of the state and each

state has to be ready to defend itself in an international arena where life and conditions are “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1973: 65). In contrast to realism, idealists adopt a normative approach to history and consider how the world could be or “should” be as opposed to simply accepting how it is. They are motivated by the belief that decisions should be guided by a sense of morality and respect for the rule of law. Idealists are concerned with how to bring about a more just and peaceful world by encouraging greater cooperation between states. They argue that states are rational and will be prepared to recognize and respect international laws when dealing with others (Roberson, 2002: 3). It is from this perspective that idealists favour diplomatic initiatives and international institutions in order to resolve conflicts and disputes.

Realists dispute the idea that international institutions can prevent conflict and cite empirical evidence to justify their claims. The League of Nations was an international organization created out of the destruction of the First World War. It originally intended to use a framework of law to provide collective security and act as an arbitrator in resolving international disputes. But this ambition proved to be flawed and the League was unable to contain the expansionist ambitions of Hitler’s Germany. The realist historian E. H. Carr criticised the League’s assertions that international law could prevent conflict. The idea that democracy, self-determination and international organizations could restrain an anarchic system was naïve. The League failed to restrain the militant imperial ambitions of Germany and Japan in the 1930’s which ultimately led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Carr argued that the outbreak of war was partly rooted in the idealist views of the Paris Peace Conference (1919-20) who had failed to realize that power politics is not the cause of war but a means of preventing it (Roberson, 2002: 1). He did not believe that international laws could be an effective means by which to prevent international conflict and argued that power was the primary element which governed international relations. This argument would become a central theme of Martin Wight’s *Power Politics* (1946) and form a key component of the English School of International Relations.¹ By the 1950’s this view was to be further reinforced by Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations* (1948) and the

¹ The English School of International Relations promotes the idea of an “international society” in which states conform to a set of “rules” which help to maintain a sense of order. Operating within an anarchical society, states conform to the structure of an international system, using mechanisms of diplomacy, international law and organizations to maintain a strategic balance of conflict and cooperation.

preservation of sovereign power became the accepted wisdom within the field of international relations. But this realist view of power does not entirely reject all moral convention. In *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939*, Carr noted that “realism devoid of morality lacks meaningful action,” and therefore, “for realism to work it must contain both elements of morality and reality” (1946: 92).

Before any sense of meaningful exchange can take place between nation-states the international order needs to conform to a sense of logical structure. This argument formed the basis of C. A. W. Manning’s *The Nature of International Society* (1962). By examining the role of diplomacy in global politics, Manning argued that there was an inherent sense of logic in the diplomatic exchange of nation-states which gave structure and order to the international system. This recognition of order in global politics is explored in *The Anarchical Society* (1977) in which Hedley Bull explained how the international system is not entirely in a state of anarchy and that some degree of order does exist. But this sense of order is incomplete. While tensions between states still exist, cooperation can be achieved through a mutual respect for international institutions. This cooperation has brought about the formation of an international society which should be able to alter the nature of conflict leading to an international order based upon societal values which are better equipped to manage conflict (Bull, 1977: 22-50). Therefore, Bull’s conception of an international society has emphasized the need for states to reduce their level of sovereignty arguing that the rights and freedoms of states are limited and subject to the rights of an international community (Roberson, 2002: 7). Furthermore, Bull argues that the common good of humanity could be advanced by moving beyond the selfish interests of nation states. It is this line of thinking that has led to the notion of combining elements of pragmatic realism within a legal framework of idealism so that the abstract ideals of an international order can come into existence. In *Beyond the Anarchical Society* (2002), Edward Keene challenges the realist notion that international relations can only be understood in Machiavellian terms. Just because the international system is anarchic does not mean that all states are compelled to follow the logic of *realpolitik*. Instead Keene argues that we should not underestimate the fact that states do cooperate with one another and respect the rules and regulations of an international order. Therefore, while the logic of anarchy

explains the basis of a states behaviour it is the rationale objectives of normative thinking which characterize the nature of an international society.

2.3. Structural Realism and Power Politics

During the 1970's new theories in international relations began to emerge which challenged the earlier conceptions of traditional realism. In *Power and Interdependence* (1977), Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed a theory of *complex interdependence* arguing that international organizations tend to reflect the collective interests of all states. The liberal ideas of Keohane and Nye have challenged the core assumptions of realism and emphasized the importance of non-state actors and economic issues in shaping world events. *The Theory of International Politics* (1979) by Kenneth Waltz is regarded as being one of the most influential books on international relations for a generation and established Waltz as a natural successor to Morgenthau. While Waltz ignores ethics in statecraft his theories on international politics reflect a sense of *structural realism* in which the state's behaviour is determined by the structure of the international system. Structural realists argue that conflicts arise from a lack of overarching power and authority in the international system. From this perspective, anarchy, hierarchy and the distribution of power will determine the character of the international order. In providing a deeper understanding of how states coexist in an international system Waltz's provides an argument of structural realism and self-help. He argues that in an anarchical system a balance of power is maintained regardless of a state's underlying intentions, i.e. when no institution can be relied upon to guarantee the state's survival a peaceful coexistence can be achieved by maintaining a balance of power. This is made possible by the realization that in a hostile environment, with no global government, the state has more to gain through cooperation with other states.

While Bull and Waltz have moved beyond the paradigm of power politics towards the prospect of an international order, other realists have taken a reactionary position and rejected the New World Order in favour of a multi-polar world. John Mearsheimer for example has disputed the notion of a liberal peace in his article *Back to the Future* (1990). Mearsheimer's thesis provides a structural analysis of the international system during the Cold War. He argued that the Cold War's bipolar world of ideological confrontation had ensured a "long peace" of relative stability, but now that this structure

had ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union the future would revert back to the past and resemble a history of instability (Mearsheimer, 1990: 29-32). While there is nothing distinctly original about Mearsheimer's observations and he offers nothing new, his analysis of the Cold War and his sense of pessimism is widely shared by other realists including Kenneth Waltz (1993: 45-50). Mearsheimer has stated that the optimism of a New World Order was based upon a misreading of history and the events of the Cold War. Furthermore, he speculated that after the fall of communism ethnic divisions would re-emerge and Eastern Europe would descend back into the turbulent conditions of the inter-war years (Mearsheimer, 1990: 33). The Bosnian War (1990-95) and the Kosovo Crisis (1999), provides evidence to support Mearsheimer's pessimistic prediction of ethnic division and regional conflict. So while realists concede that there has been a steady increase in democracy and free market reforms, the world after 1989 has seen a series of brutal conflicts with the break-up of Yugoslavia (1990-9), genocide in Rwanda (1994) and lawlessness in Somalia. It is against this background of brutality and chaos that realists have questioned the optimism of the New World Order.

The prediction that ethnic and regional conflict would follow the Cold War was not a pessimism shared by all. Charles Krauthammer predicted that the New World Order would resemble a unipolar world of increased stability achieved by U.S. hegemony. In the *The Unipolar Moment* (1990), Krauthammer predicted that the U.S. would emerge as the world's most powerful nation enjoying a position of global dominance comparable to that of ancient Rome. But Krauthammer also suggested that U.S. hegemony would be a "unipolar moment" lasting for no more than three to four decades suggesting the eventual return to a less stable multi-polar world (1990: 23-24). This view is reflected in Huntington's article *The Lonely Superpower* (1999), which dismisses the notion that the U.S. is a global hegemon and argues that the international system is destined to pass through a series of uni-multipolar decades with the U.S. as the primary super-power acting in cooperation with other major powers (1999:37). Furthermore, the spread of globalization after the Cold War has not replaced the nation state with a New World Order of international cooperation. Instead the international system is destined to return to a period of multi-polarity characterised by a strategic balance of competitive states, as described by Kenneth Waltz in *Structural Realism after the Cold War* (2000: 28-32).

Structural realists argue that international developments are essentially determined by the distribution of power and the way power is distributed will determine the nature of security. From this perspective power is considered to be the best means of ensuring global security, but while power is important in maintaining peace, it has to be utilized properly in order to maintain a sense of security.

Due to the competitive nature of the global system any sense of instability will destabilize the strategic balance of power leading to hostility and aggression. Proponents of offensive realism argue that a combination of anarchy and uncertainty with the global system causes states to pursue power as a means of attaining greater security. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001) Mearsheimer argues that states constantly seek to increase their power in order to attain a greater level of security and improve their position within a global hierarchy (2001: 140-3). As a proponent of *offensive realism*, Mearsheimer argues that this competing desire for security has created an international system of anarchy and instability. During the Cold War global stability was achieved through the nuclear deterrence of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), but since the collapse of the Soviet Union the global system has returned to a state of instability and lawlessness. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on the 11th September, 2001 have only added to this perception of lawlessness in the 21st century. Writing against the backdrop of these uncertainties Robert Kagan's *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (2008) warns of the growing threat posed by authoritarian regimes. Kagan argues that the rise of autocratic powers, such as, China, Russia and Iran could lead to a new ideological conflict comparable to that of the Cold War. Without the deterrence of MAD states would resort to the pursuit of power as a means of achieving security. But while Kagan's analysis provides a compelling argument of the threat posed by the rise and association of authoritarian regimes, his study largely ignores the tensions and divisions existing between democratic states, such as the U.S. and E.U., or the tensions between autocratic states, like China and Russia. Furthermore, Kagan also dismisses the extent to which global developments like free trade and the spread of democracy have helped to promote peace and stability.

2.4. Defending the Liberal Peace

Fukuyama's assertion that liberal democracy will produce a universal lasting order is rooted in a set of liberal arguments dating back to the seventeenth-century. In *Laws of War and Peace* (1625), Hugo Grotius set out a foundation of laws designed to restrict war and promote peace. He established a secular framework of international laws which were grounded in reason and designed to defend natural rights. Kant (1795) and Montesquieu (1748) further advocated the use of legal institutions and a separation of power to help promote peace and stability, promoting the argument of a liberal peace in which democracies do not fight each other. Liberal optimists have long argued that democratic institutions are better equipped to mediate and resolve conflicts emerging between states. This effectively challenges the realist notion that international relations are conducted in a state of anarchy in which the pursuit of power and self-interest is the only logical cause of action. Furthermore, the spread of free-market capitalism increases levels of trade among states creating powerful economic incentives for a peaceful coexistence. The benefits of increased trade are explored in Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion* (1910), arguing that as states invest in each other's economies, financial ties are strengthened leading to greater economic interdependence and providing a disincentive for war. Angell's ideas have been criticised for being too general and failing to recognise that interdependence does not exist equally among all states (Navari, 1989: 353). But varying levels of interdependence and self-sufficiency does not alter the fact, that in a global economy, states are no longer discreet national entities and therefore Angell's arguments concerning interdependence and the economic benefits of trade are defensible. Furthermore, as liberal ideals are seen as being universal the spread of democracy and capitalism offers the hope of creating a New World Order of peace and prosperity.

The conditions for achieving a universal democratic peace are outlined in Immanuel Kant's utopian essay *Perpetual Peace* (1795). Kant's ideas reflect a strong sense of optimism that a lasting international peace can be achieved through constitutional reform and international laws. His hypothetical treaty called for a federation of republics held to account by a constitution and the moral conscience of a rational citizenry. This federation would be able to achieve a permanent peace because in Kant's view liberal states would be passive in their interaction with each other. Kant's ideas on the passive liberal state were revived in the 1980's by democratic peace theorists like Michael Doyle

(1986) and Bruce Russett (1995). Since the 1990's individuals like Zeev Maoz (1993) and John Oneal (1999) have developed a body of literature on the democratic peace incorporating Kant's ideas into the study of international relations. Doyle supports Kant's idea of a democratic peace by arguing that liberal states have a greater tendency to exercise restraint when resolving conflicts. This is due to the effects of parliamentary democracy and economic interdependence. As the instinctive pursuit for power is replaced by the rational logic of cooperation, states become less aggressive and seek peaceful solutions. But the idea of a liberal peace is not without its critics. In the 1990's David Spiro's article *The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace* (1994) and Christopher Layne's *Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace* (1994) sought to challenge the idea that democracies do not fight each other. Layne and Spiro's research attempted to denounce the liberal peace as an insignificant myth. They challenged the hypothesis of the liberal peace stating that the criteria for classifying democracies and the various operational differences can produce findings in which democracies actually do appear to go to war. But while there is some debate as to what exactly constitutes a "democracy", proponents of the liberal peace agree that democracies are better equipped to avoid wars. Furthermore, Doyle makes the observation that while democracies do not fight each other they are aggressive when dealing with authoritarian regimes (1986: 1152). So while the liberal peace theorists do not entirely reject realist notions of power politics they do concede that the international order exists in what could be described as a "mature anarchy" as opposed to an atmosphere of war against all.

The acceptance of an international order has helped to promote a sense of liberal optimism in which Western values of democracy, capitalism and a respect for liberal institutions appeared to have triumphed over all other systems of social order. It is from this perspective that Fukuyama declared "the end of history" marking "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy" (1989: at 4). This promoted the idea that the spread of democracy would result in the spread of peace and appeared to suggest that the basis for the liberal peace rested upon a commonly held ideological consensus. However, there is a misconception that states sharing a common ideology are less likely to become hostile towards one another. In *Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon* (1991), Fukuyama defends the democratic peace but states that

“the reason does not have to do with ideological consensus” (1991: 662-3). He goes on to explain that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries European states broadly accepted the legitimacy of monarchy but this did not prevent them from waging war on one another. Fukuyama explains that after the French Revolution monarchies were replaced by liberal democracies whose citizens had no desire to engage in imperial conquests with one another. Furthermore, the recognition of universal values and the ability to satisfy individual desires within the economic sphere has enabled democracies to maintain a liberal peace. But a democracy cannot be supported by the production of economic wealth alone, it also has to be supported by people who believe in the principles of a democratic state. Therefore, while democracies will attack states that they feel are illegitimate they resist going to war with states whose governments they respect. But a mutual respect for Western liberal democratic values may not be compatible with non-Western civilizations.

The struggle between the traditional values of Islam and the liberal views of the West are considered to be the main area of conflict and antagonism. In *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) Huntington argues that it is not Islamic fundamentalism that stands in the way of democratic reforms but the fundamental essence of Islam which simply makes it incompatible with democratic values. In other words Huntington’s argument is that the Islamic mind-set is grounded in a culture which excludes modern liberal democracy. Furthermore, Huntington states that “the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame,” and goes on to conclude that “Islam has bloody borders” (1993: 7). While Huntington’s remarks were based upon an impartial survey of religious conflicts taken from James L. Payne’s *Why Nations Arm* (1989), his observations have nevertheless been met with fierce criticism (1989: 125, 138-39). Edward Said criticizes Huntington’s views in *The Clash of Ignorance* (2001), stating that civilizations are not single unified entities. Instead they are highly complex in their beliefs and expressions. In *Orientalism* (1978) Said examines the effects of Western imperialism on oriental cultures and argues that Western attitudes towards the Middle-East are often based upon false assumptions. These assumptions ultimately lead to a misunderstanding of other cultures and an inability to relate to other civilizations. Furthermore, Said stresses that civilizations are

not “shut-down sealed off” units they contain a broad diversity of expressions which need to be respected and understood (2001: 2).

Proponents of the liberal peace argue that democratic institutions can be applied to any state regardless of civilization or culture. From this perspective liberal institutions are compatible with all cultures as they reflect a set of universal values. Huntington is dismissive of such a notion arguing that Western liberal democracy cannot be universally applied and warns of the dangers of multiculturalism. In the final chapter of *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996), Huntington observes that throughout history various civilizations have at one point in time been convinced of their own immortality and provides examples of how the empires of Mongolia and Rome were convinced that their civilizations had achieved a permanent sense of social order. But in reality, “societies that assume that their history has ended,” warns Huntington, “are usually societies whose history is about to decline” (2002: 301). Furthermore, Huntington rejects the notion of a democratic peace and argues that the nature of conflict will change from an ideological confrontation to a clash of civilizations and culture. While states will still remain the chief antagonists of conflict, the nature of conflict will now revolve around civilizations. Huntington argues that the differences between civilizations are far deeper than that of ideologies. This is because culture is not simply an artificial construct like nationalism or communism, instead it holds the essence of one’s identity and the perceptions of life which have been constructed over centuries of social conditioning. Huntington argues that the effects of globalization are likely to increase conflicts between civilizations. This entails that as the world becomes increasingly connected and transformed into a global village, cultural differences and the threat to existing ways of life are far more likely to arise. Therefore, the social impact of global capitalism could lead to increased levels of tension and conflict between civilizations fostering feelings of resentment towards the West.

2.5. The Effects of Globalization

The effects of globalization have been both positive and negative bringing about the benefits of increased wealth and progress but also creating future challenges in terms of economic inequality and future uncertainty. Robert Kaplan’s article, *The Coming Anarchy* (1990), challenges the liberal optimism of the New World Order. Kaplan argues that since the end of the Cold War the world is

becoming increasingly divided in terms of essential resources. He explains that while the inhabitants of developed countries are largely well provided for, and enjoy the benefits of a prosperous society, people in developing countries are increasingly suffering the ill-effects of economic decline (Kaplan, 1990 at 39). The shortage of basic resources combined with rapidly increasing populations and the effects of urbanization will, in Kaplan's view, lead to political instability. Central to this Malthusian nightmare is the belief that the traditional certainties of the past are rapidly dissolving creating a future of conflict and uncertainty. Kaplan argues that as the ideological conflict of the Cold War subsided, concerns over essential resources like food and water would become ever more urgent. As life in underdeveloped countries becomes increasingly intolerable the deprived peoples of these "dying regions" will attempt to migrate towards more prosperous zones (Kaplan, 1990 at 43). This will increasingly lead to greater concerns over immigration and the problems caused by an unequal redistribution of resources.

A similar argument concerning the growing level of inequality within the New World Order has been put forward by Robert Cox in *Global Perestroika* (1992). Cox has argued that the essential transformation towards what we understand as the New World Order did not emerge with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Instead the current formation of world politics began to take shape during the mid-1970's. Cox argues that the ill-effects of the world recession i.e. the oil crisis, stagflation and the economic decline of Western economies resulted in a decisive shift in economic thinking. Social Keynesianism and the era of the welfare state, which had helped maintain a respectable level of social equality, was suddenly replaced by monetarist policies favouring free-markets and low inflation. This shift in economic thinking has resulted in greater levels of social inequality (Cox, 1992: 27-28). Furthermore, Cox argues that while these policies have created vast amounts of wealth for prosperous economies, it has also led to increasing levels of misery and poverty in the developing world. Similar concerns are expressed by Paul Kennedy in *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (1993) which provides an agenda of the challenges the world will have to face over the coming years. Kennedy is of the opinion that the pace of technological development coupled with the increase in population and environmental concerns could lead to serious levels of inequality and deprivation which will be

difficult to manage and control (Kennedy, 1993: 3-20). While the ideological confrontation of the Cold War may have ended, deep levels of social and economic division still remain. Therefore, while the New World Order has triumphed in so far as spreading freedom and democracy is has also failed to provide equitable levels economic growth and development.

Thomas Friedman provides a celebration of global free-market capitalism in *The Lexus and Olive Tree* (1999), and praises policies of deregulation and free trade. But Friedman also acknowledges how the conditions of economic deregulation resemble a “golden straightjacket” which causes a country’s political and economic choices to become increasingly limited. The restrictive effects of practicing free-market orthodoxy can undermine the autonomy of states and result in a loss of culture and national identity. In *Making Globalization Work* (2009) Joseph Stiglitz expands upon some of the arguments presented in *Globalization and its Discontents* (2002) and expresses his concerns over the way in which increased levels of economic inequality is leading the world towards increased political and economic instability. In order to address these problems Stiglitz argues that stronger and more transparent institutions are needed to resolve the world’s financial problems and insists that greater levels of government intervention would be an effective means of stabilizing market forces (Stiglitz, 2006: 269-92). While globalization has increased the spread of science and technology throughout the world, Stanley Hoffman argues that the ill effects of globalization have provoked a “revolt of dissatisfaction.” In the *Clash of Globalizations* (2002), Hoffmann comments on the globalization of culture, stating that the increased flow of consumer products has led to a choice between diversity and uniformity. This in Hoffmann’s view has produced a “disenchantment with the world” and a “reaction against uniformity” (2002: 3). Antagonism towards the West may well increase as traditional societies try to resist the ill-effects of globalization, but modernization and the spread of consumer culture will inevitably cause traditional societies to change. In *Open World: The Truth about Globalization* (2002), Philippe Legrain examines how globalization can be an instrument of positive change. In responding to Friedman’s concerns on global uniformity, Legrain states that if “countries are becoming more alike, this is because people’s tastes have converged” (2002: 296). Legrain does not view globalization as an imperial threat to culture and identity. Instead he argues that while the

bonds of nationality are loosening, cultural identity is not disappearing. Therefore, globalization is freeing people from their geographic bonds, providing the possibility of new opportunities, but they are not losing their sense of identity.

Global capitalism is leading to the globalization of culture and this to many traditional societies represents an ideological hegemony of Western control. In *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1996), Benjamin Barber comments on the adverse effects that global capitalism has had on traditional societies. He argues that the rapid increase in global capitalism has led to a climate of alienation and chaos in traditional cultures which are ill-equipped to handle the social influences of a consumer society. Barber warns that the effects of consumerism need to be better managed so as to prevent the worst excesses of global capitalism from creating a source of confrontation between Western and traditional values (1996: 8-9). From this perspective globalization is not spreading peace but creating conflict and resentment. The result is increased levels of hostility in which local cultures and national sentiments are likely to intensify so as to preserve national identities against an onslaught of secular ideology and Western hegemony. In *Globalization and American Power* (2000), Kenneth Waltz argues that globalization is a system of U.S. imperialism which came into effect after the Cold War. "Globalisation means homogenization," states Waltz, it creates a uniform order reducing choice in which Anglo-American economic interests can be advanced (2000: 47). This pessimistic theme is developed further by Roger Scruton in *The West and the Rest* (2002), who argues that Western civilization is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. He argues that while global capitalism transcends national boundaries and promotes freedom of individualism, it also tends to undermine national identities and is devoid of the values relating to the wellbeing of community. Consequently the social effects of consumerism and a multi-cultural society will weaken traditional values and national sentiments. This could have serious social implications for future societies as people feel alienated and disillusioned by the imposition of a foreign culture they are more likely to resort to violent and vengeful behaviour. In *The World is Flat* (2005), Friedman raises concerns about how the spread of technology and integrated economies are affecting the world's sense of identity. Friedman does acknowledge that in a "flat world" political identities will be reshaped. This will cause political

parties to redefine their ideologies which could affect the workings of democracy and lead to an erosion of ideology. Furthermore, tensions among our identities as consumers, workers, taxpayers and citizens could also come into sharper conflict. One of the reasons for this conflict will be due to the increased levels of competition that will spread throughout a “flat” world. As economic globalism continues to spread, the world is effectively growing smaller as people are no longer constrained by space and time (Friedman, 2005: 477-86). While the long-term effects of globalization could create a more universal and homogenous world, increased levels of competition and a desire for equal recognition could create a crisis of identity for the Last Man living at the end of History.

2.6. The Last Man

Fukuyama devotes the final chapter of *The End of History* (1992), to describing the conditions of the Last Man. As History reaches a decisive point of conclusion the Last Man will emerge living in a universal homogenous world of peace and prosperity (Fukuyama, 1992: 287-99). The Last Man is the combined consequence of two opposing concepts, namely: liberal democracy and the struggle for equal recognition. Fukuyama’s conception of the individual’s desire for freedom and equal recognition comes primarily from Kojève’s (1947) reading of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1817). But despite the triumph of liberal ideas Fukuyama’s depiction of individuals living in a world of peace and prosperity provides a grim account of a society lacking any sense of ambition. Fukuyama draws heavily on Frederick Nietzsche’s view that the Last Man in History will essentially be a victorious slave living in a secular democracy of liberal ideals. In *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883-85) Nietzsche provides a somewhat pessimistic depiction of the Last Man in which humanity has reached a point of social stagnation and has lost all sense of drive and purpose. The implications of social stagnation are examined in Martin Heidegger’s article *Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?* (1967) which, in examining the desires of the human condition, suggests that all forms of accomplishment are born out of discontent. Nietzsche explores this theme again in *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), arguing that motivation and self-advancement arise from discontent and nothing of importance can be achieved without some form of suffering and hardship. In other words, without the conditions of discomfort

creating an impetus for individual motivation, the Last Man will lack any sense of purpose and the moral conviction needed to move History forward.

Without a sense of purpose and motivation, future societies would no longer possess the ideals and aspirations needed for advancement, presenting the prospect of a decline or end to ideology. Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* (1929) presented one of the first comprehensive studies which discussed the social conditions leading to the decline of ideology. In reflecting Weber's (1947) observations on the functional rationality of industrial societies, he argued that utopian ideals and aspirations decline due to the practical necessity of rational politics. The theme of using rational politics as a means of social engineering is explored in Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology?* (1960). Bell argued that political ideologies and ethical arguments are no longer relevant to modern Western societies as political parties simply compete for power by promising higher levels of economic growth and material affluence. Furthermore, Bell observed that Western societies had developed in such a way that ideologies were no longer relevant as their functions and practices had in effect been taken over by the science of social engineering. As societies modernise they also rationalise and political ideologies are replaced by the rationality of economics and the scientific controls of government bureaucracy. The pacifying effects and repressive tolerance of a contemporary society are explored in Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). As a key member of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse effectively argues that liberal democracy's increased use of science and technology has become an instrument of oppression. In today's contemporary society of freedom and mass consumption people are controlled by the forces of technological progress while pursuing a soulless life of materialism. Allan Bloom reflects a similar sense of pessimism in *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) which provides a critique of higher education and argues that the liberal ideals of a contemporary society are leading humanity towards an intellectual crisis. In *Natural Right and History* (1999), Leo Strauss shares many of Nietzsche's concerns that the effects of a modern secular democracy will have on the future development of civilization. Bloom and Strauss both appear to view the modern world as one of stagnation in which the comfort and protection of society has been provided by the constraints of rational morality. Without the conditions needed to produce the higher types only the Last Man will

remain and human advancement will become obsolete. Here future society consists of a “herd morality” in which the slave has established a ruling order to the detriment of human advancement. In this universal homogenous world of peace and prosperity the Last Man will lack the *thymos* or spiritedness to drive himself forward.

Fukuyama agrees with Nietzsche that modernity will cause the decline of *thymos* at the end of History but he argues that the Last Man’s fate could still be avoided as only certain parts of *thymos* will decline. The human desire for recognition will still continue even if History has come to an end. Fukuyama’s assertions that the Last Man will continue to strive towards recognition has a long established tradition in Western political philosophy. For example, Plato’s *Republic* provides an examination of the soul using the term *thymos* to describe the spirited characteristics of man’s nature. The principle of this theme is reflected in Machiavelli’s ideas on statecraft in which the “good” prince uses his *virtù* of strength and cunning to adapt to change and ensure the safety of his kingdom (2009: 90-92). In the *Leviathan* (1651) Thomas Hobbes provides a detailed examination of the human condition comparing the selfish nature of man to a wound up spring that will only ever cease in death (1973: 1). Fukuyama argues that the qualities of *thymos* will find expression in the rigours of enterprise capitalism in which the talents of free spirited individuals will find a non-destructive outlet. Free-market economies have generally been seen in terms of a competitive society in which individuals live to pursue their material desires and this could easily extend to other forms of recognition. However, a laissez-faire free-market economy also affects the social structures of society and shapes its moral condition. In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) Adam Smith examines the nature of prudence and argues that commercial exchange is not simply about the pursuit of profit or material comfort but also includes establishing a reputation and gaining admiration from others. From this perspective human advancement will still be possible in the modern world as elements of *thymos* will still exist. Therefore, the spirited individuals will be able to pursue their ambitions but within an arena restricted to the commercial sphere. Furthermore, as the activities of entrepreneurs seldom extend to achieving military or political objectives their desires for attaining wealth, power and influence are restricted to non-destructive outlets.

In *Capitalism and Democracy: The Missing Link* (1992), Fukuyama explains that the human desire for prestige and recognition can only be satisfied through the rationality of democracy which is able to grant basic rights and freedoms to all citizens. But the individual's desire to attain recognition can only be achieved if societies subscribe to a set of common values and this requires a sense of trust and cooperation. In *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1996), Fukuyama examines the value of social capital and argues that modern societies require a greater sense of trust and cooperation in order to prosper. Here the effects of social capital result in a greater convergence between societies leading to greater interaction and interdependence between civilizations. This in effect makes civilizations more homogenous and less likely to clash. But the rational principles of a democratic society, with its scientific principles of organization and control, coupled with advancements in medical science could also result social stagnation. In *Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle* (1999), Fukuyama speculates how Nietzsche's pessimistic feelings of discontent, vital for motivating human advancement, could be nullified with the use of prescription drugs like Prozac (1999: 17). Here the technological forces of a rational society committed to ensuring stability and wellbeing could ultimately lead to a world reminiscent to that of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), which warns against the dehumanizing effects of scientific and material progress. Under these conditions the individual would lose all sense of ambition and exist in a state of apathy and nihilism. In this case the Last Man at the end of History would have no sense of loyalty to his community and no reason to gain their admiration for his endeavours. So while the end of History would bring an end to war and revolution it will also signify the loss of a cause for which to fight.

2.7. Conclusion

In *The End of History?* (1989) Fukuyama argued that Western liberal democracy had triumphed over all other systems of government, marking the beginning of a New World Order. The spread of capitalism and democracy after the Cold War revived the notion that democracy was a universal concept which could be successfully implemented throughout the world. In *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) Huntington dismissed such a notion arguing that Western liberal democracy cannot be universally applied and warned of the dangers of multiculturalism. Furthermore, Huntington argued

that non-Western civilizations were incapable of democratization and would clash with Western values as they were fundamentally different. While *The Clash of Civilizations* is regarded as a major theory for understanding conflict in global politics its observations are by no means infallible. Huntington's arguments are largely based upon the assertion that a clash of civilizations is somewhat inevitable and cultural identity will become the new fault lines of future conflict. Therefore, *The Clash of Civilizations* is essentially a study on the origins and causes of conflict, it does not anticipate the prospect that civilization and culture could be altered by the effects of globalization and the spread of Western ideals. Furthermore, Huntington's paradigm remains trapped in a realist conception of power politics and rejects the idea of a New World Order committed to peace and prosperity.

The realist conception that states are committed to the preservation of sovereign power first appeared in the 1950's (Wight, 1946 and Morgenthau, 1948). Since then realists have modified their position on power politics acknowledging that the international system is not entirely in a state of anarchy and that some degree of order does exist. But despite developments in IR theory during the 1970's (Bull, 1977; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Waltz, 1979), realists still maintain that states are competitive by nature and the stability of the global system can only be achieved by a strategic balance of power. Realism remains committed to the prospect that the international order is inherently unstable and therefore international developments are observed primarily in forms of change. Furthermore, proponents of realism (Kagan, 2008 and Mearsheimer, 1990) cannot accept the idea that a unipolar world could last for any significant period of time or that Western ideals of freedom and democracy could extend to all civilizations and become universal. There is still the reluctance within realist thought (Kaplan, 1990; Cox, 1992) to acknowledge the extent to which global capitalism is transforming the world through trade causing nations and cultures to become closer and more integrated. Instead the ill-effects of globalization, such as, increased levels of inequality and concerns over the scarcity of resources are often used as a basis of argument to predict future conflict and instability. The result is an ideological divide between IR theorists who remain committed to a doctrine of power politics and proponents of globalization (Friedman, 2006; Le Grain, 2003; Stiglitz, 2006; Wolf, 2005) and the liberal peace (Doyle, 1986; Moaz, 1993; Russett, 1995) who seek to

promote the benefits of democracy and free trade. This study will examine these opposing arguments in greater detail and illustrate how the spread of global capitalism and liberal democracy in the twenty-first century represents a triumph of Western ideals and supports Fukuyama's arguments as set out in *The End of History* (1989) more than twenty years ago.

3. The New World Order

3.1. Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed the beginning of a New World Order, in which the U.S. would continue to maintain its position of global dominance and pursue a sense of internationalism, reviving the ideals of Woodrow Wilson and his view that spreading democracy would help to spread peace. The “triumphalists” of the New World Order, such as Krauthammer (1990) and Fukuyama (1989), held a positive view of the post-Cold War. Writing in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama’s essay *The End of History?* (1989) argued that Western liberal capitalism had triumphed over communism and this signalled “the end of history” (1989: 4). It also represented the triumph of liberalism after the Cold War and revived the notion that democracy was a universal concept which could be successfully implemented throughout the world. The end of the Cold War also marked the beginning of a “unipolar” moment in which the U.S. would defend international justice, prevent future aggression and settle international disputes. Democratic capitalism would increase economic cooperation, reduce tensions between states and end the incentive for imperial wars of conquest. From this perspective the spread of democracy would ultimately lead to a New World Order of peace and prosperity.

In contrast to this optimistic view, realists did not greet the end of the Cold War with such enthusiasm and had a far more pessimistic view as to how the New World Order would develop. Kagan (2008) and Mearsheimer (1990) argued that the world of international politics would continue to be competitive and unstable, being characterised more by anarchy than stability. They argued that the idea of a New World Order was essentially a misreading of history based upon a naïve optimism which had failed to acknowledge past events. By 1992 the optimism of the New World Order was soon replaced with regional instability in Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1992-5), Kosovo (1999) and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked the beginning of a “war on terror,” leading to U.S. interventions in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-2011). Within a decade the Realist position had been vindicated and the future appeared to resemble the conflicts of the past. But 9/11 also presented a paradox revealing that the U.S. was both the most powerful nation on earth and the most vulnerable.

Being faced with this conflicting realization U.S. foreign policy has had to move beyond unilateral action and regime change to accommodating newly emerging powers like the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies and promoting a greater sense of international cooperation. This has increasingly led to the formation of a trans-governmental order in which states are forming interconnecting networks of exchange through which to attain a sense of global governance and pursue their national interests. This chapter will examine these themes and arguments in greater detail and consider the extent to which the aspirations of the post-Cold War have influenced the nature of global developments in the twenty-first century.

3.2. The End of History?

The End of History? (1989) was written at a time of great pessimism in U.S. politics, published a year after Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1989), with its prophecy that the U.S. was facing *imperial overstretch*, Fukuyama's article provided a positive account of how democracy was transforming the world.² *The End of History?* (1989) can be regarded as an "antidote to the prevailing 'declinist' mood of American political analysis in the 1980's," observes Marks, and was intended to celebrate the triumph of liberalism over all other ideologies (1997: 454). When Fukuyama states that History has come to an end he is not suggesting that time and events have somehow reached the end of their course, he is expressing Alexandre Kojève's (1947) interpretation of Hegel (1817) that History as a dialectical clash of ideologies has come to an end. From this perspective Fukuyama's argument pertains to a conflict between individual freedom and collective authority (Fukuyama, 1989: 4-5). Fukuyama states that a dialectical struggle of these opposing ideas began with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 and continued until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of the Berlin Wall signified the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and signified a victory for Western liberal democracy. So from a "dialectical" perspective History had ended and democracy would ultimately triumph over all other ideologies, producing a universal form of human organization capable of providing lasting stability.

² The term *imperial overstretch* or *over-reach* refers to an imperial power's tendency to expand its military ambitions beyond a point at which the level of military expenditure can no longer be sustained by its domestic economy. It is from this perspective that Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1989) argues that military conflicts can be understood in relation to economic change.

Fukuyama's conception that History has come to an end relies heavily on Hegel's notion of time. "This notion is a paradigm for historical thinking," observes Roth, "insofar as it organizes future, present, and past as temporal dimensions *for man*" (1985: 295). Hegel's conception of the future contains a sense of hope and optimism which can be willed by humanity with a sense of ambition. The future will contain a sense of the present which would have been derived from a selection of past events. The nature of these past events creates a sense of structure and tradition enabling the present to appear as recognisable and relevant. It is from this perspective that History not only has a sense of *destiny* and *purpose* but a sense of *destiny influenced* by the will of humanity. Furthermore, Kojève's interpretation of Hegel states that human desire is the desire for recognition which ultimately leads to a sense of self-consciousness. This desire for recognition and the development of the self-consciousness produces the Hegelian sense of time and History. Therefore, "Hegelian time is history as apprehended by man," explains Roth, and "Hegelian knowing is the discursive form of this apprehension" (1985: 295). From this perspective Fukuyama presents a teleological conception of history which moves in a discernable direction and its evolutionary nature is driven by the aspirations of human desire.

Kojève's conception that History has an end and will reach some form of conclusion relies upon the notion that humanity ultimately moves towards some finite conclusion. From this perspective, Kojève draws upon the ideas of Marx and Heidegger and projects the finite qualities of human existence onto the course of History. This argument essentially relies upon a sense of deductive logic that if the power of human conception is finite then History, being the product of human action, should also be finite (Roth, 1985: 297). But the realization that History has an end is not the same as the actualization that History will come to an end as knowledge is still dependent upon a course of action to bring History to an end. Therefore, Fukuyama's paradigm provides a defensible realization concerning the triumph of liberalism over all other ideologies but his paradigm has not yet been fully realized and the extent to which the end of History will reach a decisive end will depend upon the course of actual events. Before Fukuyama's paradigm can reach a sense of conclusion democracy and capitalism would have to become universal so as to end the dialectical forces of opposition which drive History forward.

Fukuyama's *The End of History?* (1989) essentially supports globalization and the idea that free markets can influence the course of human history. Fukuyama's central argument in *The End of History?* is that the spread of capitalism will help to promote Western liberal democratic ideals which will eventually replace all other types of governing regimes. It is now over twenty years since Fukuyama published *The End of the History and the Last Man* (1992), in which he stated that History had ended in so far as the evolution of human society had moved through various forms of government which had culminated in liberal democracy and free market capitalism. Since then there has been various developments which have challenged the optimism of a New World Order, most notably the break-up of Yugoslavia (1991-99) the civil war in Chechnya (1999-2000) and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11 (2001). However, in *Has History Started Again?* (2002), Fukuyama argues that "this hypothesis remains correct, despite the events since September 11: modernity, as represented by the United States and other developed democracies, will remain the dominant force in world politics, and the institutions embodying the West's underlying principles of freedom and equality will continue to spread around the world" (2002: 3). But Western principles also need to provide higher levels of economic growth to succeed. In the past regimes like communism and fascism sought to challenge democracy, and future regimes of autocracy or Islamic theocracy may seek to resist the spread of liberal democratic ideals, but as long as these governing models are unable to deliver economic growth they are unlikely to succeed. From this perspective the course of History will be determined by the spread of global capitalism and not the principles of freedom and equality.

Fukuyama maintains that democracy has triumphed over all other ideologies because it is the only universal form of human organization capable of delivering economic prosperity. In his article *Reflections on the End of History, Five years later* (1995) Fukuyama states that "liberal democracy and free markets constitute the best regime, or more precisely the best of the available alternative ways of organizing human societies," which he argues, "satisfies the most basic human longings, and therefore can be expected to be more universal and more durable than other regimes or other principles of political organization" (1995: 29). However, Gray challenges Fukuyama's assumption by arguing that governments exist only for as long as they are considered legitimate by their population. Gray

explains that democracies are not simply justified by their legitimacy but the extent to which they can serve the needs and interests of their populations. If they fail in this task they will be regarded as illegitimate regardless as to whether they are democratic or not (1998: 149-50). Therefore, governments are only legitimate in so far as they meet the needs of their citizens. Gray argues that the primary purpose of all governments is to protect its citizens against the evils of war, civil disorder, crime and ensuring basic levels of subsistence. If a government cannot provide these basic levels of security and social provision it will lose its sense of legitimacy. Furthermore, security and provision is considered to be a greater universal requirement of human need than democracy. Therefore, the legitimacy of a state is not determined by liberal democratic values but by the extent to which it can protect its citizens against the evils of war.

Fukuyama's conception of democracy tends to be restricted to a Western conception of liberal democracy that favours constitutional governments protecting individual rights and freedoms. He does not appreciate the extent to which democratic governments can be separated by different ideologies and the conflicts that could emerge from such differences. In the coming decade conflict between states may not simply be restricted to tensions between democracies and totalitarian regimes but may also include competition between liberal and non-liberal capitalist regimes. The tension between democratic and autocratic capitalism in the twenty-first century could prove to be as intense as the ideological conflict between East and West during the Cold War (Macey and Miller, 1992: 279-80). From this perspective the economic changes that have taken place since the mid-1980s are not so much evidence that the world is embracing liberal democratic reforms but more a reflection of the extent to which capitalism has triumphed over state economic planning. But the triumph of the free-market does not in itself signify the spread of liberal democracy or the end of History. The economic effects of globalization are more economic than political in terms of finding new markets as opposed to promoting good governance. Furthermore, in most parts of the world liberal democratic values are viewed with scepticism and contempt. There is no real evidence to suggest that the ideals of the Enlightenment will have a universal appeal in the twenty-first century. Therefore, the dialectical clash

driving History forward may not necessarily revolve around which economic model works best but which political model proves to be the most prosperous for economic growth.

In *The End of History and the New World Order* (1992), Macey and Miller argue that Fukuyama fails to draw a distinction between liberalism and democracy. Fukuyama seems to regard democracy as being an extension of liberalism, but in fact democracy is a separate entity from liberalism. Democracy simply refers to a system of government in which the citizenry appoints an official who they believe will represent their best interests. Democracy does not necessarily promote liberal aspirations pertaining to constitutional rights and freedoms: like free speech, religious tolerance and equal rights for women. “Fukuyama sees democracy and liberalism as being natural counterparts,” explains Macey and Miller, “and suggests that any separation between the two concepts is only a theoretical construct” (1992: 281). By linking democracy with liberalism Fukuyama has a tendency to argue that any state which moves towards embracing free market reforms can be regarded as being democratic. States like Iran, Peru and Singapore may hold general elections, allow for private ownership of property and have embraced the free market but when compared to the values of Western liberal democracy these states are essentially autocratic not liberal. “What is emerging victorious is a commitment to capitalism and private ordering rather than a commitment to liberal democratic values,” observes Macey and Miller (*Ibid*: 283). The move towards private ownership and free market reforms is not due to a sudden admiration of Western capitalist idealism, but more a pragmatic realization to the fact that central economic planning is no longer sustainable.

The End of History? (1989) was intended to celebrate the triumph of liberalism over other ideologies and argues that liberal states are internally more stable and peaceful in their relations promoting a liberal conception that globalization reflects the highest order of human society. But as Macey and Miller explain “while capitalism may have triumphed over socialism, the triumph of capitalism is not equivalent to the triumph of liberal democracy” (1992: 289). Therefore, Fukuyama is “correct in his assessment that for the first time in human history a worldwide consensus has emerged about how to order society, but the scope of consensus is far narrower than Fukuyama would have us believe” (*Ibid*: 289). This clearly states that the foundation of Fukuyama’s human order is based upon

the rationality of market forces, in which individual self-interest and competition serve as the driving force and motivation for all human interaction. But while a free market economy appears to be the best way of allocating scarce resources in an economy, there simply is no consensus about which system of government will best direct capitalist forces (Cox, 2000: 225). A capitalist economy can flourish under an authoritarian regime just as well as under a liberal democracy. But as authoritarian regimes do not tolerate individual rights and freedoms which typify a liberal democracy they do not have to deal with the tensions and conflict that would otherwise exist between individual rights and state control.

3.3. The New World Order

The idea of a New World Order was first proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1988 (1988: 1). Gorbachev called for greater cooperation between nation states and to strengthen the UN's role as an international peacekeeper. He argued that ideology should no longer characterize the nature of foreign affairs and stated that force could no longer be regarded as a legitimate means of conduct in international relations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 President George H. W. Bush proclaimed the dawn of a New World Order in which liberal democratic ideals could spread throughout the world. The end of the Cold War marked an end to the ideological conflict of superpower rivalry and the threat of a nuclear war, and provided the possibility of a liberal peace promoting international norms and standards. At the Malta Conference in 1989 Bush and Gorbachev expressed their intentions to move away from an era of Cold War containment and superpower rivalry towards a policy of cooperation and reduced military tension. In September 1990 Bush delivered a speech to the U.S. Congress concerning the federal budget deficit and the crisis in the Persian Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was in this speech that the President outlined his vision of the post-Cold War in more detail: "The crisis in the Persian Gulf," stated Bush, "also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times,...— a new world order — can emerge" (1990: 2). His speech included a commitment to U.S. global leadership and a respect for the rule of international law. There was to be a partnership between the USA and the Soviet Union which would promote collective security, restrict the use of force and integrate the USSR into the global economy. These proposals certainly capture the optimism of the

early post-Cold War (1989-91) but on reflection they were perhaps too ambitious and impractical to be realistically achieved.

At the beginning of the 1990's the U.S. was the supreme superpower able to operate freely in a unipolar world. Like Britain after the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) the U.S. was free to operate without the restraints of a bi-polar world. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 removed Manuel Noriega from power and demonstrated how swiftly the U.S. could deploy military force in a unipolar world. In the Middle-East there appeared to be evidence that a New World Order was in operation. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 a broad Western and Islamic alliance condemned Saddam Hussein's actions and coalition forces were successful in expelling Iraqi forces during the Gulf War of 1991. During the Cold War the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) had been largely undermined by the superpower rivalry, but in November 1990 the CSCE produced a treaty which effectively ended the Cold War with the vision that it would one day replace the Warsaw pact and the NATO alliance in providing international security. However, in practice the CSCE's commitment to ensuring collective security was, according to Hyde-Price, "polite but sceptical," and states were only prepared to commit themselves to "*cooperative* – not collective – security" (1998: 26). The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 revealed the CSCE's lack of commitment and an inability to provide the collective security needed in preventing an international crisis. The CSCE was later renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in order to signify its permanent status and commitment to maintaining European security after the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 1998: 32). A concerted effort was also made by the (OSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS) to draw explicit links between human rights and international security. These links resulted in the creation of international laws and agreements which permitted the use of military intervention to protect human rights. In 1991 the U.N. General Assembly ruled in favour of using humanitarian intervention without the consent of states involved (Mathews, 1997: 59). This ultimately led to increased acts of military intervention, such as, the imposition of a no-fly zone in Iraq (1991) and U.S. interventions in Somalia (1992) and Haiti (1994) being justified largely on humanitarian grounds.

The optimism of a New World Order brought with it the hope that international institutions like the UN would be supported by the world's major powers to ensure peace and security. But in the years following the Cold War the optimism of a New World Order seemed to be replaced with the pessimism and instability of a new world of *disorder*. During the Cold War international and regional tensions had been effectively maintained within the ideological conflict of a bi-polar world. Forty-five years of superpower rivalry had maintained a sense of order through the existence of an external threat which had helped to promote an internal sense of cohesion. But now that the ideological rivalry had ended, the external threat had disappeared and states that had once been united by a common sense of purpose were now divided. As the ideological tensions of the Cold War subsided they were quickly replaced by regional pressures based on ethnic and cultural differences. The war in Bosnia (1992-5) and the civil war in Chechnya (1994) provide a case in point. During the Cold War ethnic tensions and conflicts had been successfully contained by the ideologies of a bi-polar world. But after the Cold War these constraints had disappeared, allowing racial, ethnic and regional tensions to re-emerge. The Bosnian War (1992-5) was the longest and most violent war to take place in Europe since the Second World War (1939-45). The ethnic bloodshed that occurred between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia lasted until the Kosovo crisis of 1999 in which the NATO alliance finally intervened to end Serbia's war of expansion which had resulted in acts of genocide not seen since the Second World War. Here the New World Order had failed to maintain stability and a respect for human rights and international law.

The optimism of the New World Order presented a vision of a multilateral world in which the United Nations would oversee the post-Cold War order and ensure peace and security. Unfortunately the U.N. was simply not capable of providing collective security and taking decisive intervention to ensure peace. Despite the good intentions of the UN it lacks the military resources and political resolve to ensure global security. The genocide in Rwanda (1994) is evidence of the U.N.'s inability to prevent war and provide collective security. Without the leadership and intervention of the United States no one could have prevented Saddam Hussein from taking effective control of Kuwait. Without U.S. intervention "the world would have written off Kuwait," argues Krauthammer, in the same way

that “the League of Nations, wrote off Abyssinia” (1991: 25). The Gulf War (1991) displayed the power of the United States to operate freely in a unipolar world. The extraordinary speed with which the U.S. intervened during the Gulf War effectively prevented Iraq from occupying Kuwait and destabilizing the Gulf region. Global security relies upon America’s ability to deploy military, diplomatic and economic assets and provide decisive intervention in any region of the world. It would appear that the ideals of a “New World Order” can only be achieved if the U.S. acts as a global hegemon and ensures the stability of a unipolar order.

3.4. The Unipolar Moment

At the end of the Cold War the U.S. emerged as the world’s sole superpower able to act freely in a unipolar world. The term “unipolar” was popularized by Charles Krauthammer in the early 1990s (Krauthammer, 1991 and 2004a). Drawing upon a long legacy of imperialist thought, Krauthammer promoted the idea that America had a unique role to play in the world which would last for a considerable length of time (Midgley, 2007: 616). In *The Unipolar Moment* (1991), Krauthammer states, “the most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity,” and explains how, “multipolarity will come in time...But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment” (1991: 23-4). By 1992 the term unipolarism was being used in policy statements at the U.S. Defence Department urging the Cold War strategy of “collective internationalism” be replaced with a new strategy of “benevolent domination”. Drafted by Paul Wolfowitz under the supervision of Dick Cheney (Secretary of Defense), the statement urged the first Bush administration to declare U.S. global hegemony and assume sole responsibility for international security (Midgley, 2007: 618). By 1997 a neoconservative think tank under the leadership of William Kristol, Robert Kagan and Gary Schmitt founded *The Project for the New American Century* (2000). The project’s mission was to promote American global leadership, expand “zones of democratic peace” and have a military force that could “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars” (Kagan et al, 2000: iv). The proponents of the project urged the government to use its diplomatic, economic and military resources to promote American values in order to create a *Pax Americana* and shape the modern world in America’s image.

In the years following the Cold War the U.S. demonstrated a willingness to maintain global security in a unipolar world. The U.S. was able to increase its position of power and influence due to the collapse of the USSR and its unchallenged military capability. The “unipolar moment” enabled the United States to make use of greater levels of military intervention. The U.S. was now free to intervene wherever it chose. Increased military intervention began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1991. This continued during the Clinton Presidency with humanitarian intervention in various “zones of turmoil”, such as Somalia (1992) and Haiti (1994), further intervention by U.S. led NATO forces occurred in Bosnia (1992-5) and in Kosovo (1999), (Kagan, 2002: 18). During the 1990’s the U.S. was able to increase its position of economic strength. President Clinton implemented a programme of economic measures which eliminated the U.S. deficit, boosted economic domestic growth and productivity and enabled the U.S. to remain internationally competitive. By the late 1990’s the U.S. economy boomed, its share of world economic output had risen and its position in the world market had been greatly enhanced. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the U.S. was now more economically powerful than it had been some ten years earlier (Cox, 2004: 595).

In the years following the Cold War America had attained a sense of hegemony and was free to act without restraint. This freedom to act was clearly evident in the unilateral nature of U.S. foreign policy following the election of George W. Bush in 2000 (Kagan, 2008b: 28). In *America’s Imperial Ambition* (2002), Ikenberry explains how “for the first time since the dawn of the Cold War, a new grand strategy is taking shape in Washington. It is advanced most directly as a response to terrorism, but also constitutes a broader view about how the United States should wield power and organize world order” (2000: 49). In this new paradigm the U.S. would be less bound to its partners in the global rules and institutions. Spreading the ideals of democracy would involve a policy of regime change which if necessary would be achieved with the use of military action (Heywood, 2011: 226). America would take a more unilateral role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue regimes seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The “new grand strategy” that Ikenberry refers to would emerge as the Neoconservatism of the second Bush presidency (2000-8). This Neo-

conservatism was a combination of neo-Reaganite and “hard” Wilsonian foreign policy initiatives designed to enable the U.S. to take advantage of its position of influence in a unipolar world. Neo-Reaganism was a remnant from the Cold War depicting the world in polarised terms of good and evil. The U.S. and its allies were viewed as “good” while rogue states and terrorist groups possessing weapons of mass destruction were considered as “evil”. The policy of “hard” Wilsonian ideals would involve spreading liberal democracy throughout the world as a means of promoting peace.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade centre in New York on the 11 September 2001 are often viewed as a decisive turning point in which the liberal aspirations of a New World Order were shattered and replaced by a realist doctrine of fighting a war on terror. In the aftermath of 9/11 Huntington’s apocalyptic vision of a world in turmoil consumed by a clash of civilizations suddenly appeared very real. From this perspective it was the war on terror and not the fall of the Berlin Wall that revealed the true nature of the New World Order. But the events of 9/11 did not change the U.S., instead it provided an opportune moment for the U.S. to pursue its global ambitions. The threat of international terrorism created a sense of crisis which provided the U.S. with the excuse it needed to legitimize its actions and implement a set of policy measures which prior to 9/11 would have been considered as too extreme. Without the terrorist attacks on September 11, President Bush would not have been able to extend various legal powers of government, such as, the *Patriot Act* (2001) which gave the Federal Government increased powers of surveillance and the right to detain immigrant suspects indefinitely (2001: Sec 201-25). Other security measures included the power of “extraordinary rendition” where terror suspects could be held at Guantanamo Bay and subjected to the authority of a military court (Heywood, 2011: 298). By refusing to classify these prisoners as “enemy combatants”, detainees could be removed from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and denied the protections outlined in the Geneva Convention. The quasi-legal nature of the Patriot Act demonstrates the extent to which the U.S. government was prepared to go in restricting civil rights and liberties and rejecting international law.

The global war on terror was swiftly launched after 9/11 with the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. In January 2002 President George W. Bush identified various rogue states, such as,

Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea as forming an 'axis of evil'. This effectively reignited the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War dividing the world into two opposing adversaries, i.e. nations defending freedom and democracy against rogue regimes committed to acts of terrorism. Furthermore, President Bush's foreign policy ambitions were extended beyond spreading freedom and democracy so as to include regime change. The desire to implement regime change resulted in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 which removed Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist government from power. Here a 'coalition of the willing' was prepared to defy the U.N. in the face of strong international opposition and support the U.S. in taking military action. While the attack on Afghanistan was regarded as an act of retaliation against a state which had given refuge to Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network al-Qaeda, the invasion of Iraq was far more controversial. During the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. generally had international support. Furthermore, as the Taliban's ideologies were similar to that of al-Qaeda the U.S. could argue that the invasion was an act of self-defence. But during the invasion of Iraq the U.S. did not have international support or a U.N. resolution, Saddam Hussein's regime did not appear to have direct links with al-Qaeda and there was no real evidence to suggest that Iraq possessed a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. But as the invasion drew closer it became more apparent that the U.S. was no longer prepared to tolerate the existence of rogue regimes and Saddam Hussein would have to be deposed.

Proponents of realism like Kagan (2008) and Mearsheimer (2001) regard the prospect of a unipolar order as being inherently unstable and dangerous. They argue that the prolonged dominance of a single power threatens others states and causes them to become aggressive in an attempt to end the unipolar dominance of a single power and return to a balance of power. Therefore, realists have a tendency to anticipate that a unipolar world order will only exist for a short period of time and tend to anticipate its demise (Wohlforth, 1999: 5). Critics of unipolarity are quick to presume that a unipolar world is inherently unstable and will soon be replaced by a bipolar or multipolar world. They underestimate the overwhelming advantage that the U.S. currently has over the rest of the world and argue that the advantages of a unipolar world will not be sustainable due to the counterbalancing of other states, such as Russia and China. But there is no real evidence of counterbalancing by other

powers since the end of the Cold War. Despite the fear of international terrorism, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the effects of the Arab spring, which has resulted in regime change and instability in the Middle East, most countries have been reducing their levels of military spending. “Military spending by all other great powers is either declining or holding steady in real terms,” observes Wohlforth, and “while Washington prepares for increased defence outlays, current planning in Europe, Japan, and China does not suggest real increases in the offing, and Russia’s spending will inevitably decline further” (*Ibid*: 35). The United States is the only state capable of projecting global military power. By currently spending an estimated 4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defence the U.S. outspends all other great powers and its expenditure on research and development is probably greater than the rest of the world combined (Lieber, 2012: 124).

The conventional wisdom of realist scholars argues that unipolarity is inherently unstable and if the U.S. continues to act as a global hegemon this will inevitably lead to a backlash resulting in a return to a multipolar world of strategic balance. But this argument assumes that a unipolar world is not durable and aspirations of liberal democracy cannot become universal. When one considers how global capitalism, democracy and international institutions have spread over the last twenty years there is no reason why unipolarity could not last as long as the bipolarity of the Cold War or perhaps even longer. In *The Stability of a Unipolar World* (1999), Wohlforth describes how “the United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries” (1999: 7). Furthermore, the U.S. is the first state in modern history with a decisive advantage in all underlying components of power including, military, economic, political and diplomatic. In a unipolar system, a dominant power does not need to ally itself with a number of smaller states and is therefore more capable of taking decisive intervention as opposed to a multipolar system in which the dominant power can only act with the support of allied states (*Ibid*: 25). Therefore, a unipolar world will remain as long as the U.S. can remain a global hegemon and while a unipolar order will not bring an end to conflict a dominant hegemon has the potential to provide a greater sense of global stability that would otherwise be achieved in a system of bipolar confrontation or a strategic balance of power.

3.5. Towards a Trans-governmental Order

Under President George W. Bush the U.S. administration's reaction to September 11 has been about fighting a war on terrorism and implementing regime change in the middle-east which has depicted the U.S. as rejecting international opinion and pursuing a belligerent unilateral foreign policy (Lieber, 2012: 66). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 President Bush made effective use of strong rhetoric and unilateralism to promote himself as a war time president. But despite the rhetoric and unilateral action, the effects of 9/11 revealed a paradox of how powerful and vulnerable the U.S. is. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq were an initial success for the U.S. and its allies resulting in the swift overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. But military intervention soon proved to be problematic as the invasions turned into a complex war of counter-insurgency and the U.S. had grossly overestimated the efficiency of its military power finding itself tied up in a protracted conflict with no clear exit strategy. It is due to the difficulties and limitations of military intervention that the Bush administration has had to pursue greater multi-lateral engagement and intergovernmentalism during its second term of office.

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 American foreign policy has been criticised for being too unilateral and aggressive in nature (Chomsky, 2003). Before the Iraq war the credibility of the UN was seriously undermined by the Security Council's failure to agree upon a resolution that would authorize the use of military force.³ This consequently led the U.S. and Britain, along with a small group of allied states, to invade Iraq without UN authorization. However, international criticism of the Iraq War has overshadowed the multilateral components of the second Bush administration. George W. Bush has actually sought to revive George H. W. Bush's early post-Cold War attempts to create a New World Order. In *The New New World Order* (2007) Drezner argues, that despite the perception of U.S. hegemony and a "Bush doctrine" committed to unilateral action and fighting a war on terror, the

³ The United Nations Security Resolution 1441 stipulated that Iraq must comply with all previous UN Resolutions, provide immediate and unrestricted access to weapons inspectors and disclose the full details of its weapons programme. If Iraq failed to comply it would "face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations" (2002: 5). However, the resolution was not a pretext for war and Iraq's failure to comply would not automatically authorize the use of military force. A second UN resolution specifically authorizing the use of force would be needed in order to make an invasion legal.

U.S. has actually entered into a process of multilateral engagement pursuing inter-governmentalism. Drezner describes how “the Bush administration has been reallocating the resources of the executive branch to focus on emerging powers” (2007: 35). Washington has increasingly tried to include the interests of emerging powers in forums ranging from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Health Organization (WHO), on a broad range of issues like nuclear proliferation, banking and finance, to the environment (*Ibid*: 35). All these efforts reflect an attempt to implement elements of multilateralism, but due to the rhetoric of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” and commitment to regime change these internationalist policies have largely gone unnoticed.

The war of counter insurgency in Iraq has made neo-conservatism an unsustainable strategy and encouraged greater use of multilateralism as a means of furthering U.S. interests. Despite the rhetoric shown by neo-cons like John Bolton (former UN Ambassador) and Donald Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defence), Washington has sought to improve relations with emerging powers and promote global governance. Despite being a great military superpower, U.S. security ultimately depends on global security and this requires strengthening international relations. While the United States appears to favour the use of unilateral action and has refused to sign international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and has opposed the International Criminal Court (1998), these cases tend to overlook the fact that the U.S. has been the chief architect in creating multilateral institutions like, the UN, NATO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), (Hirsh, 2002: 31). Together these institutions have created an international system committed to promoting democracy, peace and free-trade. Since the early 1990’s the U.S. has not only used its military strength to influence international events it has also used its political and economic power to influence international decisions. The U.S. has exerted economic influence on other countries through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. While IMF and World Bank policies have become a contentious issue in developing countries, were conditions on loans and structural adjustment programmes have led to an era of austerity during the 1980’s and 90’s, these policies have also been successful in forcing governments to exercise greater fiscal discipline, reduce state controls and embrace the free-market. Furthermore, since the late 1990’s the IMF and World Bank has begun

forging alliances with businesses, NGOs and civil society, resulting in broader public participation and greater openness in decision making (Mathews, 1997: 60).

The U.S. administration has increased its level of engagement with international organizations so as to reflect the changing nature of the global economy. The formation of the G-20 in 1999, following the financial crisis in Asia, has enabled the U.S. to include Brazil, India and South Africa into trading talks so as to address the challenges of a globalized economy. In order to promote peace in the Middle-East, the U.S. has forged an alliance with Russia, the European Union and the U.N. so as to create the Diplomatic Quartet (2002). While the Quartet has been criticised by Palestinian Officials for being somewhat useless and has so far failed to make any significant progress in producing an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan, the Quartet does reflect the U.S. administration's commitment to working with an international organization as opposed to simply taking unilateral action (Hirsh, 2002: 21). It would be preferable for the U.S. to allow China and India to advance their interests within the structures of international governance. So the Bush administration has sought to include emerging powers on issues ranging from energy, the environment and nuclear proliferation. "Washington has engaged China through APEC's Energy Working Group." observes Drezner, "It has encouraged China and India, which are anxious to secure regular access to energy, to work with the International Energy Agency in order to create strategic petroleum reserves" (2007: 43). The U.S. has also launched the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APPCDC) with Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea to develop energy efficiency and encourage environmentally sustainable growth. As these members account for more than half of the global economy, the Partnership has the potential to be more effective at addressing global warming than the Kyoto Protocol. By accommodating these states in international institutions the U.S. is in a good position to maintain better relations and assert a greater degree of influence.

The perception of the U.S. pursuing a unilateral foreign policy in a world characterised by instability and disorder is too simplistic. Today a New World Order has emerged in the form of *transgovernmentalism*, i.e. a form of international government in which governing institutions form networks of cooperation and exchange. Keohane and Nye first observed these developing networks in

the 1970's and by the late 1990's transgovernmentalism had become an effective means of producing international governance. When President Clinton called for a "new government for a new century" he foresaw the use of transgovernmentalism as a means of promoting liberal democratic values around the world and over the last two decades globalization has resulted in a reduction of national autonomy creating greater levels of international cooperation (Clinton, 1997). In *The Real New World Order* (1997), Anne-Marie Slaughter examines the impact of transgovernmentalism and describes how, "the state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts" (1997: 184). Today's government agencies, executives, and legislatures are increasingly forming networks of exchange with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of transgovernmental relations. International problems caused by terrorism, organized crime and crisis in banking and finance are increasingly being addressed through transgovernmental networks. So while transgovernmentalism may not appear to have any real sense of impact against the drama of international politics, for bankers, lawyers, and business leaders, transgovernmental networks are a reality.

3.6. Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a debate about the nature of the New World Order. One optimistic view is that the end of the Cold War marked an end to superpower rivalry and a New World Order would emerge characterized by peace and international cooperation (Krauthammer, 1990 and Fukuyama, 1989). However, the New World Order was not so much the result of a triumph of Western liberalism over other ideologies but more the consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union which allowed the U.S. to become the last remaining superpower. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked an end to superpower rivalry, and the sudden disappearance of America's arch nemesis allowed more power and influence to shift towards the U.S. Therefore, the so called "liberal moment" in world affairs was really the beginning of a unipolar order in which the U.S. emerged as the world's last superpower enjoying a position of a global hegemony reminiscent to that of Imperial Rome. But the U.S. now faces the challenge of how to maintain its strategic advantage and adapt to a changing world of newly emerging powers.

After the Cold War the United States emerged as a regional hegemon in a unipolar world. But while a hegemon has full domination over its sphere of influence it will always be threatened by what is beyond its reach. The power of the Roman Empire was undermined by its inability to establish stable frontiers. Great Britain in the nineteenth century was able to establish a greater sense of stability by maintaining tolerant relations with other European states, but its empire became increasingly unstable when extending frontiers beyond its control in Africa and Asia (Jervis, 2006: 13). The frontiers of U.S. hegemony are more ideological than physical but the U.S. still faces the imperial challenge of controlling strategic zones of interest. Maintaining global interests leads to the fear that undesired changes in one area of the world could threaten or undermine its interests elsewhere. During the Cold War the U.S. could argue that it was defending the free world against the Soviet's "Evil Empire" but because America is now the dominant hegemon any attempt to defend democratic values or promote an internationalist agenda is met with resentment. It is perhaps ironic that in a unipolar world where America is the only remaining superpower that it is the U.S. which now stands accused of being an evil empire.

4. The Liberal Peace (Revisited)

4.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter will be to examine the liberal peace in greater detail and illustrate the extent to which democracies do not fight each other. The spread of democracy and capitalism after the Cold War represented a triumph of Western liberal ideals and the hope that liberal democratic capitalism could create a New World Order of peace and prosperity. The idea of a liberal peace can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's essay *Perpetual Peace* (1795). Kant argued that a perpetual peace could be achieved through a transformation of individual consciousness, the implementation of a republican constitution and a federal contract among states to abolish war. The idea that liberal democratic states are passive in their relations towards one another was revived in the 1980's with theorists like Michael Doyle (1986) and Bruce Russett (1995). Doyle argued that there are two elements of Kant's legacy which had resulted in a "separate peace," namely: the "pacification of foreign relations", which has helped liberal states establish peace amongst themselves, and the use of "international imprudence", in which liberal states have primarily fought defensive wars and exercised restraint as a means of managing conflict (1986: 1155-6). Without these values and restraints the logic of cooperation is replaced by the pursuit of power which is often cited as the main reason for why non-liberal states become engaged in acts of war.

Attempts to explain the democratic peace stem from Kant's notions of public accountability in which declarations of war would be taken by governments who are accountable to the people as opposed to a monarch. Furthermore, disputes are less likely to arise between states sharing similar values and upholding institutional arrangements that restrict executive power. However, the idea of a liberal peace does not suggest that liberal states never engage in acts of warfare as democratic states are just as aggressive as dictatorships and are just as likely to wage war. But an examination of modern history reveals that, with the exception of a few examples, liberal democratic states hardly ever go to war promoting the idea that democracies do not fight each other (Levy, 1988: 661-2). While there is some debate as to what exactly constitutes a democracy, proponents of the liberal peace agree that democracies are better equipped to avoid wars. The main reason for this is public accountability

whereby the populace can use the electoral process to restrain governments from acts of aggression. Furthermore, liberal democracies are better equipped to settle disputes through diplomatic initiatives and international agencies, such as the OECD and the WTO, which enable states to resolve disputes peacefully and avoid the prospect of war.

4.2. The Realist Challenge to the Liberal Peace

Challenges to the liberal peace generally tend to revolve around the following arguments, namely: the liberal peace does not really exist, and if it did, it is somehow insignificant and that realism provides a better examination of international politics (Hastedt and Knickrehm, 2003: 56). The realist tradition argues that the liberal peace is simply not possible as international politics is essentially conducted in a state of nature and therefore the foreign policies of liberal states would have to reflect this sense of reality. So even if the liberal peace did exist its presence would be insignificant against the strategic balance of power in global politics. Furthermore, there are fundamental problems with establishing the existence of a liberal peace. Firstly, liberal democracies do not always consider each other to be liberal, i.e. problems with perception can often lead to conflict. Secondly, liberal democracies are not always governed by a liberal leader, i.e. a democratic state could be ruled by an autocratic government who may not respect the liberal institutions of another state (Owen, 1994: 120). This has enabled critics of the liberal peace like Layne (1994) and Spiro (1994) to claim that when a conflict does emerge between two liberal democratic states proponents of the liberal peace will often reclassify a democracy as being despotic to support their argument. Finally, if a liberal peace really did exist then democratic states would never make threats towards one another.

Kant's essay on the *Perpetual Peace* has become the pinnacle of an Enlightenment tradition promoting the idea that democratic government will lead to a more peaceful world. But in emphasising that Kant's ideas refer specifically to republics and not democracies, Gates, Knutsen and Moses (1996) have sought to undermine the very foundations on which the democratic peace is based. Their polemic article *Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View* (1996), argues that the proponents of the liberal peace have essentially misinterpreted Kant and are mistaken in their judgement as to what his notion of a democratic peace would be (1996: 6). However, Clare and Danilovic have sought to rectify this

point in *The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)* (2007), by arguing that Kant actually viewed democracy as a form of despotism in which all citizens would exercise executive power (2007: 399). Without a separation of powers this would amount to a form of direct democracy resulting in a form of plebiscite tyranny. For Kant, a democratic government is less important than the spirit of public policy. Here a respect for civil liberties and the rule of law is what will distinguish a liberal from an illiberal state. Therefore, the way the people are governed by a head of state is far more important to Kant than simply who rules. Kant even goes as far as stating that a monarchy could rule over a republic. In making this point he is evidently more concerned with how the general interests of the people will be implemented and expressed as opposed to merely finding representation. So while Kant does not specifically refer to democracy, he clearly does think that a federation of republics would be better equipped than princely states in creating a stable order. Therefore, while Kant's *Perpetual Peace* does not directly refer to the Democratic Peace it nevertheless does advocate an international order of mutual cooperation and moves away from the realist conception that the state is the highest level of sovereign power and international politics is conducted in a state of nature.

In contrast to the above, Layne's article *Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace* (1994), attempts to denounce the liberal peace as an insignificant myth arguing that international politics is essentially an anarchic system of self-help in which the absence of authority and regulation forces states to take responsibility for their own survival. Layne observes that the "imperative of survival in a threatening environment forces states to focus on strategies that maximize their power relative to their rivals" (1994: 11). States will often try to take advantage of others in order to improve their level of self-defence and secure a strategic military advantage. But as military power tends to be more offensive than defensive in nature states are often trapped by a security dilemma in which measures originally taken for self-defence may have a unintended consequence of threatening others. Furthermore, as a state can never be certain as to the true intentions of another state its policies are often a reactionary response to its security concerns being provoked by fear and mistrust. As Waltz explains, "in self-help systems, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures" (1986: 329). From this perspective competition creates a

greater sense of anxiety in the international arena where states can stand to lose their sense of autonomy and face occupation or extinction. Therefore, cooperation between states is possible but it is hard to maintain due the competitive nature of the international system.

The argument of the liberal peace relates more to mature democracies whose institutions have developed and stabilized over a period of time. Therefore, the democratic peace takes time to establish and while peace may prevail in the long term between mature democratic states, in the short term democratization may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. This is an argument which Mansfield and Snyder make in *Democratization and the Danger of War* (1995), arguing that newly democratizing states are more likely to act aggressively than non-democratic states. Their study examines the great powers of Europe during their initial period of democratization and observes that, in a transitional stage of development, democratic institutions are often weak and ineffective (1996: 176-207). Weak institutions combined with various social groups of competing interests can lead to increased tensions and conflict with other states. Weak institutions can also be manipulated by an elitist minority who, in wishing to protect their own interests, may win public support by appealing to national sentiment. Furthermore, unpopular rulers who are desperate to enhance their poor domestic image will often consider winning a foreign war as a strategy for remaining in power. An example of this can be seen during Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 which was initially undertaken by General Galtieri in a desperate attempt to improve his popularity and divert the public's attention away from the country's ailing economy. Here inflaming national sentiment with ideals and aspirations of empire proved to be an effective tool for justifying war but it would ultimately lead to Argentina's humiliating defeat and Galtieri's demise.

The evidence supporting the liberal peace seems compelling but on closer inspection it may simply be just a matter of chance. Spiro's article *The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace* (1994) compares the absence of war between liberal democratic states to the luck of winning a lottery. In the same way that winning a lottery is purely a matter of chance, so *chance* may also explain the liberal peace. Spiro argues that nobody thinks it's strange that millions of people play the lottery each week and lose and only a lucky minority win. So the fact that democracies are usually at peace and not

regularly engaged in war should not be seen as unusual as the absence of war between democracies may simply be just a matter of chance and have nothing to do with a liberal peace hypothesis (Spiro, 1994: 51). Therefore, simply observing that peaceful relations have existed between democratic states is not in itself enough to prove the existence of a liberal peace. Firstly, the absences of war between liberal states may not be that remarkable as tensions between any two states could be peacefully managed regardless of their regime. Doyle acknowledges this point but argues that over the last 200 hundred years there has not been an instance of war between two liberal states (1986: 1156 and Appendix A). In fact over the last two centuries there have only been two examples of liberal democracies going to war against each other, namely: the Spanish American War of 1898 and Finland's entry into World War II on the side of Germany (Hastedt and Knickrehn, 2003: 55). Therefore, democracies have proven themselves to be far more capable of avoiding wars than autocracies. Secondly, peace between two states may simply be the result of a spurious relationship in which democracy and peace are the result of an additional factor and peace is not a direct result of democracy. However, Maoz and Russett's study, *Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986* (1993), tested the hypothesis for evidence of spurious relationships but their study found no real evidence to support such a claim (1993:636). Instead the relationship between democracy and peace was still a significant factor even when other causes and influences were taken into account.

Both Layne and Spiro's research has challenged the liberal peace hypothesis stating that the criteria for classifying democracies and the various operational differences can produce findings in which democracies do appear to go to war. Exceptions to the democratic peace usually involve disputing the definition of the term democracy and how a particular nation is perceived during the time of a conflict. For example, during the American War of Independence (1775-83) most Americans did not consider Britain to be a democracy as the country was ruled by a monarch. The conflict between Britain and America during the American War of Independence can be cited as an example of two democratic states sharing the same culture and values which went to war. However, as Doyle argues during this time America simply did not view Britain as being a democratic state and it was not until

the Reform Act of 1832, when Britain's sovereignty shifted away from the monarchy towards parliament, that relations between Britain and America improved (1980: 1156). Another problem in defending the liberal peace arises from the difficulty in defining the term democracy. The definition of democracy varies from author to author and may change from one historical epoch to another depending on the course of events. So for example, before the outbreak of the First World War social scientists in the U.S. regarded Germany as being a progressive nation state with a modern constitution, but after 1918 Germany was considered to be an autocratic regime (Gates et al, 1996: 4). In this instance Germany's system of government had not significantly changed but the way it was perceived by social scientists had.

The above argument can be further illustrated by Layne's examination of the Venezuela crisis (1895-96), in which he explains that the reason why Britain appeased America in the late nineteenth century was a result of an increased threat from Germany and Russia (1994: 22). Therefore, as Britain could no longer maintain its position of "splendid isolation" it aligned itself with America. But this realist assumption of securing an alliance to maintain power is not entirely defensible. In *How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace* (1994), Owen explains that while Germany posed a threat to British interests in Africa, America in turn posed a threat to British interests in the New World. So Britain's appeasement of America can be understood from the perspective that liberal states will cooperate with one another when they share similar ideologies, i.e. British liberals simply trusted a democratic United States more than an imperial Germany (Owen, 1994: 118). Before the outbreak of the First World War Germany was essentially an autocratic state ruled by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Politically Germany was a feudal aristocracy ruled by a medieval king, the electorate had little influence over the government's decisions to wage war and the press was often restricted as seen when the Kaiser imposed restrictions on anti-war literature in 1913 (Owen, 1994: 121-2). So although the U.S. admired Germany's progressive social policies, Britain intensively disliked Germany's autocratic ideology and most British and Americans regarded Germany as undemocratic.

4.3. Angell and the Capitalist Peace

Increased trade and economic interdependence has been cited as one of the benefits in securing the liberal peace. As levels of trade among nation states increases there is a powerful economic incentive for pursuing a peaceful coexistence. Therefore, proponents of the capitalist peace, such as, Gartzke (2007) and Weede (2004) argue that trade and war are essentially incompatible and cannot exist together. However, the preservation of territory is paramount to the sovereignty of any nation state. Historically territory has been closely associated with a nation's sense of power and prestige, i.e. states having a large expanse of territory would usually have bigger populations producing more labour and possibly more natural resources. As larger territory was equated with having more wealth and the ability to wield more power and influence, wars of conquest have been motivated by a desire to increase territory, power and wealth. However, in *The Great Illusion* (1910), Norman Angell provides an examination of military power in relation to a nation's social and economic advantage and argues that an expansion of territory through war and economic expansion through trade stands in opposition to one another (Hegre, 2005: 29). This effectively challenges the notion that empire provides a pathway to prosperity and that economic growth is a by-product of imperial ambitions. Therefore, states wanting to increase wealth and power have to make a choice between either expanding territory or increasing their level of trade. They cannot simultaneously pursue both, as trade and conflict are simply incompatible.

Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion* (1910) was published four years before the outbreak of the First World War and is essentially an anti-war treaty promoting the ideals of liberal internationalism. Angell argued that war was essentially a destructive pursuit having no value of utility. He therefore urged future governments to pursue peace as a means of avoiding the destructive consequences of conflict and sought to illustrate how free-markets could promote a capitalist peace (Navari, 1989: 341). He argued that the benefits of free-trade made it easier for states to acquire wealth through peaceful trading relations, and therefore, modern industrial economies are less likely to pursue policies of territorial conquest as a means of attaining wealth. Angell explains that there are two main reasons for pursuing a capitalist peace. Firstly, the wealth generated by a modern industrial economy is highly complex to manage and control, this makes it difficult and costly for a hostile

power to invade a foreign country and manage its economy through force. Furthermore, as wealth can be more easily and cheaply acquired through commerce than coercion the rational economic incentives for warfare are removed. Secondly, the effects of global trade have led to the integration of world markets and greater levels of economic integration. These increased levels of integration have strengthened mutual interests in economic growth but globalization has also reduced the extent to which countries can exist as discreet national economies immune from global events (Gartzke, 2007: 170). Therefore, the ill effects of war, financial crisis or a natural disaster travel through the global system inflicting damage on all economies regardless of their position in the world.

The Great Illusion (1910) presented a “blue-print” of modernization, urging governments to recognize the changing social, political and economic conditions that were set to emerge in the modern world. The economic philosophy of Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) had long argued that free markets reflected the underlying conditions of social life which operated in accordance to the laws of nature. Smith therefore advocated a policy of laissez-faire arguing that the social benefits of the free-market would emerge naturally once the economy was free from interference. Angell agreed with Smith’s assumption that free-markets would promote a more rational and civilized society, but he insisted that there was nothing natural about this process. Instead Angell argued that free-markets were the result of specific historical conditions and not the result of natural laws or spontaneous needs, i.e. free-markets are produced by modern economic conditions (Navari, 1989: 342). Furthermore, Angell included a sense of interdependence within his theory of historical change arguing that the social and economic policies of states are guided by greater levels of cooperation and exchange. Proponents of the liberal peace have long argued that economic interdependence helps to promote peace as it increases the cost of war making conflict between states an unprofitable and costly pursuit (Mousseau et al, 2003: 279). From this perspective war is considered irrational and economic development becomes more important than military might. Angell sought to develop an “historically specific theory of what caused interdependence,” explains Narvari, “and of why some states found themselves in a condition of vulnerability” (1989:342). Angell argued that interdependence emerged at a specific point in time due to specific historical conditions in which free-markets were determined more by historical

conditions than by the forces of natural law. The social conditions promoting economic development have increasingly led to greater levels of interdependence reducing the prospect of war and conflict.

Economic trade is greatly enhanced by investments and development in infrastructure and equipment which provides a deterrent against the use of conflict. Acts of warfare are costly and undermine the economic development of states by destroying vast swathes of infrastructure and investment made to a state's productive resources. States with higher levels of economic resources have less incentive to become embroiled in costly wars that will lead to the destruction of infrastructure, loss of investment and undermine economic development. In *The Capitalist Peace* (2007), Gartzke argues that a free-market economy provides two essential ingredients in securing a liberal peace. Firstly, free-markets are sensitive to government policy and react quickly to political events. "Actions that frighten markets discourage investment, drive down economic conditions domestically," explains Garzke, "and thus are likely to be avoided by local leaders" (2005: 32). Secondly, modern economies create their wealth through financial services and manufactured exports which don't require the occupation of foreign territory. Gartzke clearly illustrates this point when he explains "the historical impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital," which leads Gartzke to conclude that "land does little to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of military occupation" (2007: 166). Therefore, countries that create wealth through intellectual and financial capital are less dependent on securing territory as a means of achieving economic growth and have little incentive to invade and occupy foreign territory. From this perspective the democratic peace is largely the consequence of trading relations between developed states (Mousseau et al, 2003: 282).

The argument that interstate trade helps to promote economic development and encourage the creation of democratic institutions remains a contested issue. In *The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization* (2004), Weede acknowledges that trade and democracy do help to promote a liberal peace, stating that "peace by trade is at least as important as peace by democracy" (2004: 173). This suggests that free-markets have the same potential as democracy to liberate states from the prospect of

war. But the assumption that interstate trade, economic development and democracy are somehow all inter-related is somewhat misleading. In *How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace* (2003), Mousseau, Hegre and Oneal collectively argue that “trade, democracy and development are theoretically distinct concepts; and none is a sufficient cause of another” (2003: 282). So for example there are poor democracies with limited trade, such as, India and wealthy states like Saudi Arabia which are not democratic and oil rich countries like Nigeria, which despite being wealthy and democratic, have failed to economically develop (*Ibid*, 2003: 282). But nevertheless, Mousseau, Hegre and Oneal’s study on free-markets and the liberal peace does generally conclude that economic interdependence has a pacifying effect on trading states. Furthermore, economic development and liberal democracy are mutually conditioned, i.e. a modern economy relies upon the state to ensure that contracts are legally binding therefore as markets develop they help promote democracy and the rule of law. As the institutions of democracy respect the rule of law they not only protect the operation of free-markets, which help promote economic development, but they also share a constitutionally constrained respect for the rule of law in foreign affairs which compels governments to resolve conflicts through peaceful negotiations and not through acts of military coercion (Mousseau et al, 2003: 300-301).

The main challenge to Angell’s *The Great Illusion* (1910) is that in the immediate course of historical events his assumptions were proved wrong. The outbreak of the First World War (1914-18), the Wall Street Crash of 1929 followed by the Great Depression and the Second World War (1939-45) all seemed to undermine the prospect of a capitalist peace. The ideological tensions of the Cold War restricted democracy and free-trade, stifling the optimism of a liberal peace for another forty-five years. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War a truly global economy emerged and with it the optimism of a New World Order promoting democracy and free-trade. Today globalization has spread throughout the world integrating economies and increasing the prospect for greater peace and prosperity. Just over a century later the ideas expressed in Angell’s *The Great Illusion* (1910), which seemed so absurd against the events of the twentieth century, appear today as a credible study promoting the benefits of a capital peace. Angell’s

observation would later mark a shift in conceptual thinking moving away from the theories of natural law towards the sociological conditions leading to greater levels of economic interdependence.

4.4. Hegemony and Economic Interdependence

Since the eighteenth-century liberal economic theories have been closely linked to political ideas favouring constitutional democracy and respect for the rule of law. Increased economic interdependence and free-trade encourage peaceful relations between states and reduce tensions which could lead to conflict. The spread of globalization is associated with the idea of liberal progress in which democracy, and free-trade helps to promote an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. But for realists power and security is still the dominant factor governing international relations and to reject this notion would be to overlook the fact that international politics is essentially conducted in a state of nature (Morgenthau, 1946 and Carr, 1961). From this perspective the international system is inherently unstable and international trade is often seen in terms of zero-sum game in which the empowerment of one state can only be achieved at the expense of another. As empires are built on military power and ruthless commercial trade, international politics can be observed in terms of military strength in which conflict and competition determine the rise and fall of great powers (Kennedy, 1989). Therefore, realism rejects the notion that a liberal peace can be achieved through increased levels of trade and instead insists that stability can only be achieved by the existence of a dominant power or hegemon.

According to the theory of “hegemonic stability”, a system of world order can only be achieved by the existence of a dominant power capable of asserting a sense of control over other states. This requires the efforts of an economic and military superpower which is prepared to act as a global hegemon. “Without this hegemon, the order will collapse,” observes Hegre, therefore “the liberal peace requires adhesion to the rules of a liberal international economic power” (2005: 32). In order for a hegemonic power to be able to protect an international political economy it must possess sufficient military power to provide protection against a hostile power. The protection of economic interest may become an issue of military security in which case military power becomes a central component to the theory of hegemonic stability. Nowhere is this theory more clearly illustrated than during the years of the Cold War in which Western states enjoyed high levels of economic growth and

a sustained period of peace. This period of economic stability was partly the result of an international alliance of Western powers who stood in opposition to the Soviet Union. Therefore, a liberal peace and economic growth was only achieved as a result of a global contest of superpower rivalry in which the U.S. achieved hegemonic stability through being the dominant leader of a Western alliance of liberal democratic states promoting the free market under the protection of NATO.

During the Cold War the NATO alliance greatly reinforced the realist position that international politics is dominated by the pursuit of power and there is no higher authority than that of the nation state. The threat of Soviet expansion was held in check by the nuclear deterrent of MAD as opposed to the actions of an international institution like the U.N. Here the absence of a higher authority becomes the most important feature of the global system. International politics is conducted in a state of nature in which states see one another as potential adversaries pursuing their own self-interest in a lawless arena of power politics. Under these conditions basic survival is considered the primary objective of all states which in turn characterises their relationship towards all other states. Without the existence of an effective higher authority to enforce laws and regulations a struggle for basic survival becomes the state's primary objective. But as all states have the potential to destroy one another there is no real means to ensure survival and guard against an attack. This poses a "security dilemma" in which increasing levels of security will not necessarily ensure greater protection from a rival state (Hegre, 2005: 18-19). If one state increases its level of security in order to guard against an attack it decreases the level of security in other states and disrupts the balance of power. This disruption can provoke other states into embarking upon an arms race in order to redress the imbalance of power by enhancing their own security. In the end the first state may well find itself back where it started and facing an adversary which is now potentially even more dangerous.

When considering issues of danger and security survival still remains the primary objective of any state so a democracy should be just as likely to go to war as an autocracy if its survival is threatened. While Hegre agrees that democracies and autocracies both share the same objectives to ensure survival, when it comes to increasing wealth he argues that the two regimes will often behave in a different manner. In *Development and the Liberal Peace* (2005), Hegre explains that in a

democracy the government is accountable to the people and wealth is spread across a broad spectrum of the population which includes a diversity of varying interests. But in an autocracy the dictator is not democratically accountable to the people and wealth is often restricted to a smaller percentage of the population. Therefore, “an autocratic leader may benefit disproportionately from war,” observes Hegre, but “the prosperity of a dictator typically depends on the amount of resources that can be extracted from the economy” (2005: 27). In order to increase revenue the regime will often draw upon the nation’s tax base an example of this can be seen during the reign of Bernabò Visconti (1323-85), the Lord of Milan, whose despotic rule raised huge sums of money through unscrupulous taxation and financed his wars of conquest. “For a dictator, it is quite certain that territorial expansion increases prosperity,” states Hegre, therefore an autocratic leader may actually stand to benefit from engaging in war (2005: 27). Furthermore, in an autocracy the rulers are not held accountable to the people and need only satisfy the needs of a small minority. In a dictatorship the politically disempowered majority will typically bear the greatest cost of war in terms of financial burden and risking their lives while a relatively small minority will live to enjoy the spoils of war. So while the majority of the population may not benefit in terms of greater resources or growth in income, military expansion would still be regarded as a success if it provided huge economic benefits to a small minority.

While increased levels of economic interdependence does not alleviate a state’s security concerns it does promote a greater level of cooperation and reduces the likelihood of open conflict. Furthermore, economic interdependence often leads to military cooperation in which trading states form a military alliance in order to protect their common vested interests. For example the Munich Conference of 1938 marked the high point of appeasement among European powers in which Britain and France agreed to allow German occupation of the Sudetenland. But while a group of states might form a partnership and trade peacefully with each other they could still be aggressive towards other states with which they share no mutual interests and the agreement could ultimately fall apart. This would reinforce the argument that trading alliances and military cooperation are really nothing more than a form of appeasement sustained by commercial interests. However, Hegre argues that trading relations will be undermined by military conflict as war disrupts trade through blockades restricting

commercial activity and creating uncertainty. War also destroys confidence and undermines a trading partner's trust (2005: 30). Trading partners are deterred by the prospect of higher risks and lower returns which discourages investment. So when a state engages in a military conflict trading relations are undermined by a threat to security leading to a loss of confidence. Therefore, a war with one state damages the trading relations of all.

4.5. Conclusion

From the various observations presented above the following arguments concerning the validity of the liberal peace can be made. The proponents of the liberal peace argue that the empirical evidence drawn from a large number of case studies validates the theory that democracies do not fight each other. However, Layne questions the "casual logic" of the liberal peace and argues that the evidence needs to be re-examined. While Layne agrees that the "proponents of a liberal theory of international politics have constructed an appealing vision of perpetual peace within a zone of democracy and prosperity" he insists that this is really an illusion (1994: 7, 48). There is no evidence that democratic systems of government have significantly altered the international political system and there is no real evidence that economic interdependence promotes peace. Therefore, Layne argues that the widely held view that democracies do not fight each other is largely based upon a series of examples and tests which either prove that states are democratic when war is avoided and not democratic when wars take place. So for realists international politics continues to operate in a competitive world of self-help in which power remains the only rationale for states pursuing their own interests in an international system of anarchy. This is a reality which has to be confronted as it cannot be transcended by the ideological notion of a liberal peace.

While the idea of the democratic peace essentially argues that liberal states help promote a greater sense of stability it does not completely reject the realist notion of power and strategy in international politics. Russett argues that realism still retains a valid basis of argument but he opposes the "vulgar" realist notion that the international arena consists of a perpetual war against all "in which the threat that other states pose is unaffected by their internal norms and institutions" (1995: 175). Statistically the liberal peace demonstrates that democracies do not fight each other but they are just as

likely to become engaged in wars than any other regime (Maoz and Russett, 1993). While power and strategy effect the calculations of nation states democracy does not entirely eliminate war, Russett nevertheless maintains that shared democratic values greatly contribute towards maintaining peace and stability. On balance the liberal structuralist view of the liberal peace appears to be vindicated by the empirical argument that democracies do not fight each other. This effectively supports Kant's argument of the *Perpetual Peace* in which a holy trinity of democracy, free trade and respect for the rule of law creates a federation of states capable of sustaining peace and ending the scourge of war (Owen, 1994: 95-6). Furthermore, as liberal democracies are accountable to their citizens, their foreign policies will reflect the interests of the people which are seen as universal and shared by all. However, the idea that liberal democratic ideals reflect universal interests may in fact become a source of conflict if imposed upon other civilizations and cultures. In the next chapter the cause of such conflicts will be explored in greater detail when discussing the ideas of Samuel P. Huntington and *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996).

5. The Clash of Civilizations

5.1. Introduction

When *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993) first appeared in *Foreign Affairs* it generated more discussion in three years than any other article published since the 1940's (Chiozza, 2002: 711). Huntington's article was later expanded into a book which has been heavily criticised for its apocalyptic vision of the future. Intellectuals like Chomsky (2003) and Said (2001) have condemned Huntington's portrayal of civilizations for being too simplistic and culturally offensive. Defenders of the liberal peace like Russett and Oneal (2000) have conducted complex tests and constructed elaborate arguments to disprove Huntington's "theory" of conflict between civilizations. But while these arguments have succeeded in producing a body of criticism and conclusive evidence, they overlook the fact that *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) is a *paradigm* and not a *theory*. Huntington is not attempting to present a new theoretical approach to the study of International Relations, he is simply using civilization as a basis from which to explain the source and nature of future conflict. It is "meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War," explains Huntington; "It aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policy makers" (1996:13). Therefore, *The Clash of Civilizations* is not intended to be read as a work of social science presenting a formal theory it is simply a paradigm, and as Huntington clearly states, "no paradigm is eternally valid" (*Ibid*, 13-4). So while the concept of civilizations may be useful to understanding global politics in the late twentieth century this does not mean that it will be relevant in the twenty-first.

Huntington's depiction of conflict between civilizations is among the most thought provoking and controversial visions of the post-Cold War world. His central claim is that civilizational conflict will become the greatest threat to world peace and future conflicts will not be ideological, political or economic in nature but will emerge from cultural tensions (Huntington, 1993b: 22). Huntington's methodology is rooted in a realist conception of world politics and his use of empirical evidence helps to explain and support his ideas. His ideas on conflict reflect elements of social psychology and the conditions under which intragroup cohesion can be enhanced by pursuing confrontation with others. In

The Functions of Social Conflict (1956), Coser examines the nature of conflict theory and explains how conflict can be used to solidify a social group. Huntington effectively extends these ideas to international politics and argues that global cohesion could be maintained by nurturing conflict between states. His arguments provide a form of cultural realism in which a primordial sense of ethnic and national identity forms the basis of conflict. Here ethnic and national identities, religious and cultural beliefs will influence policy makers and the goals that states pursue in determining the character of the international arena (Chiozza, 2002: 714). Therefore, interstate conflict is an unavoidable feature of global politics and while Huntington does not advocate the use of conflict he does believe that the future of global politics will be determined by a Clash of Civilizations.

5.2. Fault Lines of Future Conflict

The Clash of Civilizations is an attempt to describe the character of a post-Cold War paradigm. It sets out which groups of countries will be the most important in world affairs in the twenty-first century and the most relevant to our understanding of global politics. In the post-Cold War world Huntington argues that patterns of conflict and cooperation are essentially shaped by a nation's culture and the nature of civilization (1993a: 186-7). For Huntington the history of the international system has been about an evolution of conflict and struggle arising between monarchs, empires, ideologies and finally civilizations. Like Marx, Huntington argues that the course of history is essentially about conflict and struggle. The source of this conflict is based around cultural identities, in which differences in religion, customs and traditions increasingly become a means of establishing an opposing dialectic. Therefore, the clash of civilizations is essentially a continuation of history in which future international developments will be determined by conflicts emerging within and between various civilizations. From an evolutionary perspective civilizations are seen as the natural successor to the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Huntington's study examines human motivations following the end of the Cold War and the possible reasons for future conflict. The basis of his theory argues that conflicts are more likely to occur between different civilizations with distinctly different cultures. From Huntington's perspective "civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale" (1996a: 207). Here the central contention of Huntington's thesis relies

upon the notion that states from different civilizations are more likely to clash than states which share a common civilization. Therefore, cultural identity will become the central force in determining the future of global politics.

Huntington argues that following the Cold War global conflict will occur at the fault lines of major civilizations and culture will increasingly replace ideology as a source of conflict. While nation states will still remain as key actors in international affairs, he argues that the ideals of civilization will increasingly come into play, i.e. when nations share a common culture and the people of those states identify themselves as being part of the same civilization then politics will reflect these common concerns. Huntington describes a civilization as being “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (1996a: 43). He argues that civilization is essentially “culture writ large,” and the central defining characteristic of a civilization is its religion. Therefore, “the major civilizations in human history,” according to Huntington, “have been closely identified with the world’s great religions” (Henderson, 2004: 541). Huntington contends that religion is one the most important elements which either unites or divides different civilizations. In Huntington’s view religion is the most profound difference between civilizations. Clashes between civilizations are greatly enhanced by beliefs in a different god. Therefore, conflicts between civilizations are more likely to occur between people of different religions. The reasons for this in Huntington’s view is that religion is far more significant than that of race and nationality, a person could be of mixed race or hold dual nationality but it would be very difficult to practice more than one religion. Therefore religious identity becomes far more exclusive as it reflects a deeper sense of conception as to one’s self and the principles governing nature, society and the self. Huntington argues that religion is a central focus of conflict. “Faith and family, blood and belief are what people identify with,” observes Huntington, “and that is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics” (1993a: 194).

Huntington argues that the world is essentially made up of seven or eight different civilizations which create a series of fault lines from which confrontation may result. These

civilizations can be grouped as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and finally African civilization. Huntington is adamant that civilizations are destined to clash and argues that conflicts will occur along cultural fault lines which can be grouped into the six following categories (1993b: 25). The first category pertains to the existence of different civilizations in which people are separated in terms of their history, language, culture, traditions and religion. These differences shape society's views on their relationship with God, individual rights and freedom and notions of authority. Furthermore, these are fundamental differences which have been shaped over long periods of time and cannot be easily changed. In the second category increased levels of migration have led to greater levels of interaction among and within civilizations. These increased levels of multi-cultural interaction have led to increased levels of tension and anxiety often resulting in hostility towards other groups. The third category refers to how globalization is weakening the state as a source of national identity and destroying local customs and traditions. This loss of cultural identity is provoking an increase in religious fundamental ideology. The revival of religious militancy provides a basis of identity which unites civilizations but it also promotes increased levels of hostility towards other groups (1993b: 25-26).

In the fourth category of cultural fault lines, Huntington identifies a sense of national consciousness is growing among non-western states. As the West exports its customs and influence it also causes non-western countries to re-examine their own identities and a resurgence of nationalism is beginning to emerge. An example of this can be seen in Turkey where a religious and national resurgence can be observed. In the 1920's Atatürk's government implemented a programme of Western reforms and Islam ceased to be the state religion, but despite decades of incremental reform Turkey's secular society is undergoing an Islamic revival. This cultural and national resurgence is most evident among the elites of non-western society who traditionally had adsorbed Western influences through education and association with Western institutions (Lechner and Boli: 2008: 41-42). The fifth category concerns the manner in which political and economic associations are being replaced with cultural loyalties. In economic and political conflicts, which revolve around an ideology, a person's economic circumstances and political loyalties can change but in a conflict emerging out of

civilizations one's nationality, race and religion is fixed cannot be changed. Therefore, in a clash of ideology the question is "which side are you on?" but in a clash of civilizations one's identity is fixed and the question is simply "what are you?" (Huntington, 1993b: 27). The sixth category pertains to economic regionalism which has been increasing with the creation of large trading blocs and single markets. The first of these can be observed in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which later evolved into a common market and the European Union. In 1967 the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) increased regional cooperation between Asian states contributing to the rise of the tiger economies in the 1990's. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1993 has created one of the world's largest trading blocs whose regional and economic cooperation spans across the North-South divide. As these global trading blocs increase economic regionalism will strengthen economic inter-dependence and promote a common identity among civilizations (Lechner and Boli, 2008: 41-42). But while economic regionalism will strengthen interdependence, Huntington argues that trading blocs will usually develop between countries from the same civilization, and therefore, economic regionalism could become a source of tension between different civilizations.

Huntington's ideas are based upon four key developments, namely: the relative decline of the West, the rise of Asia and China, the resurgence of Islam and the impact of globalization. This emergence is primarily the result of an increase in multi-culturalism, a rise of national sentiment and anti-western feelings among elitist groups in non-western states. It also includes newly emerging economic powers promoting greater cultural awareness, and a growing resurgence of religious and national identity. All these factors coupled with rising economic growth in non-western states are challenging the West's position of global dominance. Huntington argues that these factors are forging a new international order and observes that the clash of civilizations will occur at two basic levels, namely: a macro and a micro level (Henderson, 2001: 318). "At the macro level world politics are likely to involve conflicts and shifting power balances of states from different civilizations," explains Huntington, "and at the micro level the most violent, prolonged and dangerous [...] conflicts are likely to be between states and groups from different civilizations" (1993a: 187). At the micro level rivalry

exists between different civilizations across local fault lines whereby the most violent, prolonged and dangerous conflicts are likely to occur. At this level civilizations sharing a common culture are likely to band together forming alliances against opposing cultures creating an environment of conflict. These principles are then extended to the macro level of world politics which are characterised by conflicts and shifting balances of power between states from different civilizations. At this level conflict exists between a global division of states, namely: the West and the Rest in which Western civilization stands in opposition to China and the Islamic world.

5.3. The West versus the Rest

Huntington's clash of civilizations produces a cultural dialectic implying that the West is essentially better than the rest and must seek to prevail over other cultures whose values and institutions are different. *The Clash of Civilizations* adopts a West versus the Rest dichotomy in which democratic states are faced by a hostile non-democratic world which is hostile to its presence. Huntington argues that Islamic and Confucian civilizations are fundamentally in conflict with Western values and believes that these civilizations are essentially incapable of democratization. Therefore, the West should continue to pursue its superiority and ignore the rest. "In a multipolar, multicivilizational world, the West's responsibility is to secure its own interests," states Huntington, "not to promote those of other peoples when those conflicts are of little or no consequence to the West" (1996b: 42). Huntington is of the opinion that the West's continued domination over the rest of the world will become an on-going source of conflict. He explains that the reason for conflict will stem from Western efforts to promote liberal democracy as a universal value, advance economic interests and maintain a position of military dominance" (1993b: 43).

After the Cold War the U.S. emerged as the last remaining superpower, dominating the world in terms of military and economic power. But while the U.S. is the only superpower Huntington insists that this does not mean that the world is unipolar (1999: 35-36). Global politics has moved on from the bipolar system of the Cold War through to a unipolar system as seen during the first Gulf War (1991) and is now passing through a series of uni-multipolar decades. The current international system is a "strange hybrid, a *uni-multipolar* system" observes Huntington, consisting of one primary super power

and several other major powers (*Ibid*, 37). The U.S. is still the dominant power with the capacity to act in international affairs but it needs a degree of cooperation from other major powers. Furthermore, “the United States lacks the domestic political base to create a unipolar world,” states Huntington, and “American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver. The result is a foreign policy of “rhetoric and retreat” and a growing reputation as a “hollow hegemon” (*Ibid*, 40). So while the United States still remains a supreme military and economic power with the diplomatic resources to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world it still needs to act in partnership with others states to maintain its power. Therefore, the United States cooperates closely with Saudi Arabia to counter Iran’s growing power and nuclear ambitions in the Gulf. The U.S. has also developed closer relations with the Ukraine, Georgia and Uzbekistan as a means of countering Russian power and the special relationship with Britain provides the U.S. with some degree of leverage in the European Union (Huntington, 2003: 9). In all these cases U.S. cooperation helps to serve mutual interests and counter the influence of major regional powers, but it also illustrates Huntington’s image of the U.S. as a “hollow hegemon” having limited powers and unable to act freely in a unipolar world.

During the Cold War the U.S. was able to assert its influence as a dominant hegemon in a bi-polar world. As the dominant military power in the NATO alliance sustaining a nuclear stalemate through a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the U.S. was able to ensure a strategic balance of power and a position of overwhelming dominance. Attempts at sustaining the legacy of the Cold War was evident in the rhetoric of President George W. Bush whose war on terror divided the world into liberal states defending freedom and democracy against an axis of evil. The neo-con think tank *Project for the New American Century* (1997-2006) proposed a huge increase in military spending so as to enable the U.S. to “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars” (Donnelly, 2000: iv). But the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq may have exposed the limits of U.S. military capabilities and the rising economic might of the BRIC economies may challenge U.S. economic power. Continued Western domination seemed assured in the early years after the Cold War but today the world is rapidly changing and economic power is shifting away from the West towards a set of newly industrializing states. In *The Post-American World* (2008), Zakaria Fareed examines the

rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China and explains how these newly emerging BRIC economies will overtake many Western powers in the twenty-first century (2008: 1-6). Evidence supporting Fareed's claim can be observed in December 2011 when the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) reported that Brazil had just overtaken Britain as the world's sixth largest economy and predicted that by 2020 Britain is likely to be surpassed by Russia and India (Kampfer, 2011: 12). While the size of a country's economy does not necessarily reflect the extent of its economic power or its ability to influence world events, the rise of the BRIC economies is significant in terms of economic change (see Appendix B and C). But whether this change will challenge Western domination or significantly alter the global balance of power remains unclear.

The West is likely to remain one of the most powerful civilizations for many years to come, and as it asserts its power and influence upon non-Western societies they will be confronted with a choice. Some will simply emulate the West and join the "band-wagon" of Western values others may try to project their own economic and military power so as to create a "balance" against the West (Huntington, 1993b: 41). In being confronted by this geo-political reality Huntington argues that the West essentially has two options, firstly: it needs to consolidate its power and defend itself against the rest, and secondly: the United States should strengthen its relations with Europe and Latin America, maintain good relations with Russia and Japan and protect its interests against the rise of China and the threat of Islam. Huntington has been criticised for stating that "Islam has bloody borders" (1993b: 35) but the potential threat from the Muslim world should not be underestimated. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, thirty-two armed conflicts were recorded in 2000 of which twenty-three involved Muslims (Huntington, 2003: 13-14). "The time has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality," states Huntington, "and to promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations" (1996b: 41). In order to maintain a position of dominance the West needs to maintain its economic and military superiority and try to exploit differences between various civilizations. Therefore, in order for the West to maintain a position of ideological hegemony over the rest, the West should seek to devise policies that will ensure its ability to meet the challenges of an increasingly competitive world.

The West has continued its efforts to promote liberal democracy through acts of military intervention and regime change as seen in Afghanistan (2001-present), Iraq (2003-11) and Libya (2011). It has also continued to advance its economic interests and maintain a position of military dominance. The consequence of these efforts could lead to a conflict between the “West and the Rest” in which the future axis of global politics could be determined by the reaction of non-western civilizations to the continued domination of the West. The most prominent forms of resistance are likely to come from Confucian and Islamic states who may form alliances in order to challenge Western power. The West needs to prepare for such eventualities and consider the implications of its actions. Huntington argues that these implications need to be divided between securing a short-term advantage and long-term accommodation (Huntington, 1993c: 1). In the short-term it is in the West’s interests to promote greater cooperation within the sphere of its own civilization, i.e. Europe and North America incorporating Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are closer to the West. Maintain close relations with Russia and Japan and strengthen relations with regimes who are sympathetic to Western values. The West should strive to strengthen international institutions that will promote Western interests. The West should also seek to limit the military expansion of potentially hostile civilizations, such as, China and the Middle-East and seek to exploit the differences and conflicts between Confucian and Islamic states. Achieving these objectives would require a policy of full spectrum dominance, i.e. maintaining Western military superiority in the middle-east and south-east Asia, but whether this objective is sustainable during increasing levels of global competition appears somewhat unlikely.

5.4. Rejecting a Universal Civilization

Western civilization is often portrayed as a “universal civilization” whose principals can be adopted throughout the rest of the world. Globalization is promoting the aspirations of a universal civilization by spreading liberal democratic values throughout the world and uniting humanity in an acceptance of common values. Huntington agrees that at a superficial level Western culture has spread throughout the rest of the world most notably in the form of mass consumption and popular culture. But at a more fundamental level Western concepts are considered to be fundamentally different from that of

traditional societies and their influence is fiercely opposed. The principles of freedom and democracy, promoting liberal ideals of individual equality and respect for human rights, often have little relevance to Islamic, Confucian, Hindu or similar orthodox cultures. The propagation of Western ideals is seen by many traditional societies as evidence of “imperialism”, whereby respect for human rights and the rule of law, becomes a means through which the West can condemn the customs and practices of a traditional society. The idea of a “universal society” is essentially a Western idea which presupposes that people have universal qualities and characteristics which are essentially the same. However, this is not accepted by more traditional societies, such as in Africa, where the existence of kinship and tribe places an emphasis on what distinguishes people from one another. Huntington questions the legitimacy of a world community stating that, “the very phrase ‘the world community’ has become the euphemistic collective noun,” giving global legitimacy to the interests of the U.S. and its Western allies (1993b: 39). Today’s modern liberal democratic governments are essentially Western in terms of values and origin. When Western ideals have taken root in non-Western countries it has usually been done through some form of Western intervention like colonialism or enforced regime change.

Liberal democracy has been presented by Kojève and Fukuyama as a “universal and homogenous state” which can be applied to any culture (Fukuyama, 1992b: 66). But liberal democratic ideals of individualism, secularism and respect for human rights have not been readily embraced by orthodox cultures. Huntington argues that the notion of a “world community” or “Free World” is nothing more than a euphemism for Western dominance, in which the U.S. and other Western powers use the ideals of freedom and democracy to give themselves a sense of global legitimacy from which to justify their domination over weaker states. Western institutions like the IMF and the World Bank are a case in point. These institutions were originally created after the Second World War as a means of providing newly independent countries with credit for national development. But after years of economic mismanagement these newly independent states had squandered their wealth and were now saddled with huge debts. Today the IMF and World Bank are regarded by many ordinary people in the developing world as an oppressive instrument which promotes Western economic interests at the expense of developing countries. “In any poll of non-Western peoples,” observes Huntington, “the

IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavourable rating from just about everybody else” (1993b: 39). Huntington goes on to argue that other international institutions like the UN Security Council are dominated by Western interests. Here the West will use its influence in the UN to acquire the legitimacy it needs to justify imposing sanctions or acts of military intervention. So the notion of a world community bound together by liberal democratic institutions is in Huntington’s view absurd, stating that “the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interest and promote Western political and economic values” (*Ibid*, 40). Therefore, the struggle for military, economic and institutional power is a source of conflict between the West and other civilizations, and this disproportionate imbalance of power will provoke conflicts between civilizations. The West and the Islamic world is perhaps the clearest example. America’s relations with Iran have been in a state of decline ever since the fall of the Shah in 1979 and Iran still sees the U.S. as the Great Satan whose military presence in the Gulf is a symbol of U.S. imperial power.

Huntington attacks the idea that Western culture will one day become universal. He rejects the “*Coca-Colonization*” thesis in which American popular culture will envelop the world with its consumer products. He also dismisses the theory of “modernization” which argues that as countries modernize and become more developed so they become more Westernized in their values and attitudes. In “*The West: Unique, Not Universal*” (1996), Huntington states that “modernization and economic development neither require nor produce westernization” (1996: 37). Instead they provoke indigenous cultures into reacting against the effects of Western influences and reassert their efforts to preserve their own traditional values. The ill-effect of urbanization generates feelings of alienation and a crisis of identity which is often alleviated by religion. Huntington argues that “the global revival of religion is a direct consequence of modernization” (*Ibid*, 37). The steady increase of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world since 1996 is evidence that a growing sense of alienation is being replaced by a revival in religious sentiment. Huntington explains that at an individual level, the movement of people into unfamiliar cities and occupations breaks their traditional

local bonds. But at a societal level, “modernization enhances the economic wealth and military power of the country as a whole and encourages people to have confidence in their heritage and to become culturally assertive” (*Ibid*, 37). As a consequence many non-Western societies revert back to their indigenous culture. The promotion of Asian values during the rise of the tiger economies during the early 1990’s supports the claim that economic success often reinforces a sense of self-belief in one’s own culture. Dore’s insightful study on *Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture* (1984) suggests that Western influence is receding in former colonies due to a phenomenon he describes as “second-generation indigenization”, in which larger numbers of university graduates are attending local universities as opposed to studying abroad (1984: 420-1). This reduced exposure to Western institutions is resulting in a regression of Western influence causing indigenous peoples to revert back to their indigenous customs. This ultimately leads to an erosion of Western institutions and their influence in Non-Western countries.

Huntington makes the point that democratization in non-Western countries does not necessarily lead to the spread of Western values. Indigenization produces a democratic paradox in which non-Western societies adopt Western style elections but this does not result in the spread of Western values. If anything electoral competition actually promotes anti-Western sentiments and often produces governments which are hostile towards the West. Huntington explains that “politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are” (1996b: 39). Instead politicians produce a manifesto which they believe will appeal to the sentiments of voters and this may well be anti-Western in tone. Therefore, democratic elections can often lead to a popular mobilization against Western-orientated elites and the West in general. Huntington goes on to explain that increased levels of global interaction will not necessarily lead to a common culture of interdependence as “wars occur most frequently between societies with high levels of interaction, and interaction frequently reinforces existing identities and produces resistance, reaction and confrontation” (1993a: 192). He rejects the assumption that increased modernization and economic development creates a homogenizing effect producing a common culture and argues that while wealthy industrialized societies do share common cultural traits, these societies tend to be Western

societies. Here a distinction needs to be made between modernization and Westernization. Japan, Singapore and Saudi Arabia are considered to be modern, prosperous societies but they are not Western in terms of culture and values (*Ibid*, 192). Therefore, modernization and economic development does not necessarily lead to a process of Westernization.

Globalization is spreading innovation to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) throughout the world. This promotes technological advancement and enables under-developed regions to prosper. Furthermore, the spread of popular culture has become a potent symbol of a universal civilization catering to the needs of a consumer society. While Huntington acknowledges the extent to which the modern world is driven by innovation and mass consumption he remains sceptical that such developments are evidence of a universal civilization. Throughout history, “cultural fads have been transmitted from civilization to civilization,” observes Huntington, as various innovations from one civilization have been adopted by another (1996a: 58). Sometimes they are adopted out of necessity to ensure progress or to satisfy the curiosity for an exotic taste, but often they are simply imposed upon an indigenous culture. Whatever the reason may be for adopting these innovations, the spread of innovation is usually a reflection of one civilization’s power over another. It is from this perspective that Huntington dismisses the notion that the spread of popular culture is evidence of a universal civilization spreading Western values of democracy and capitalism. “The essence of Western civilization,” observes Huntington, “is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac. The fact that non-Westerners may bite into the latter has no implications for their accepting the former” (*Ibid*, 58). Therefore, the argument that the spread of popular culture represents a triumph of Western civilization simply trivializes Western culture and fails to acknowledge the extent to which other civilizations are opposed to its values.

5.5. Conclusion

In the final chapter of *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996), Huntington warns of the dangers of trying to impose the values of Western civilizations onto other nations. He observes that throughout history various civilizations have at one point in time been convinced of their own immortality and provides examples of how the Roman, Ottoman and British empires were all convinced that their civilizations

had achieved a permanent sense of social order. But in reality, “societies that assume that their history has ended,” warns Huntington, “are usually societies whose history is about to decline” (1996a: 301). However, Huntington does consider the prospect of achieving global security by focussing on the commonalities which unite civilizations. Instead of promoting the universal features of one civilization, one should focus on qualities that are common to all civilizations. Therefore, instead of promoting a New World Order of liberal democracy and global capitalism, policy makers would be better advised to consider an international multi-civilizational order as a means of avoiding future conflict (*Ibid*, 318). But the difficulty with a multi-civilizational order is how to find a means of encouraging active participation without simply imposing one civilization’s will upon another. While other powers may seek to challenge U.S. hegemony their cultural differences are likely to make it difficult for them to organize an effective coalition of resistance (Huntington, 1999: 46). Therefore, the dominance of one civilization over a variety of others would result in accusations of imperialism leading to a fragile system characterised by coercion and resentment.

Huntington nevertheless concludes that the fundamental and innate differences among civilizations will lead to conflict. The Sinic and Islamic world opposes the West over issues of arms control and sees the promotion of Western liberal democratic values as a form of neo-imperialism. Therefore, continued Western hegemony will only serve to increase tensions between civilizations. Huntington argues that the weakness and irrationality of the rest will oppose the spread of Western values and believes that the future will not consist of a peaceful coexistence between civilizations but one of conflict and violent clashes. In the long-term the West needs to accommodate non-Western civilizations and this will require developing a more profound understanding of these civilizations and identifying areas of commonality from which mutual interests can be pursued. Non-Western civilizations will want to acquire wealth and technology for national development. This may well result in Non-Western civilizations becoming modern without becoming Western. In this case the future is unlikely to consist of a universal civilization but could resemble a variety of civilizations coexisting within a framework of universal cooperation (Huntington, 1992c:1). However, Huntington’s study of civilizations does not fully appreciate the extent to which the world has been

transformed by the effects of globalization and the impact that this is having on cultural identity. So in the next chapter of this study I will examine the impact of globalization and review the extent to which societies are being transformed by the effects of a global consumer culture.

6. Global Consumer Culture

6.1. Introduction

The idea of a global economy began to emerge in Europe at the turn of the sixteenth-century and has gradually expanded to encompass the entire world. The age of Enlightenment sought to promote the ideals of freedom and democracy and aspire to a universal belief in justice and progress (Axford, 1996: 159). Enlightenment thinkers like J. S. Mill (1861) and Adam Smith (1776) promoted the notion that democracy and capitalism should become universal. For these theorists the Enlightenment project would ultimately replace the customs and traditions of indigenous cultures with a single world-wide order founded on the principles of logic, sense and reason. Over time democratic capitalism would be extended throughout the world and a global free-market would become a reality. As existing economic systems and cultures became redundant they would lose their significance and increasingly merge into a universal free-market. Since the end of the Cold War nation states have increasingly become integrated into a global economy and now share a greater sense of interdependence. While this represents a loss of economic state control it also represents an opportunity to take advantage of a global market. Globalization has the effect of compressing and unifying the world into a single entity in terms of spreading the institutions and aspirations of capitalism and democracy around the world. As this process continues to develop, people will become increasingly aware of a global existence that is universal in character (Lechner and Boli, 2008: 53).

The effects of global capitalism represent a Western hegemony of transnational liberalism in which increased levels of trade will lead to greater prosperity and economic interdependence between states. Fukuyama described this as the “liberal idea” in which the spread of democracy and capitalism would provide a permanent order of political and social development. But the spread of liberal democratic reforms will not only effect governments and economies but will also have a marked impact on culture as well. As globalization combines the logic of capitalist expansion and global consumption it will challenge the existence of local cultures. These challenges may result in an upsurge or a re-awakening of cultural identity as people begin to reflect upon who they are in an increasingly uniform world. As the world continues to globalize, societies will localize in an attempt

to retain their sense of cultural identity (Tomlinson, 2002: 270). A culture of global consumption will increasingly affect society's sense of identity in a variety of different ways. This may revitalize national sentiments and lead to a greater sense of awareness and appreciation of local customs and traditions. But it will also create a cosmopolitan culture of international identity and universal recognition. Today a global culture is increasingly evident in that most urban areas are beginning to resemble one another. As the world becomes increasingly homogeneous the differences between people and society will continue to diminish and civilizations will become more and more alike.

6.2. Global Culture in Context

In "*Towards a Global Culture*" (1990), Anthony D. Smith, argues that national cultural identity consists of three defining characteristics. Firstly, there is a sense of continuity whereby successive generations share the same experiences and traditions. Secondly, a collective sense of shared history is needed in which shared memories of specific events form the basis of a population's sense of common identity. Thirdly, the population needs to have a common sense of destiny which has been derived from its past experiences (Smith, 2007: 280). Therefore, cultural identity is reliant upon a sense of continuity, shared history and the pursuit of a common destiny. From this perspective nations can be understood in terms of the historic identities which are contextual, i.e. being rooted to a specific time and place. A global culture in contrast does not have any sense of historic identity as it is not restricted by contextual restraints. Therefore, while national identities are constructed from past experiences, a global culture is artificially constructed from a multitude of existing identities which can be fused together to form a construct of collective identity with an imaginary culture.

While it might be argued that global culture is nothing new and that earlier forms of cultural imperialism have sought to adopt and propagate standardized motifs, as with the Roman Empire or the Holy Crusades, these forms of cultural imperialism were distinctly contextual being defined by a clear sense of time and place. Contemporary global culture by contrast is devoid of any contextual character, not being tied to any specific time or place it appears timeless and cut off from the past. From this perspective global culture exists as an elusive present or imagined future which has no history. In having no sense of time or place "global culture is here and now and everywhere," observes

Smith, “and for its purposes the past only serves to offer some decontextualized example or element for its cosmopolitan patchwork” (2007: 279). Therefore, global culture is essentially an artificial manifestation fusing science and technology with ethnic motives to create a cosmopolitan culture that is politically neutral and has a universal appeal. For this reason products of global culture often appear “future-retro” in design, presenting a paradox of contradicting terms which can only be understood in the present. A global culture can be seen as a universal timeless construct, being eclectic in design it comprises a whole series of human sentiments and signifies an era of scientific and technical liberation over nature. But a global culture is not specific to a nation’s sense of heritage or custom. Its eclectic nature provides a composite of many cultural influences that can appeal to various tastes and nationalities. Therefore, as a product of globalization, global culture is designed to be a trans-national culture of universal appeal.

In attempting to reach a mass market, global culture will endeavour to produce a mass of commercial commodities that are standardized and designed for mass appeal. However, their contents will often be drawn from traditional styles and motifs which reflect the designs of an indigenous culture. Global culture is a universal extension of popular culture often containing elements of elite high-brow culture and indigenous folk art which has been adapted for global mass consumption. The fashion, music and art of global culture reflects a postmodern pastiche of cultural motifs and styles which are modified for popular appeal. Global culture is in effect a mixture of cultural influences itself becoming a multi-cultural patchwork of ethnic motifs which form a standardized commodity that will satisfy a market of universal consumption (Smith, 2007: 278). An example of this can be seen in the fast food industry where a customer can order a spicy chicken tortilla wrap with fried onion rings and a large cappuccino. Here indigenous cuisine from Mexico, the United States and Italy has all been combined into a single order of convenience food. In trying to appeal to national sentiments global culture largely draws its inspirations from local influences. So global culture is what gives local culture a medium through which to find an audience. Therefore, a connection of interdependence can be established between global and local culture. When people consume a global product its appeal is often rooted in a universal conception of local identity. Over time this local identity gains popularity

and becomes established as a fashionable commodity. Having attained universal appeal it becomes a global icon but its origins begin as a local identity.

The idea of a global culture can clearly be seen with the spread of global consumerism whose commercial ideologies are fuelled by the strategies of a global market. The use of global marketing strategies effectively change the way people live and think whereby meaning and identity are no longer reflective of any specific culture or geographic location and are no longer tied to any specific time or place. Global consumer products are designed to satisfy the demands of a universal consumer living in a cosmopolitan culture. An example of this can be seen in car design, such as, the Lexus which is designed and marketed to produce, what Axford describes as, “a standard overall design with sufficient flexibility to allow for local variation on the common denominators of taste” (1996: 156). While the Lexus can be seen as a “world car” in terms of marketing and design other products and services are deliberately tailored to suit the demands of a specific market. In this case global products are given a local identity within a geographic location to suit specific tastes. For example the format of a reality based television programme like Big Brother can be modified in terms of language, nationality, ethnic identity and cultural nuances in order to suit the tastes of different audiences from different cultures around the world. Therefore, globalized or localized, universal culture is not restricted by any contextual considerations of time and place.

While traditional cultures are still viewed with a certain amount of nostalgia the effects of contemporary postmodernism are generally disliked. “Modernity destroys traditional cultures,” states Axford, “and replaces them with cultures built on reflexivity” (1996: 162). However, the culture of the post-modern world is more flexible than the grand meta-narratives of a modern world prescribing to the ideas of the Enlightenment. In the political realm the Enlightenment typically formed a dialectic between the ideals of capitalism and communism, with its conflicting differences restricted to a social polarization between opposing ideologies. The globalization of the modern world may result in the demise of these grand old narratives but it may also lead to a new set of ideas which celebrate diversity and comparison as a basis of understanding. So the diversity of post-modernism may ultimately succeed in producing a global culture. In *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), Jacques Derrida

argues that diversity would cause all perceptions of knowledge and self-identity to arise from a deferred position bringing about a new interpretation. All human knowledge would then become referential, i.e. our knowledge and understanding would be based upon recognizing the *différence* between concepts as opposed to simply comparing knowledge to an accepted standard which is believed to be fixed and absolute. Therefore, absolute infallible notions of truth, the self and reality would no longer exist and instead all interpretations would provide a probable explanation. In this case a dialectical opposition between local and global culture could be replaced with a celebration of *différence* in which the nature of comparisons would form the basis of comprehension.

6.3. Global Culture versus Cultural Identity

Globalization has been accused of sweeping across the globe bringing a market driven economy of mass consumption to the rest of the world. This has resulted in the homogenization of culture. The adverse effects of this have resulted in an erosion of national identity. As the West exports a standardized version of its culture to the rest of the world, cultures in the developing world are increasingly coming under threat (Scruton: 2002). In *Globalization and Cultural Identity* (2002), Tomlinson acknowledges that “cultural identity is at risk everywhere with the depredations of globalization,” and the customs and traditions of the developing world are particularly at risk (2002: 270). This view supports the widely held assumption that the spread of globalization is destroying cultural identity and undermining national sentiment. However, Tomlinson goes on to explain that this is really an overly simplistic account of globalization and on closer inspection a completely different phenomenon begins to appear. The effect of globalization, “has been the most significant force in *creating and proliferating* cultural identity,” observes Tomlinson, (*Ibid*: 270) but this will entail a more sophisticated examination of globalization and the notion of identity and culture.

Critics of globalization complain that the spread of consumer culture has resulted in a loss of choice and diversity, i.e. as the modern consumer society becomes more homogenous so its tastes become more uniform. Furthermore, increased globalization and the expansion of the global franchise have resulted in a small number of multi-national chains dominating the market place and restricting the consumer to a limited choice of products (Klein, 2000: 129-41). At a superficial level this may

appear to be true but on closer examination the increase in global franchise does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the variety of products. In the past greater choice and diversity could only be achieved through travelling to new locations, therefore distance and location were a prerequisite for diversity and specialism. However, the rise of the global franchise allows for greater choice and diversity within a smaller area and distance. In cosmopolitan cities in the U.S., “we find the same chain – Starbucks – in thousands of locations across the country,” explains Storper, and a global franchise like Starbucks is able to serve a diverse array of speciality coffee within a small geographical space (2000: 401). In a modern day city the corporate logos of McDonalds, Pizza Hut and K.F.C (Kentucky Fried Chicken) can be seen every few blocks. At first this gives the impression of bland uniformity but these chains also offer consumers a broader selection of products thereby bringing greater diversity to a smaller location. Therefore, the reduction of physical space has not only led to a more homogenous market place but it has also resulted in providing a greater diversity of consumer choice.

The adverse effects of homogenization are explored by Hardt and Negri in *Globalization of Empire* (2002) in which the spread of global capital is compared to a form of imperial oppression (2002: 116-119). These critics argue that globalization brings about a sense of homogenization in which local identities are destroyed by a global culture of bland uniformity. But globalization can also liberate a culture which is trapped in a fixed geographic location (Legrain, 2002: 318). As the global economy becomes more integrated globalization creates a greater sense of inter-connectivity. Globalization helps promote a sense of *detrterritorialization* whereby cultural experiences are no longer restricted to a particular locality (Tomlinson, 2002: 270). A society may retain a high degree of its own cultural identity but with *detrterritorialization* new identities can gain expression and the indigenous culture is not the only experience. Therefore, the existence of McDonalds and Starbucks doesn't erode the national and cultural integrity of cities like Paris, Madrid and Tokyo. Furthermore, our exposure and interaction with global media and communication allows local culture to become increasingly international. Today culture is no longer restricted to a specific location which allows our own cultural existence to become enriched by other global experiences. For example: global television news broadcasts reports news events from all around the world. The details of these reports shape our

opinions and increase our awareness of other cultures within the confines of our own geographic identity (Legrain, 2002: 313). Therefore, the globalization of the news media helps to generate a universal sense of awareness and reflects the extent to which current events have become an issue of global significance.

As local identity intensifies in reaction to the unifying effects of global capitalism, the modern-day consumer is confronted by a broad selection of products. But on closer examination these products require the consumer to conform to fixed patterns of behaviour which can only be achieved through promoting a universal culture of mass consumption. Critics argue that in a global market place there are simply too many options in terms of goods and services to the extent that contemporary life is too fragmented with a confusing array of possibilities. In *Lived Effects of the Contemporary Economy* (2000), Storper observes, that six to ten times more consumer products enter the market each year than back in the 1970's. There are now more products with exactly the same function and near identical features all competing in the market at the same time (2000: 400). In fashion retail for example product changeovers have increased to such an extent that the fashion business has grown from having two to six collections a year. The two traditional fashion seasons of spring/summer followed by autumn/winter now include two new collections known as pre-fall and resort/cruise. These are inter-seasonal collections which are designed to fill the gaps between the spring/summer and autumn/winter collections. In addition to this some fashion retailers have begun presenting a mid-season collection so as to include lines for high-summer and Christmas vacations (White, 2010). However, despite the huge increase in various product lines critics argue that global consumption is creating a homogenous culture of bland uniformity characterised by less diversity and variety of choice. Today there are only minor differences between products and consumers merely make an informed choice by choosing one product over another which is practically identical in terms of design, function and price. Products are merely distinguished by a brand in which a logo creates a desired image through association in which the product becomes an idealised commodity satisfying a socially conditioned need (Klein, 2000: 27-30). So while the product itself may serve some practical

purpose and is purchased on the rational grounds of filling a practical need, products are essentially bought on an impulse which satisfies the consumer's emotional desires.

The spread of globalization has led to a uniform conversion in which consumer products are increasingly similar. At a superficial level this conversion can be seen in examples of consumer culture, such as, fast foods, fashion and film. This conversion typifies the characteristics of the modern society with its increasingly homogenized cosmopolitan culture of mass consumption. The providers of this consumer culture are often transnational corporations with subsidiaries operating throughout the world. The rise of the Multi-National Corporation (MNC) has ended geographical restrictions and internationalised business operations. But conversion can also be observed in aspects of culture and social class. In industries like entertainment, hospitality and tourism there is an increasing sense of uniformity in terms of organization and the presentation of service. The venues for concerts and symphonies provide a case in point. These venues present the same kinds of acts, which often resemble each other and are often organised by the same companies. Tourism and hospitality has increasingly become globalized with hotels and restaurants being part of a chain of global industries providing the same products and services throughout the world, e.g. Holiday Inn and Hilton. The vacation "has traditionally been the activity by which we pursue the different or exotic," explains Storper, but today "the average beach resort in Mexico looks a lot like the average beach resort in Tunisia or the Costa Brava, with its chains of hotels, restaurants, shops, and nightclubs" (2000: 400). As each beach resort, theme park and shopping centre begins to resemble one another, the experience of a vacation is becoming a uniform experience catering to a universal consumer. Here the idea of conversion extends beyond the realm of the physical environment to include aspects of human experience. From this perspective the universal vacation provides a universal experience leaving holiday makers with similar memories.

In *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995), Benjamin Barber describes the way in which global capitalism is shaping the character of society and influencing the culture of society. "McWorld is a product of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce," explains Barber (2003: 17). Its products are not just simply material objects but also include an aesthetic image which forms an important component

of each product line. Therefore, Western consumerism is not just about selling a product but also extends to the marketing and selling of a brand which represents an idea. This idea can only be sold as a commodity if the consumer can buy into the concept of the brand and that requires building a culture of consumption. "It is about culture as commodity," explains Barber, "apparel as ideology" (2003: 17). Consumer products like Cadillac or Harley-Davidson extend beyond mere practical use. These products are not simply modes of transportation but icons of a lifestyle. People don't want to own these products just for purposes of utility but because of what these products represent to them in terms of aspirations and nostalgia (*Ibid*: 17). Therefore, consumption is not merely a rational decision motivated by practical purpose it is an emotive choice influenced by social and cultural considerations. As these social and cultural considerations find expression through global consumption a universal homogenous world could prevail.

6.4. The Homogenous Society

The idea of a universal culture offers the vision of an integrated New World Order of common ideals and aspirations. This could create an integrated world of harmony and cooperation reflecting the values of a uniform homogenous society. But globalization also brings with it the prospect of cultural imperialism in which Western ideals of mass consumption are imposed upon the existing culture of an indigenous people. This ultimately results in the imposition of "western-centric" norms and practices on an indigenous culture resulting in a psychological crisis, feelings of alienation and provoking a reaction of hostility (Axford, 1996: 158). In the fast developing world of telecommunications and multi-media, for example, global companies like Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom and News International have bought into national companies. In taking advantage of changes to national regulatory regimes and innovations in fibre-optic technology these companies have broadened the gap between consumers wanting to have products of popular culture and entertainment and those wanting to defend the integrity of national culture (*Ibid*: 160). Critics of global communication like McChesney (2000) and Thomson (2000) argue that this is evidence of corporations pursuing imperialist ambitions in the market place resulting in a process of denationalization and loss of sovereignty. They liken the spread of global communication to an imperial crusade of corporate power

in which multi-nationals compete for global domination in an unregulated market place. But the effects of global communication are not entirely negative and in some instances can promote a greater sense of cultural identity depending upon the conditions and aspirations of a specific market.

Today we are no longer restricted by geography as the speed of communication increases so time and space collapses (Friedman: 2005). Global communication has also revolutionized the way in which we see and interact with the world. In a global economy hard-trade in manufactured goods is being superseded by a soft-trade in information and images. This soft-trade of ideas is less dogmatic than religion or political ideology and is capable of operating in a far subtler manner of influence. But as the effects of globalization have increased, non-Western countries have sought to strengthen their sense of identity. Examples of this include: religion, as seen with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, regional and national identity, as seen with the promotion of Asian values, and patriotism and culture as with glorifying Confucian ethics (Sen, 2008: 19). However, the power of soft-trade relies upon its ability to propagate ideas and values which can be likened to a religious doctrine of consumption. As Barber explains, “music, video, theatre, books, and theme parks,” have become “the new churches of a commercial civilization in which malls are the public squares and suburbs” (2003: 17). These products are examples of soft-trade which are penetrating a global market of mass consumption. National identities are giving way to what Barber describes as a “common world taste” revolving around “logos, advertising slogans, stars, songs, brand names, jingles, and trademarks” (*Ibid*: 17). So while there may be evidence of increased cultural awareness and national sentiment, a universal culture of mass consumption appears to be growing throughout the world.

When discussing culture in relation to global consumption the U.S. is typically seen as the leading exporter of popular culture. The spread of music, film, fashion and fast food are examples of American popular culture which have become a defining part of global consumption. This culture is propagated through what can be described as “soft-power”. While the U.S. does not force anyone to buy its products consumers nevertheless find these products attractive and desirable. The use of soft-power is a vital component of mass consumption but it is also viewed as evidence of ideological hegemony through which the U.S. exerts its global ambitions. In *The Globalization Process* (2001),

Hebron and Stack describes the negative effects of mass culture as a “foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with its materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and fraternizing of nationalities,” which in their view, amounts to “a prescription of cultural genocide because of the process potential to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human civilizations” (Lieber and Weisberg, 2002: 281). For these critics, mass consumption destroys the identity and diversity of human culture, replacing it with a bland uniformity of material consumption. From this perspective the spread of global consumption is viewed as a form of economic imperialism in which the soft-power of consumer culture becomes an extension of U.S. interest. For some communities globalization represents a threat to existing customs and traditions. The spread of multi-national corporations for example has resulted in the demise of many neighbourhood shops and local foods. Today large chain stores stocking a huge variety of the same branded goods have replaced the local shop keeper. This brings greater choice and convenience to the consumer but it also results in a bland uniformity and a loss of cultural identity.

The loss of the familiar provokes a reactionary response to the alienation that globalization can bring. But a distinction needs to be drawn between the spread of globalization and the preservation of national culture. The U.S. exports its culture to other parts of the world and this is met with intense feelings of admiration and animosity (Hoffmann, 2002: 2). But it also exports the practices of modern civilization through science and technology. The spread of Western technology “enjoys an almost unhampered global reach,” explains Schäfer, and is seen as a desirable component for progress (2001: 311). However, the spread of America culture is often resisted by opposing nation states. In order to understand this we need to draw a distinction between the sentiments of local culture and the development of a global civilization. An example of this can be illustrated with reference to Microsoft and the Hollywood film industry which are both American companies having access to global markets. Microsoft develops computer software and has attained a position of global dominance while Hollywood makes and distributes films to a global audience seeking entertainment. Both of these companies are distinctly American, but while Microsoft is exporting technology, Hollywood is exporting images and culture. Computer software is seen as a vital component of technological

progress which is flexible and can be adapted or customized to suit the specific needs of the consumer which does not influence or challenge cultural values. For example when Microsoft produced a French version of Windows 98 this technology was excepted because it did not offend cultural sensibility. “People get upset about the imposing cultural and economic outreach,” of a global power like the U.S., observes Schafer, yet they are not annoyed by, “the ‘windowing’ of several concurrently running programs on their monitors, especially if the interface between the user and the software tool is adapted to the local language” (2001: 311). So there appears to be a perceived difference between Americanization and globalization. While Americanization entails the propagation of values onto other cultures globalization promotes a universal application which does not necessarily require assimilating to a set of foreign values.

As a source of entertainment Hollywood relies upon marketing and promoting its films to the consumer which requires a level of socialization in which the consumer adopts the values and aspirations of the product. The American film industry is a global business producing movies which are distributed to consumers throughout world. While Hollywood movies dominate the international film market the films themselves do not seek to export American culture. If anything the Hollywood film industry has had to adapt itself to suit the tastes of global consumers. Hollywood blockbusters, like *Avatar* (2009) and *Transformers* (2007) are designed to be more universal in their appeal as opposed to providing a dazzling display of Americana. As more than half the gross revenues for Hollywood movies come from young foreign audiences directors have to produce films that will appeal to the tastes of this audience. Hollywood directors increasingly produce movies that are designed to have a universal appeal and can easily be understood by various cultures with different languages. As Lieber and Weisberg explain, “American action movies, especially those aimed at Asian markets, are characterized more by their violence or explosiveness (which requires little translation) than by their dialogue” (Lieber and Weisberg, 2002: 282). By placing a higher emphasis on the visual qualities of the film, “The de-emphasis on language and the tendency toward highly demarcated good and evil is appealing across many cultures” (*Ibid*: 282). So although American movies are seen as an example of America’s global influence, the films themselves are not necessarily

influenced by American values. In attempting to dominate the international movie market film makers produce a product with a universal appeal which is inclusive of global values and not specifically American. Therefore, the Hollywood film industry may dominate the global market in economic terms but it does not seek to impose ideological or cultural domination.

Critics of globalization argue that as corporations compete for market share they will act in a *duopolistic* manner, i.e. the rational behaviour of competitive business is to take market share away from rival competitors. This typically results in clustering around a specific geographic location and then reducing the variety of products the company can offer (Klein, 2000: 135-39). This effectively increases market presence, places rivals in direct competition and caters to the tastes of the common dominator. Major Hollywood film studios are an example of this, primarily focussed in one geographical location they seek to produce “formula films” which cater to audiences of a specific age and taste. “Filmgoers may see films that feature different stars and slight variations on a common theme,” explains Storper, “but as far as the decision makers in the industry are concerned, they could be rolling out instalments in a series” (2000: 402). Furthermore, the price of marketing and distribution reduces the amount of revenue which a studio can afford to spend on making a film. Therefore, as the industry becomes increasingly competitive and uniform producers aim the products towards a middle market where profits are more likely to be higher. In such a highly competitive market cultural products like music and film increasingly rely upon the use of a “formula” aimed at a common dominator. Superficial differences in style and presentation may provide a thinly disguised illusion of choice but all these products will conform to a middle-of-the-road marketing strategy. However, this further serves to illustrate that the Hollywood film industry’s primary desire is to achieve economic success not to pursue ideological or cultural domination.

6.5. Conclusion

The prospect of a universal civilization based upon liberal democratic ideals and practicing a common culture appears too idealistic. While the modern world increasingly subscribes to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, most societies still follow the customs and traditions of their forbearers. Furthermore, people’s attitudes and behaviour are the products of social conditioning rooted in irrational beliefs and

emotional attachments to kinship, tribe and country. But despite these impediments a global civilization expressing the ideals of a technological Benthamite society could still emerge. As the world continues to globalize and interact through international commerce, communication and cultural exchanges, there is a growing recognition of common global interests. Environmental issues, human rights and green politics affect more people promoting the prospect and need for a universal world order. "People could embrace the civilization of this planet with as much loyalty as they now embrace their local cultures," explains Schafer, in which case globalization may be able to unite the world through an internationalization of culture (2001: 312). As a cosmopolitan culture spreads throughout the world, civilizations will come to adopt the universal characteristics of a global culture. National sentiments and cultural identities may still remain but civilizations will have more to unite them than to divide them. With a greater celebration of diversity feelings of loyalty will no longer be restricted to the indigenous but will extend towards accommodating international concerns as well. A future global community is feasible if more and more people begin to think of themselves as living a life which is similar to other groups of people. Culture and civilization will no longer be a divisive issue dividing the world into different geographical spheres but a common ideology of universal acceptance uniting the world together.

As global capitalism spreads across the world a universal culture of mass consumption will increasingly replace existing customs and traditions. The New World Order, of global capitalism with its materialist values of pleasure through consumption is challenging the traditional values of custom and community. Over time this universal culture may erode away national sentiments and replace traditional values with a uniform identity of global culture. Western societies have attained a position of global influence and a culture of mass consumption appears to represent a new geopolitical ideal. Today the effects of a consumer society is impacting upon other cultures challenging their existing social values and moving them towards a universal culture of mass consumption. In the long term development of globalization the spread of global capitalism will result in a greater sense of homogenization and sustained periods of peace and stability. From this perspective a global consumer culture looks increasingly possible. So what began as a utopian ideal in the eighteenth century looks

increasingly achievable in the twenty-first. The rationality of the Enlightenment has endured long enough to see the formation of a global economy and nothing at present suggests that a culture of universal mass consumption is not possible. But if this proves to be the case what would the long term effects of a global consumer culture have on the future development of humanity? In the next chapter of this study the consequence of Fukuyama's Last Man will be examined in relation to the effects of a universal homogenous state promoting peace, prosperity and equal recognition.

7. The Last Man at the End of History

7.1. Introduction

In the last chapter of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama expresses his concerns that the factors bringing about the end of History may also lead to an end of civilization. Fukuyama is adamant that the End of History signifies the triumph of liberal democracy over all other ideologies which in time will become universal. Here the triumph of liberalism has ended the dialectical struggle for individual freedom bringing History to a point of conclusion. This argument relies upon a teleological conception of History in which the progression of liberal ideals will eventually lead to a universal homogenous state. It is from this universal homogenous state that the Last Man will emerge living in a world of peace and prosperity. But without the existence of struggle what will drive the course of human History forward? The democratic aspirations of freedom and equality coupled with the banality of mass consumption may lead to social stagnation reducing society to a mindless herd of passive consumers lacking any sense of ambition. In such a society where everyone is free and equal with nothing to aspire to, civilization may degenerate into apathy and nihilism.

By referring to the ideas of Nietzsche and Strauss, Fukuyama provides a pessimistic vision of the future in which the Last Man at the end of History is an apathetic nihilistic creature “stripped of all vitality by the material comforts and formal equality that democracy provides” (Gilley, 2010: 161). Fukuyama’s initial depiction of the Last Man is bleak lacking any real sense of motivation from which to develop and he acknowledges the extent to which a universal world of peace and prosperity could become a soulless desert of banality and stagnation where humanity has lost all sense of purpose. But on closer inspection the Last Man will be exposed to the competitive forces of the free-market compelling him to adapt to the challenges of his environment and preventing social stagnation. As mankind cannot subsist on equal rights and material comforts alone people will also need ambition and a sense of purpose to define their lives. So this chapter will examine the concept of the Last Man in greater detail and consider the extent to which individual ambitions can be accommodated in a society committed to ensuring greater levels of equal recognition.

7.2. The Last Man

Fukuyama's conception of the individual's desire for recognition, as it relates to a universal homogenous state, comes primarily from Kojève's reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1817), (Kojève, 1980: 31-71). The classic formulation of this theme is the master-slave dialect which forms the key to Hegel's entire philosophy of History. In Kojève's view human History is characterized by a struggle for recognition between masters and toiling slaves. At first this struggle remains unproductive as the slave is incapable of attaining any sense of satisfaction through recognition. But in the course of time the contradictions of master and slave are overcome and a universal homogenous state emerges. Here every individual receives "universal" recognition as an equal citizen enjoying political rights as a "legal person" protected by civil law (Kojève, 1980: 8-10). It is this fully "satisfying" form of recognition which brings History to an end and switches off its dialectical drive. Therefore, Hegel's depiction of History reaches a point of conclusion when modern man's struggle for recognition and satisfaction for desire is granted by a framework of legal rights in a universal homogenous state.

The central argument explaining the course of human History has rested on the notion of a dialectical struggle between masters and slaves creating a driving force moving History forward and shaping the course of human events. This force is essentially controlled by the ambitions of *megalothymia* i.e. the *thymos* (spiritedness) of great men, such as, Caesar and Napoleon who are among the great movers of History. As these individuals strive for power and recognition their ambitious endeavours drive the course of History forward elevating mankind to a higher sense of social order. Hegel argued that History would eventually reach a conclusive end when human society achieved a sense of order in which its fundamental needs were satisfied. Fukuyama has argued that the triumph of liberalism at the end of the twentieth-century has proved that democracy and capitalism can provide a stable social order and is superior to any other political economic alternative. Liberal democratic societies are able to provide their citizens with freedom and equality while capitalist enterprise not only satisfies the desire for material goods and wealth but also satisfies the desire for social recognition. Therefore, liberal democracy is able to end the dialectic struggle of master and slave by removing subordination with freedom and equality, and capitalism provides an incentive for

accumulating wealth and provides a non-destructive outlet for aspirational individuals who desire power and recognition.

Fukuyama's depiction of the Last Man shares Nietzsche's sense of pessimism and disillusion. For Nietzsche, democratic man is a victorious slave who is "clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of long-term self-interest" (Fukuyama, 1992: 301). As with Nietzsche's depiction of slave societies who prefer to remain isolated and display feelings of animosity and distrust towards one another, Fukuyama's depiction of the Cold War consists of two opposing cultures whose sense of purpose and identity was maintained through their mutual opposition. But once the Cold War ended their sense of purpose and identity was lost. Years of ideological conflict which created the basis of dialectical opposition had been replaced by an apathetic nihilism (Levine, 1995:260-1). So while the West's triumph over communism would allow the spread of freedom and democracy towards a universal homogenous state it would also end the West's sense of purpose in defending its liberal democratic principles, and without a strong sense of purpose the ideals and aspirations of a universal homogenous state will not be able to survive.

Nietzsche's depiction of the Last Man is a grotesque caricature of apathy and nihilism. Lacking any real sense of desire or motivation, the Last Man is content to remain stagnant and not aspire to any higher sense of ambition. "So in Fukuyama's ideal post-historical world, people would be soulless, egalitarian human ants," observes Attarian, "tame ciphers preoccupied with their bodies, guzzling economism's output and living vicariously through the exploits of the entrepreneurial, political and entertainment elite" (2000: 75). This conjures up the image that humanity has lost all sense of purpose and no longer possesses the drive and vigour necessary for self-advancement. As the Last Man lives in a world of material abundance his base desires are satisfied and, no longer compelled by a dialectical struggle for desire and recognition, he loses all sense of purpose. For Nietzsche this prospect of social stagnation is intolerable and he would prefer to allow the unpredictable forces of nature to determine the course of human History (Levine, 1995:159). For it is only by embracing the uncertainties of life that the human condition can be energised to aspire to greater triumphs. There can also be no prospect of triumph without a sense of discontent, i.e. suffering

promotes endeavour. Therefore, Nietzsche argued that the pursuit of excellence must initially arise out of a sense of discontent, “all that suffers, wills to live,” and without discontent there can be no triumph (Heidegger, 1967: 412).

Without a sense of struggle and discontent the Last Man becomes complacent and is unable to confront real moral issues. In chapter 28 of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama acknowledges this dilemma and the problems which moral complacency will pose. Drawing upon Nietzsche’s ideas from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883-85) he refers to the hollow convictions of modern man in “Men without Chests” and describes how “The last man at the end of history knows better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles,” and goes on to explain that “the loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices” (1992: 307). So instead the modern educated man is content to live a life of physical security and material abundance congratulating himself that his sense of reason has stirred him away from fanatical ideas of conflict. However, Fukuyama appears to challenge this assumption and question as to whether such a predicament would be desirable. At the end of chapter 28 he asks the poignant question:

“Should we fear that we will be both happy *and* satisfied with our situation, no longer human beings but animals of the genus *homo sapiens*? Or is the danger that we will be happy on one level, but still dis-satisfied with ourselves on another, and hence ready to drag the world back into history with all its wars, injustice, and revolution?” (1992: 312)

Here Fukuyama acknowledges the dilemma posed by triumph and discontent but does not appear to be able to reconcile the two. While Kojève’s vision of the Last Man is comparable to an animal living in harmony with nature, Fukuyama’s final vision of a global future appears uncertain. The triumph of modernity has not reached a conclusive end and “even Fukuyama is willing to allow the possibility that the ‘last man’ may slough off his historical role,” explains Axford, and perhaps be tempted to reinvent himself and let History start again (1996: 219). But for such a realization to occur the Last Man would have to be prepared to relinquish his sense of happiness and contentment in order to pursue a higher sense of purpose which would be wrought with all kinds of danger and uncertainty.

From a purely rational perspective this is unrealistic and modern man is unlikely to sacrifice his selfish interests in pursuit of a higher cause born out of struggle and discontent.

Fukuyama's examination of History relies heavily on a teleological conception that History has some sense of a concluding end. If History has a sense of *telos* this would mean that History would move in a discernable direction being linear and evolutionary in nature. Historical changes could then be observed in various stages of development and History would move towards some definable conclusion in time. In criticising this conception of History, Susan Marks observes how "Fukuyama's linear conception of history admits of only one future" (1997: 458). This future is determined by the forces of liberal democracy and a free-market economy, which in Marks's view, "reduces and oversimplifies the processes of historical change" (*ibid*: 458). Furthermore, Fukuyama has a tendency to exaggerate the spread of liberal democracy taking the view that any country which embraces some variant of capitalism as evidence to support his thesis. But Fukuyama has consistently maintained that liberalism has effectively conquered all other ideologies and democracy has become the only legitimate form of government. This effectively symbolises the triumph of the West and heralds an end to History (Fukuyama, 1989: at 3). Fukuyama maintains that liberal democracy provides the ultimate form of government as it is capable of satisfying the fundamental human desire for freedom and recognition. He argues that only in a secular liberal democracy operating a free market economy can the individual be free to pursue his desires within a society that recognises and respects individual freedom and equality. From this perspective liberal democracy provides its citizens with a framework for mutual and equal recognition.

In using Kojève's interpretation of Hegel to explain the course of human History, Fukuyama maintains that History is evolving towards a system of democratic societies promoting individual freedom and respect for the rule of law. This teleological conception of History relies upon two factors from which to drive the course of human events towards a state of permanent stability. "One is scientific and technological progress," observes Attarian, in which the process of industrialization requires societies to exercise greater levels of rational thinking which shapes their institutions and cultures (2000: 73). The need to develop new technologies requires societies to industrialize and this

can only be accomplished through the rationalization of culture and institutions. The other factor is human nature in which man desires a sense of recognition and wants others to recognize him as a moral agent having the freedom of choice and a sense of individual identity (Attarian, 2000: 73). It is with this regard that democracy enables the individual to be free and gain a sense of recognition and by achieving this feat democracy signifies the end of political evolution.

7.3. The Struggle for Universal Recognition

Fukuyama's assertions that the Last Man will strive towards recognition has a long established tradition in Western political philosophy. Plato's *Republic* provides an examination of the soul using the term *thymos* to describe the spirited characteristics of man's nature (2007: 130-54). Hobbes *Leviathan* (1651) provides a detailed examination of the human condition comparing the selfish nature of man to a wound up spring that will relentlessly pursue desire (1973: 1, 23-24). While Fukuyama defends Western ideals and argues that universal recognition can be achieved in a liberal democracy, he nevertheless acknowledges some of Nietzsche's observations concerning human psychology. Nietzsche was of the opinion that people have a natural desire to impose their will upon the world and to dominate others. Fukuyama accepts Nietzsche's argument and acknowledges how: "Megalothymia can be manifest both in the tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in the concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven" (1992:182). Here the desire to attain a sense of superiority becomes an element of central importance from which to attain a sense of recognition. Some people may simply not want to be considered as being equal to other people and may seek to establish a sense of superiority over others. This desire for greatness causes individuals to undertake risks and their struggle for recognition becomes a defining trait of their character. Their character or *thymos* reflects the nature of their soul and defines the essence of their character. Therefore, striving for superiority or *megalothymia* is "necessary for the creation of anything else worth having in life," observes Fukuyama, in which case the struggle for recognition and success becomes a necessary precondition for life itself (1992:304).

Fukuyama acknowledges that not everyone will be content with universal recognition and some may wish to assert their will over others to gain a sense of superiority. Some kind of struggle for recognition is necessary to ensure that society does not degenerate into apathy and nihilism but how to ensure that freedom and equality can be preserved against the forces of status and domination remains a challenge. In chapter 31 of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama appears to suggest that the liberal democratic virtues of freedom and equality, coupled with economic prosperity, will be sufficient to accommodate man's desires for status and recognition. "Looking around contemporary America," observes Fukuyama, "it does not strike me that we face the problem of an excess of megalothymia," if anything "the liberal project of filling one's life with material acquisitions and safe, sanctioned ambitions appears to have worked all too well," and it is "hard to detect great, unfilled longings or irrational passions lurking just beneath the surface..." (1992: 336). The same observations concerning the liberal project appear in *The end of history and the new world order* (1992/3), where Shadia Drury elaborates upon Fukuyama's claims explaining:

"Liberalism pacifies and de-politicises the aristocratic world of mastery by turning politics into economics. Liberalism pacifies the masterful *thymos* of the first man and replaces it with the slavish *thymos* of the last man. Instead of superiority and dominance, society strives for equality. Those who still long for dominance have the capitalist pursuit of wealth as their outlet" (1992/3: 95).

Here Drury suggests that enterprise will satisfy the individual desire for power and recognition while social stability will be achieved by the pacifying effects of a liberal society. But while democratic societies are committed to peace and prosperity, as well as ensuring freedom and equality for their citizens, a commitment to ensuring peace will ultimately require restricting the endeavours of individuals whose quest for recognition would stand to undermine stability. Therefore, the nature of recognition will become trivialised or restricted to non-destructive outlets like business, sports and entertainment. This creates a dilemma as to whether or not universal recognition can adequately satisfy the desires of the Last Man? The long term consequence of restricting endeavour could result in the Last Man becoming enslaved by the very principles which are intended to set him free.

Pessimistic observations concerning the long-term pacifying effects of liberal democracy are nothing new. In the late 1950's Marxist critics like Herbert Marcuse became increasingly pessimistic

about society's inability to resist the domination of capitalist control. He argued that the two main classes in capitalism had disappeared as effective historical agents. Contemporary societies are now controlled by *techno-rationality* whereby the rise in scientific techniques and technology have swept aside individual opposition, rights and freedoms in the name of logical progress (Slattery, 1992: 105-6). In *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) Marcuse argues that liberal democracy has become an instrument of oppression, stating that "Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves," and exercising "Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear" (1970: 7-8). Marcuse went on to highlight the way the culture industry produces and intensifies "false needs" as a means to creating new markets for monopoly capital. Today modern man is encouraged to pursue a life of materialism whereby the pursuit of pleasure and luxury has created a soulless dehumanized society (1970: 17). As the modern world becomes a spiritual desert the Last Man will live as a lost soul searching for meaning and understanding amid an abundance of material consumption. If society continues to move in this direction the individual at the end of History will be reduced to a one dimensional being struggling against the forces of a faceless bureaucracy and the technological progress of mass culture.

It is the social ill-effects of techno-rationality which have continued to undermine the optimism of equality and recognition. Kojève's interpretation of Hegel remains a prominent feature of Fukuyama's ideas but behind the optimism of Kojève lies the more pessimistic influences of Leo Strauss. Replying to Kojève's comments in the revised edition of *On Tyranny* (1968) Strauss explains how "The state through which man is said to become reasonably satisfied is, then, the state in which the basis of man's humanity withers away," suggesting that the equal recognition of liberal democracy may lead to the demise of humanity (1968: 223). In *Shaping Ends: Reflections of Fukuyama* (1992), McCarney mentions how Fukuyama's references to Strauss are predominantly restricted to "copious footnotes" but nevertheless he acknowledges the extent to which Strauss has contributed to Fukuyama's conception of an end to History and what the characteristics of this "end" may be (1992: 41-2). Fukuyama's conception of universal recognition reflects a Straussian sense of anxiety with regards to how this will impact on the human condition. He shares Strauss's concerns about the value

of universality, i.e. if recognition becomes universal it will become common place and lose any sense of value. Universal recognition would ultimately fail to satisfy the needs of “great men” whose ambitious natures require the admiration of others. In other words the “great men” of History need to receive accolades for their accomplishments so that their sense of recognition will distinguish them from the rest of society. Therefore, recognition cannot become universal as it is restricted to an individual’s sense of accomplishment and the social admiration that such accomplishments will achieve. Equal recognition can extend to the rights and freedoms of the individual but not to his sense of status and accomplishment.

Fukuyama’s interpretation of Kojève relies heavily on the notion that democracies are universally committed to the protection of basic human rights. This not only promotes the idea of universal human rights but also supports the notion that democratic governments are somehow reciprocal towards their populations in the recognition of one another’s rights. Therefore, recognition in effect becomes reciprocal “when the state and the people recognize each other,” explains Fukuyama, which is to say “when the state grants its citizens rights and when citizens agree to abide by the states laws” (1992: 203). Here Fukuyama extends Kojève’s argument by stating that “the liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth,” and with the recognition of equal self-worth the individual is liberated from the collective authority imposed by the state (1992: 200). Freedom and equality become interlinking components to Fukuyama’s conception of recognition and self-worth, “equality is not opposed to freedom but is rather a precondition of it,” explains McCarney, “and freedom in its turn, it now appears, is internally linked to the ability to provide satisfactory recognition” (1992: 51). Here the equality of self-worth removes the dialectical struggle of inequality between the individual and the state bringing Fukuyama’s conception of History to an end.

7.4. Universal Group Recognition

Fukuyama’s Last Man emerges from the tension of two opposing concepts, namely: universal democracy and the struggle for individual recognition. This is coupled with the idea that history will reach a decisive point of conclusion. Fukuyama is adamant that the end of History signifies the triumph of liberal democracy over all other ideologies which in time will become universal. It is from

this universal homogenous state that the Last Man will emerge living in a world of peace and prosperity (McCarney, 1992: 39-40). The Western commitment to promoting liberal democracy is rooted in the ideals and aspirations of the Enlightenment. By embracing the principles of logic, sense and reason, humanity can free itself from the dogma and irrational forces of cultural superstition and take control of its own destiny. Therefore, promoting individual rights and freedoms and ensuring equality before the law is considered to be the logical extension of these rational principles. Furthermore, Western liberal democratic societies regard these values as being universal and applicable to all societies regardless of their existing customs and culture. Western societies are adamant that by promoting democracy and capitalism the world will eventually be transformed into a global union of free and equal nations enjoying peace and prosperity (Levine, 1995: 155-6). But in order for this to be achieved the rational principles of the Enlightenment would need to attain a sense of universal acceptance so as to engineer the course of human History towards a common goal.

The idea of universal recognition is rooted in the Enlightenment's conception of what is rational and relates more to the identity of an individual rather than a group. If it is reasonable to assume that each individual would want equal recognition, the equality of recognition would need to become universal. For the individual wishing to attain a sense of admiration from their peers, universal recognition is considered to be a natural response which is justified by the principles of reason practiced within a liberal society. But the idea of group recognition relies upon one's position and membership to a group. As recognition is restricted to a specific group it cannot be considered as universal. By nature it is restricted within the aspirations of the collective who will often condemn any expression of individualism. Therefore, group recognition cannot be attained through expressions of autonomous individuality it can only be achieved through demonstrating a devoted sense of loyalty to the group. Maintaining a strong sense of devotion and loyalty to a group prevents the individual from pursuing their own aspirations. Furthermore, the conception of a group does not exist in a state of nature as it is forged into existence through a complex process of socialization and is dependent upon cooperation and coercion to function and remain intact.

While group recognition may be considered as irrational, this does not necessarily mean that it is not desirable or durable. One of the central criticisms to the liberal concept of universal recognition is that it is not self-sustaining and relies upon the ability to achieve something beyond the existence of the self. From this perspective universal recognition creates a life of perpetual un-fulfilment in which the individual strives towards a series of unobtainable ambitions that will never be achieved. Being compelled to see the value of life purely in terms of individual accomplishment may result in a parasitic form of existence where the quest for fulfilment is more important than what is actually achieved (McCarney, 1992: 48). In contrast, the irrational nature of group recognition appears to be more durable and easier to sustain as the individual's sense of worth is dependent upon their loyalty to the group and not by obtaining a sense of admiration for individual accomplishment. Fukuyama acknowledges this dilemma in the concluding chapter of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), stating that "Group rather than universal recognition can be a better support for both economic activity and community life..., but the ability of liberal democratic societies to establish and sustain themselves on a rational basis over the long term is open to some doubt" (Fukuyama, 1992: 335).

The virtues of a liberal democracy were supposed to liberate the individual from the dead hand of the state leading to a greater sense of independence and self-sufficiency. The erosion of traditional community life would reduce social impairments leading to a society of greater freedom and opportunity in which the individual would attain a greater sense of freedom, equality and recognition. In a liberal democracy commercial relationships are based upon the rationality of contractual exchange and people are motivated by self-interest as opposed to the social hierarchies of kinship and nepotism as found in traditional societies. But in practice the impersonal rationality of contractual relations, which are solely designed to meet the needs of self-interest among autonomous individuals, leads to a sense of alienation which impairs social recognition (Fukuyama, 1992: 325). In trying to address the problem of universal recognition in a liberal democracy Fukuyama observes the differences in culture between the East and West. He argues that Asian societies appear to provide a strong sense of community which is not grounded exclusively in contracts of self-interest (1992: 325). Instead it is rooted in culture, customs and religion whereby the individual's sense of recognition is attained

through the group. In this case the individual's sense of recognition is obtained through their allegiance to the collective as opposed to the individual whose sense of recognition is gained through their separation from the group.

The gradual decline of economic growth in the U.S. and Europe (Appendix B and C) in relation to the rise of South East Asia coupled with the social erosion of Western society causes one to consider that perhaps Western liberal democracy may not be that sustainable. According to the WTO's International Trade Statistics for 2012, global exports from China have grown from 2.5% in 1993 to a staggering 10.7% in 2011 (WTO, 2012: 24-25). These impressive levels of economic growth have been achieved by an authoritarian model of capitalism which not only provides an efficient manner of creating wealth but also achieves a form of individual recognition through group identity and collective control. Fukuyama appears to suggest that the individualist nature of Western capitalism may prove to be an inferior form of self-motivation when compared to the authoritarian style of capitalism practiced in South East Asia (Fukuyama, 1992: 233-4). But while an authoritarian model of capitalism may provide greater levels of economic growth, increased levels of state control would also stifle individual freedom, which could undermine creative endeavour and end the sense of status and recognition gained from individual accomplishment. Western style market capitalism becomes counter-productive when its sense of individualism begins to undermine the principles of its work ethic (McCarney, 1992: 46). Therefore, Fukuyama concludes that the future success of industrialization will require a combination of both liberal economics and authoritarian politics. Furthermore, individual recognition derived from the social admiration of an individual's accomplishments provides a rational incentive for endeavour but this does not necessarily apply to collective groups.

The West's gradual economic decline (Appendix B) could be rooted in its sense of individualism which over time has increasingly led to the erosion of stable communities. While traditional societies place an emphasis on social hierarchy limiting individual opportunity and freedom they do retain a stronger sense of community. Modern contemporary societies in comparison tend to be committed to the liberal ideals of meritocracy which seek to promote the equality of individualism

on the one hand but undermine a sense of community on the other. The impersonal competitive nature of liberal economic principles tends to atomize and separate people. Furthermore, Western liberal democracies tend to see community purely in contractual terms and the rights and freedoms of the individual are protected by the state. But as McCarney explains “these rights are themselves interpreted in ways that are destructive of the possibility of a rich common life” (1992: 44). The central principles of liberty and equality have a tendency to undermine the stability of more traditional societies. While liberty promotes individual freedom it also ensures that any contract of association, such as, employment, can be terminated if it is not jointly honoured or fails to deliver the expected benefits. Equality helps to promote greater opportunity and the removal of social hierarchy but it also undermines the sense of social cohesion that exists in traditional societies.

Fukuyama has consistently argued that liberal democracy will continue to spread throughout the world. He acknowledges that some authoritarian regimes will continue to exist outside the “wagon train” of modernisation due to their refusal to embrace the liberal ideal (Fukuyama, 1992:338). Democratic states will continue to face opposition from authoritarian regimes, such as, the post-communist nationalism of Russia, the state controlled capitalism of China or the opposition to liberal ideas from Islamic societies in the Muslim world (Fukuyama, 2012: 56-8). But while these states may have no intention of joining the wagon train of liberal democratic reform, the triumph of liberal democracy will continue as it is the only form of social organization capable of providing political stability and economic prosperity (Gilley, 2010: 161-2). Therefore, the main threat to democracy will not come from rivalling ideologies but from economic and government failures to deliver growth and prosperity. In cases of increased levels of economic inequality anti-democratic movements may gain popular support which could undermine the spread of democracy but Fukuyama argues that these problems can be addressed by good governance and will not necessarily undermine the spread of Western democratic values.

In Fukuyama’s view the real threat to democracy will not come from economic or political failure but from the psychological ill-effects that democracy will have on the future development of society. Fukuyama appears to share Nietzsche’s view that people have a need to impose their will

upon the world and this is ultimately expressed in their desire to dominate others. But as democracy helps to promote equality and ensure the protection of human rights, the desire to dominate others will be restricted and limited to more passive outlets, such as, business enterprise and sporting pursuits (Gilley: 2010: 162). But Fukuyama is concerned that the long-term pacifying effects of democracy combined with stability and material affluence will ultimately act as a disincentive for human endeavour. Here the political and economic benefits of democracy will ultimately create the conditions that will be to the social and psychological detriment of mankind (Sheikh, 2008:42-3). Therefore, the Last Man appears to be the inevitable consequence of a liberal democratic society promoting equality and contractual relationships. While these conditions are necessary in promoting a just and prosperous society, the long term effects could well lead to stagnation and impoverishment.

7.5. Conclusion

Fukuyama supports Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's master and slave-dialectic and argues that the course of History has been determined by a struggle for recognition. The master and slave dialectic has determined the course of human History producing a teleological conception that history is not without some sense of a concluding end. The ideals of liberal democracy have largely resolved the dialectical struggle between master and slave with its commitment to freedom and equality. Liberal democracy is well suited to the idea that freedom and equality should attain a sense of universal recognition, but less suited to the presentation of group recognition and collective identity. While there is evidently a conflict between Western ideals and traditional societies in terms of embracing liberal reforms the forces of modernization cannot be stopped. As Fukuyama's analogy of the wagon train describes "the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into town, and most will eventually arrive there" (1993: 339). Therefore, the effects of globalization will ultimately pull traditional societies towards modernization leading to the adoption of Western values, universal recognition and the consequence of the Last Man.

Fukuyama's depiction of the Last Man produces an apocalyptic vision. His interpretation of Kojève and Hegel results in a dilemma concerning the probable consequence of pursuing liberal democratic ideals. He has combined the desire for attaining equality of recognition with the need for

securing greater economic prosperity. Fukuyama accepts the realization that some people have a natural tendency to pursue risk even if the international system has succeeded in removing elements of danger, such as, war or adverse social conditions. Therefore, the restless ambition of the Last Man will not necessarily be thwarted by peace and prosperity as liberal democracy will still be able to accommodate these desires through non-destructive pursuits, such as, sport, commercial enterprise and individual endeavour. But nevertheless Fukuyama does acknowledge that these activities may not be enough to satisfy every individual's desire for power and recognition (Fukuyama, 1992: 329). He therefore, concludes that democracy's commitment to freedom and equality has been successful in creating the conditions needed to support universal recognition, but the question still remains as to whether equality of recognition will adequately satisfy the desires of the Last Man?

8. Conclusion

8.1. The Triumph of Western Ideals

The final chapter of this study will draw together the central arguments explored in the previous chapters and provide a final summary of reflection. This reflection will begin by assessing the triumph of Western ideals since the end of the Cold War and the impact that this has had on culture and civilization. The end of the Cold War was met with a great sense of Wilsonian optimism that a future New World Order would respect liberal institutions and democracy and free trade would spread throughout the world. The end of the Cold War also marked a new age of global capitalism in which Western technology and consumerism would become a universal phenomenon. By the end of the twentieth-century liberal democracy had become widely regarded as the only legitimate form of government and any other regime was simply regarded as an imperfect approximation still developing towards the liberal ideal. Francis Fukuyama exemplified this view when he stated that liberal democracy is “the final form of human government” (1989: 4). The New World Order also presented the prospect of a more peaceful world promoting the idea of a liberal peace in which democracies do not fight each other. But the idea of a New World Order sustaining world peace and a respect for liberal institutions was perhaps too ambitious. The break-up of Yugoslavia (1991-9), the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-11) have replaced the initial optimism of a New World Order with the prospect of increased conflict in the twenty-first century. But the prospect of a New World Order has not entirely disappeared, instead it has evolved from the U.S. acting as a regional hegemon in a unipolar world, as in the invasion of Panama in 1989, towards a trans-governmental order of increased engagement with international organizations. Today the New World Order consists of increased levels of international cooperation between states in which governing institutions form networks of cooperation and exchange. So while the prospect of regional instability and conflict still remains the spread of liberal democratic ideals does appear to have triumphed over all other ideologies.

The triumph of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism has led to what Fukuyama calls the “Western *idea*”, in which the spread of globalization appears to be making the world more alike

with its materialist values of pleasure through consumption (1989: 3). Since the end of the Cold War the effects of global capitalism have penetrated other societies and challenged their systems of cultural beliefs. However, the liberal idea is only universal at a superficial level of basic rights and freedoms and aspirations of affluence, at a deeper level, Western ideals of constitutional democracy and the separation of church and state has not been greeted with much enthusiasm. But this is not to suggest that civilizations with more orthodox cultures, such as, Confucian, Hindu and Islamic culture will not embrace Western ideals in the future. Proponents of globalization (Friedman, 2005 and Legrain, 2002) argue that the spread of democracy and capitalism represents the spread of Western civilization and the benefits which this could bring. These achievements have spread throughout the world bringing vast amounts of wealth and improving living standards. Therefore, the spread of globalization is seen as the spread of Westernization and its achievements to other parts of the world. But opponents of globalization (Scruton, 2002 and Waltz, 2000) argue that this is nothing more than a continuation of Western imperialism. Western ideals of freedom and democracy and a commitment to free trade are nothing more than an attempt to dominate the global economy. Enterprise capitalism is driven by Western countries which have established the rules of business and trade to serve their own interests often at the expense of poorer nations (Sen, 2002: 19). So while globalization is unifying many parts of the world into a global village of common values it is also threatening the social order of other cultures causing a counter reaction of hostility and resentment.

In *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (1988), John Gray examines the social impact that world trade has had on society. The effects of globalization can clearly be observed in an archetypal capitalist country like the United States. While globalization has brought about a thriving economy and generated higher levels of employment, many new jobs today are low-paid temporary forms of employment lacking any sense of job security. There is also evidence of a growing polarization of incomes whereby the gap between rich and poor has widened (Stiglitz, 2006: 8). Furthermore, the doctrine of individualism has passed a point at which it serves to promote the benefits of competition and has now become a threat to social cohesion. Gray describes how in the United States the free market has resulted in a social breakdown of society. As entire communities

increasingly descend into disorder a policy of mass incarceration is used to maintain social control. Next to China and Russia, the United States uses imprisonment as a means of social control which exceeds that of any other developed nation (Gray, 1988: 1-7). European societies are following the same course with increased levels of economic inequality, social divisions and inner city violence and squalor. Figures released by the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) in April 2013 reveal that Europe is experiencing levels of unemployment not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930's with a total of 26 million EU citizens or 12% of the workforce unemployed (Lantier, 2013). China's embrace of the free market has also led to greater social polarization between rich and poor, with increased levels of unemployment and a steep decline in public services. These increased levels of social division may well continue to increase and become a future source of conflict and concern. But increased levels of social inequality on their own are unlikely to significantly affect the structure of global politics and alter the nature of the New World Order.

8.2. The Present New World Order

At present the U.S. enjoys an unrivalled position of power and superiority which promotes the assumption that the future will consist of a New World Order committed to freedom, democracy and enterprise capitalism. But winning the Cold War did not remove all existing challenges to American global power. The U.S. is now confronted by the economic power of competing BRIC economies, cultural antagonisms from the Muslim world and the threat of international terrorism. Furthermore, a unipolar world of global capitalism and mass consumption would create numerous difficulties for other civilizations wishing to attain their own sense of identity. In *Thinking About Civilizations* (2000), Cox clearly illustrates this point when stating "the apparent victory of this Western form of universalism with its core in America became a challenge to subordinated cultures and civilizations to affirm their individuality in the face of one hegemonic form of political, economic, and cultural power" (2000: 219). But while subordinate cultures are faced with the challenge of trying to assert themselves against a stronger global power, the U.S. has its own weakness with attempting to create a universal New World Order. Universal globalization presupposes that a single socio-economic, political construct can provide an all-encompassing system which can accommodate all other

civilizations. Furthermore, the ambition to become the master of the global economy effectively puts the U.S. on a collision course with all other civilizations which would prefer to retain their own identity. It also presupposes that a New World Order would succeed in becoming a permanent structure that would somehow be removed from the course of History.

The United States, Europe and Japan have attained a position of global influence in which a culture of mass consumption appears to represent a new geopolitical order. Today the effects of global capitalism represent a Western hegemony of transnational liberalism in which increased levels of global trade should lead to greater prosperity and economic interdependence between states. In *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995), Barber acknowledges how the spread of global capitalism has brought about a wealth of social improvement. “We need markets to generate productivity, work, and goods,” explains Barber in defending the benefits of liberal democracy, but we also need “culture and religion to assure solidarity, identity, and social cohesion” (2003: 300). Barber’s criticism of globalization and the effects of McWorld are not against the spread of global economics but against the ill-effects of unrestrained market forces in which politics, society and culture are undermined by the demands of an unregulated market (2003: 295). “The problem with Disney and McDonald is not aesthetics,” explains Barber, we are not concerned “with the expression of private taste or public judgement, but to prevent monopoly control over information” (2003: 297). Therefore, it is not capitalism per se but unrestrained capitalism and an insufficient system of regulation that endangers democracy. Democracy is not threatened by the prospect of greater global capitalism as capitalism tends to promote freedom and democracy not to undermine it. So while modernization has created a wealthier world, which may have led to social fragmentation and economic inequality, it at least intends to promote a greater sense of equality. It is for this reason that the spread of democracy is so important not just to facilitate a free market but also to ensure a sense of social justice.

The spread of liberal democratic reforms will not only effect governments and economies but will also have a marked impact on culture as well. Culture extends beyond ideology and can be seen as the building blocks of an individual’s identity within society. Taken in a broader sense culture extends to civilization where groups of people share a common identity comprising of history, institutions and

systems of belief. Civilizations are not fixed entities they operate as historical processes which move forward with the course of time. For example, European civilization has evolved over the centuries from an agrarian feudal aristocracy through an industrial revolution, leading to the rise and fall of colonial empires and culminating in the creation of supranational union of political and economic cooperation. This ability to move forward presents the prospect of a variety of choices for future societies. This variety of choice can be described as being “collective” in so far as that the vision of a future society could well evolve over time through civil societies sharing a common understanding as to what the nature of the world should be. This could present the possibility of a New World Order sharing one universal vision. But as Cox explains, “it is conceivable but unlikely that one single vision could emerge common to all people. More likely there will be several collective visions” (2000: 229). This in effect would be to create a multi-civilizational order held together in universal confederation all respecting a common framework of law. But there is also the prospect that civilizations as we currently understand them may end over the course of time.

8.3. The End of Civilizations

In *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996), Huntington has a far more pessimistic view of the New World Order and argues that one should not expect the future to be a peaceful coexistence among states but a conflict between civilizations. From this perspective the hope of ending conflict appears to be unachievable and goes against the course of human history. Huntington’s argument relies upon the idea of an evolution of global politics after the Cold War. Whereas the Cold War consisted of an ideological conflict between superpowers, the twenty-first century will be structured around a clash of civilizations emerging between five different cultural traditions. Therefore, cultural identity will become the central force in determining the future of global politics. Huntington argues that liberal democracy will not result in a universal order of economic interdependence as the effects of globalization are more likely to provoke a cultural backlash against a perceived threat of Western imperialism. Furthermore, the interactions between civilizations are more likely to be characterized by confrontation than cooperation. It is from this perspective that Huntington states “the next world war, if there is to be one, will be a war between civilizations” (1993b: 39).

Critics have disputed Huntington's claims by emphasizing various conceptual and empirical problems and the difficulty of using civilization and culture as a basis of conflict. Mahdavi and Knight (2007) have argued that Huntington has merely created a new set of enemies now that the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to the West. One central problem is that Huntington tends to view civilizations as opposing adversaries, arguing that the various causes of conflict are rooted in culture and civilization, which presents a problematic basis of argument as it disregards the extent to which civilizations have had meaningful interactions and exchange. While Huntington provides a wealth of empirical evidence to argue his case, his arguments merely justify his own claims and do not acknowledge the complex nature of civilization and the sources of conflict. Furthermore, his treatment of culture is regarded as being too brief and the general conclusions are pessimistic. But the main criticism against Huntington's clash of civilizations has come from his lack of recognition as to the effects that global economics has had on culture. Huntington does not appear to acknowledge the extent to which traditional cultures are being transformed and hostilities nullified by the impact of globalization. He dismisses the extent to which global capitalism has impacted upon the world creating a greater sense of interdependence and a universal consumer culture (Barber, 2003: 299-300). If the unifying effects of globalization should continue for an extended period of time civilizations as we currently understand them may very well end. While civilizations will not necessarily disappear as geographical and cultural entities they may simply exist as benign entities being incapable of influencing the course of global events. Any "clash" that may occur between states with differing cultures and civilizations will increasingly be resolved through diplomatic initiatives and respect for international laws.

Huntington's apocalyptic vision of a future clash of civilizations provokes a strong emotional reaction. But are these emotive terms really feasible to the study of international relations and to one's conception of one's self? In *Thinking about Civilizations* (2000), Cox makes the obvious point that "most people do not think of themselves in the course of a normal day's activities as belonging to a civilization" (2000: 217). Generally speaking the term civilization does not form a basic conception of one's self, unlike gender, age, race or religion, civilization is not at the forefront of our sense of

identity. The term civilization does not immediately create a sense of unity with a group of people who inhabit a particular area of the globe. Nor does it immediately identify another group of people as being a threat to one's existence and way of life. The term civilization exists at a subconscious level of awareness which seldom forms a basis of aggression against another group of people. Huntington describes a civilization as being "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species" (1993: 24). On a purely superficial level people do identify with a common culture whose traditions and practices have become accepted over the course of time. But people's conception of cultural identity is usually limited to immediate concerns, such as, race, religion and nationality. This identity is contained within a relatively small geographic sphere which may extend beyond a nation state so as to include a continent but it seldom extends to an entire civilization. At a practical level civilization forms our understanding of the world and shapes our perception of reality. As our perception of reality can vary from one person to the next so our understanding of civilization can also vary. A civilization may be perceived in an entirely different way from one group of people to the next and as a result of these differences people and civilizations cannot simply be separated by geography.

8.4. The Remaking of the Last Man

Fukuyama's conception of History has some sense of a concluding end and relies heavily on a teleological conception of historical events. But if History has a sense of *telos* this would mean that History would move in a discernable direction being linear and evolutionary in nature. This would mean that Historical changes could be observed in various stages of development and History would move towards some definable conclusion in time (Derrida, 1969: 41-42). Both Fukuyama (1992b) and Hegel (1817) share a teleological view of History in so far as they both believe that there is an underlying purpose to the course of History which makes it progressive in nature. In supporting this hypothesis Halliday states, "Fukuyama is not saying that progress is without costs, nor is he sure that it is destined to continue, but he does assert that humanity as a whole has made progress of a significant kind over recent centuries," and short of some global catastrophe like nuclear disaster this progress is set to continue (1992: 91). This sense of progression implies that History is driven by a sense of

advancement and improvement which is beneficial to mankind. As the advancement of History moves towards a decisive conclusion there is a point of culmination where a higher level of society can be achieved. It is from this universal homogenous state that the Last Man will emerge living in a world of peace and prosperity.

Fukuyama's Last Man emerges from the tension of two opposing concepts, namely: universal democracy and the struggle for individual recognition. This is coupled with the idea that History will reach a decisive point of conclusion (McCarney, 1992: 39-40). But while this point of conclusion marks the end of History it does not result in the end of ideology or the advancement of mankind. Instead it is a dynamic continuous process, an apex which once reached continues to advance but does not fundamentally change its nature. Fukuyama's initial depiction of the Last Man is bleak, lacking any real sense of motivation from which to develop. But on closer inspection the Last Man will be exposed to the competitive forces of the free-market compelling him to adapt to the challenges of his environment and preventing social stagnation. Fukuyama maintains that liberal democracy provides the ultimate form of government as it is capable of satisfying the fundamental human desire for freedom and recognition. The triumph of liberalism has ended the dialectical struggle for individual freedom and effectively brings History to an end. He argues that only in secular liberal democracy operating a free market economy can the individual be free to pursue his desires within a society that recognises and respects individual freedom and equality. From this perspective liberal democracy provides its citizens with a framework for mutual and equal recognition (Marks, 1997: 453).

Fukuyama recognises that some individuals will want to attain a higher sense of status and recognition providing the motivation for future progress and development. He acknowledges how the qualities of an entrepreneurial society can provide an outlet for human endeavour through the sphere of economic activity. In the final chapter of *The End of History* (1992), Fukuyama explains how entrepreneurs like Donald Trump (property developer) have become examples of Nietzsche's *supermen* in a competitive world of free-market enterprise (1992: 328). Through these examples Fukuyama goes on to explain how *thymos* (spiritedness) and *megalo-thymia* (recognition of superiority) cannot simply be explained in terms of satisfying basic needs of consumption, but rather the economic

sphere provides a stable outlet through which the *superman* can pursue his ambitions in a non-destructive manner. In such an environment labour is no longer restricted to basic survival and people begin to seek non-material goals like status and recognition. Therefore, democratic capitalism provides a link between the practical benefits of economic development and the personal satisfaction of society and the individual. Furthermore, many of today's entrepreneurs like Bill Gates of Microsoft, Steve Jobs (Apple Inc.), Larry Page and Sergey Brin (Google Inc.), have restricted their energies to the world of business and innovation and refrain from entering into politics or the military where the pursuit of megalothymia could result in disrupting the global order. While these entrepreneurs have attained great levels of wealth and influence, and their innovations have changed our world in ways we could not imagine, these endeavours have not extended to destructive acts of conquest which could threaten regional or global stability. Instead individual status and recognition can be achieved within a society that recognizes universal freedom and equality without incurring the ill-effects of social stagnation or the end of ideology which would undermine the advancement of mankind.

When reflecting upon the arguments presented in this study and the examination of geopolitical developments which have taken place since the end of the Cold War, the arguments presented in Fukuyama's article *The End of History?* (1989) appear to be as defensible today as they did over twenty years ago. For despite the impact of events like 9/11, leading to military interventions in Afghanistan (2001- present) and Iraq (2003-2011) and the increased threat posed by international terrorism, Huntington's apocalyptic vision as presented in *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993) does not appear to have materialized. Instead the spread of globalization in the twenty-first century has increasingly led to the spread of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism and the benefits of a liberal capitalist peace. As enterprise capitalism and free trade continues to spread around the world a more unified culture of mass consumption is likely to emerge. This unified culture could lead to a more homogenous world in which traditional customs and beliefs could be replaced by the universal aspirations of Western ideals. Under these circumstances civilizations may become more unified and cultural traditions may cease to be of any relevance to the customs and identity of future societies. It is from this perspective that Hegel's teleological conception of History with its evolutionary sense of

destiny begins to present a possible projection of human development. If this evolutionary projection where to maintain its course for a sustainable period of time humanity itself may witness a transformation resulting in the End of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Last Man.

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Appendix A
Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union, 1700-1982

Date/Country	Date/Country	Date/Country
18th Century	1900-1945 (cont.)	1945-1982 (cont.)
Swiss Cantons (a)	Italy, -1922	Costa Rica, -1948; 1953-
French Republic, 1790-1795	Belgium, -1940	Iceland, 1944-
United States, 1776- (a)	Netherlands, -1940	France, 1945-
Total = 3	Argentina, -1943	Denmark, 1945
1800-1850	France, -1940	Norway, 1945
Swiss Confederation	Chile, -1924, 1932-	Austria, 1945-
United States	Australia, 1901	Brazil, 1945-1954; 1955-1964
France, 1830-1849	Norway, 1905-1940	Belgium, 1946-
Belgium, 1830-	New Zealand, 1907-	Luxemburg, 1946-
Great Britain, 1832-	Colombia, 1910-1949	Netherlands, 1946-
Netherlands, 1848-	Denmark, 1914-1940	Italy, 1946-
Piedmont, 1848-	Poland, 1917-1935	Philippines, 1946-1972
Denmark, 1849-	Latvia, 1922-1934	India, 1947-1975, 1977-
Total = 8	Germany, 1918-1932	Sri Lanka, 1948-1961; 1963-
1850-1900	Austria, 1918-1934	1971; 1978-
Switzerland	Estonia, 1919-1934	Ecuador, 1948-1963; 1979-
United States	Finland, 1919-	Israel, 1949-
Belgium	Uruguay, 1919-	West Germany, 1949-
Great Britain	Costa Rica, 1919-	Greece, 1950-1967; 1975-
Netherlands	Czechoslovakia, 1920-1939	Peru, 1950-1962; 1963-1968; 1980-
Piedmont, -1861	Ireland, 1920-	El Salvador, 1950-1961
Italy, 1861-	Mexico, 1928-	Turkey, 1950-1960; 1966-1971
Denmark, -1866	Lebanon, 1944-	Japan, 1951-
Sweden, 1864-	Total = 29	Bolivia, 1956-1969; 1982-
Greece, 1864-	1945-1982	Colombia, 1958-
Canada, 1867-	Switzerland	Venezuela, 1959-
France, 1871-	United States	Nigeria, 1961-1964; 1979-1984
Argentina, 1880-	Great Britain	Jamaica, 1962-
Chile, 1891-	Sweden	Trinidad and Tobago, 1962-
Total = 13	Canada	Senegal, 1963-
1900-1945	Australia	Malaysia, 1963-
Switzerland	New Zealand	Botswana, 1966-
United States	Finland	Singapore, 1965-
Great Britain	Ireland	Portugal, 1976-
Sweden	Mexico	Spain, 1978-
Canada	Uruguay, -1973	Dominican Republic, 1978-
Greece, -1911; 1928-1936	Chile, -1973	Honduras, 1981-
	Lebanon, -1975	Papua New Guinea, 1982-
		Total = 50

Note: Doyle's list of Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union observes Kant's criteria of independent states practicing democracy, free-trade and the rule of law. Doyle's study also accounts for the level of male and female suffrage and the extent to which the state has sovereignty over military and foreign affairs. (a) Refers to domestic variations within the regime, i.e. Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only North of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865 when the U.S. became liberal throughout. Doyle also argues that this list of liberal regimes is more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies (Powell, 1982, p. 5). Sources for this data have been compiled from Banks and Overstreet (1983), Gastil (1985), The Europa Yearbook, 1985 (1985), Langer (1968), U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1980), and U.S. Department of State (1981).

Source: Doyle, M. (1986). "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 80, p 1164-5

Appendix B

World Trade Organization

(Information compiled from the WTO report on International Trade Statistics for 2010 and 2012)

World merchandise exports by region and selected economy

Date	1953	1963	1973	1983	1993	2003	2009	2011
World Value (Billion Dollars)	84	157	579	1838	3676	7377	12178	17816
World Share (Percentage)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
North America	24.8	19.9	17.3	16.8	18.0	15.8	13.2	12.8
United States	18.8	14.9	12.3	11.2	12.6	9.8	8.7	8.3
Canada	5.2	4.3	4.6	4.2	3.9	3.7	2.6	2.5
Mexico	0.7	0.6	0.4	1.4	1.4	2.2	1.9	2.0
South and Central America	9.7	6.4	4.3	4.4	3.0	3.0	3.8	4.2
Brazil	1.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.4
Argentina	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Europe	39.4	47.8	50.9	43.5	45.4	45.9	41.2	37.1
Germany (a)	5.3	9.3	11.7	9.2	10.3	10.2	9.2	8.3
France	4.8	5.2	6.3	5.2	6.0	5.3	4.0	3.3
Italy	1.8	3.2	3.8	4.0	4.6	4.1	3.3	2.9
United Kingdom	9.0	7.8	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.1	2.9	2.7
Commonwealth States (CIS) (b)	-	-	-	-	1.5	2.6	3.7	4.4
Africa	6.5	5.6	4.8	4.5	2.5	2.4	3.2	3.3
South Africa (c)	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5
Middle East	2.7	3.2	4.1	6.8	3.5	4.1	5.7	7.0
Asia	13.4	12.5	14.9	19.1	26.1	26.2	29.4	31.1
China	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.2	2.5	5.9	9.9	10.7
Japan	1.5	3.5	6.4	8.0	9.9	6.4	4.8	4.6
India	1.3	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.7
Australia and New Zealand	3.2	2.4	2.1	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.7
Six East Asian Traders	3.0	2.5	3.6	5.8	9.7	9.6	9.6	9.8
Memorandum item:								
EU (d)	-	24.5	37.0	31.3	37.4	42.3	37.7	33.9
USSR, Former	3.5	4.6	3.7	5.0	-	-	-	-
GATT/WTO Members (e)	69.6	75.0	84.1	78.4	89.3	94.3	94.5	93.8

Note: Between 1973 and 1983 and between 1993 and 2003 export shares were significantly influenced by oil price developments.

a. Figures refer to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1953 through 1983.

CIS refers to the Commonwealth of Independent states.

b. Figures are significantly affected by including the mutual trade flows of the Baltic States and the CIS between 1993 and 2003.

c. Beginning with 1998, figures refer to South Africa only and no longer to the Southern African Customs Union. (Billion dollars and percentage)

d. Figures refer to the EEC(6) in 1963, EC(9) in 1973, EC(10) in 1983, EU(12) in 1993, EU(25) in 2003 and EU(27) in 2009.

e. Membership as of the year stated.

Data obtained from the WTO International Trade Statistics 2010 and 2012 www.wto.org/statistics

Appendix C

World Trade Organization

(Information compiled from the WTO report on International Trade Statistics for 2010 and 2012)

World merchandise imports by region and selected economy,

Date	1953	1963	1973	1983	1993	2003	2009	2011
World Value (Billion dollars)	85	164	594	1882	3786	7695	12421	15077
World Share (Percentage)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
North America	20.5	16.1	17.2	18.5	21.4	22.4	17.5	17.1
United States	13.9	11.4	12.3	14.3	15.9	16.9	12.9	12.5
Canada	5.5	3.9	4.2	3.4	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.6
Mexico	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.8	2.3	1.9	2.0
South and Central America	8.3	6.0	4.4	3.8	3.3	2.5	3.6	4.0
Brazil	1.6	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.3
Argentina	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4
Europe	43.7	52.0	53.3	44.2	44.6	45.0	41.6	38.1
Germany (a)	4.5	8.0	9.2	8.1	9.0	7.9	7.6	6.9
France	4.9	5.3	6.4	5.6	5.7	5.2	4.5	4.0
United Kingdom	11.0	8.5	6.5	5.3	5.5	5.2	3.9	3.5
Italy	2.8	4.6	4.7	4.2	3.9	3.9	3.3	3.1
Commonwealth States (CIS) (b)	-	-	-	-	1.2	1.7	2.7	3.0
Africa	7.0	5.2	3.9	4.6	2.6	2.2	3.3	3.1
South Africa (c)	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7
Middle East	2.0	2.2	2.6	6.2	3.3	2.8	4.0	3.8
Asia	15.1	14.1	14.9	18.5	23.7	23.5	27.4	30.9
China	1.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	2.7	5.4	8.1	9.7
Japan	2.8	4.1	6.5	6.7	6.4	5.0	4.4	4.7
India	1.4	1.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.9	2.0	2.6
Australia and New Zealand	2.3	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6
Six East Asian Traders	3.7	3.1	3.7	6.1	10.3	8.6	8.8	9.5
Memorandum item:								
EU (d)	-	25.5	37.1	31.4	35.3	41.3	37.4	34.6
USSR, Former	3.3	4.3	3.6	4.3	-	-	-	-
GATT/WTO Members (e)	66.9	75.3	85.5	81.3	89.7	94.8	95.7	95.9

Note: Between 1973 and 1983 and between 1993 and 2003 import shares were significantly influenced by oil price developments.

a. Figures refer to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1953 through 1983.

CIS refers to the Commonwealth of Independent states.

b. Figures are significantly affected by including the mutual trade flows of the Baltic States and the CIS between 1993 and 2003.

c. Beginning with 1998, figures refer to South Africa only and no longer to the Southern African Customs Union.

d. Figures refer to the EEC(6) in 1963, EC(9) in 1973, EC(10) in 1983, EU(12) in 1993, EU(25) in 2003 and EU(27) in 2009.

e. Membership as of the year stated.

Data obtained from the WTO International Trade Statistics 2010 and 2012 www.wto.org/statistics